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SUMMARY 
 
This thesis is a reading of five Don DeLillo novels in relation to the later philosophy of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, beginning with Falling Man, and working backwards to The 
Names. It is an attempt to think about the philosophical aspects of DeLillo’s work; in 
particular, the various ways in which it is engaged with the possibility of metaphysics 
and its relation to the ordinary. It examines the ambiguous status of metaphysics, and 
the nature of transcendence and the ordinary in his fiction, arguing that they form a 
dialectical relation, which guides, structures and informs many of the pressing spiritual, 
existential, aesthetic, ontological and epistemological concerns of his writing. This 
dialectic is illuminated by a parallel dialectic at work in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. 
Wittgenstein’s thought is useful for a number of reasons: it is a method or style of 
seeing rather than a systematic, substantive theory; though critical of metaphysics it is 
profoundly engaged with the inescapability of the metaphysical impulse, and the way 
metaphysical problems seem embedded in everyday language; and it is committed to 
the ordinary, but not in any reductive sense – it is not a defence of common sense or 
conventional beliefs. Understanding DeLillo’s engagement with metaphysics as part of 
a dialectic with the ordinary, and viewing it through an encounter with Wittgenstein, 
will prevent recourse to traditionalist conceptions of language and meaning while at the 
same time resisting and critiquing the postmodern scepticism frequently invoked in 
DeLillo criticism. The thesis consists of a series of comparative readings that aim to 
further our understanding of DeLillo’s novels and Wittgenstein’s philosophy; readings 
centred around a set of closely related concerns that reflect different aspects of the 
dialectic between the ordinary and the transcendent: the paradox of the ordinary; the 
limits of language; looking at the overlooked; spiritual yearning; and the logical 
sublime.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
We hang like clouds between heaven and earth,  
     Between something and nothing.  
Charles Wright
1
 
 
PART 1 
 
 
I. AIMS AND METHOD  
 
This thesis examines the ambiguous status of metaphysics and, in particular, the nature 
of and relation between the transcendent and the ordinary, in the novels of Don DeLillo 
through a comparative reading with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. It attempts 
to show that there is a dialectical tension between the transcendent and the ordinary that 
guides, structures and informs many of the pressing spiritual, existential, aesthetic, 
ontological and epistemological concerns of DeLillo’s novels, which can be illuminated 
by exploring a parallel tension at work in Wittgenstein’s later thought. It is an attempt to 
provide a mode of thinking about significant, though somewhat overlooked, aspects of 
DeLillo’s work, at the same time as offering a way out of the bind of arguing either for 
or against a postmodern DeLillo. It seeks to provide an alternative approach that 
challenges not only postmodern readings but also recourse to the kind of traditional, 
foundationalist or essentialist modes of reading typically found in the case against 
postmodern readings of DeLillo. The advantages of this approach are not only to 
illuminate apparently problematic yet vital elements of DeLillo’s novels, but to 
illustrate the value of a Wittgensteinian approach to literature and literary theory more 
generally. 
 
There are, broadly speaking, two ways in which Wittgenstein’s work functions in this 
thesis. Firstly, it provides a means of illuminating the tension between the transcendent 
                                                 
1
 Black Zodiac, New York: Noonday, 1997, p. 24 
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and the ordinary in DeLillo’s novels, and secondly, it helps us move beyond the 
contested terrain of most DeLillo criticism, to challenge both metaphysical and 
postmodern readings of his work and provide an alternative approach that avoids 
slipping into orthodoxies, whether romantic, poststructuralist or humanist. I argue that 
by understanding DeLillo’s engagement with metaphysics as part of a dialectic we can 
avoid recourse to traditionalist, logocentric conceptions of language and meaning while 
at the same time resisting and critiquing the postmodern scepticism frequently invoked 
in DeLillo criticism.  
 
On initial reflection, DeLillo and Wittgenstein may seem an unlikely pairing. DeLillo is 
a living American writer whose work has consistently addressed some of the most 
significant concerns of contemporary culture. It has been informed by, and engaged 
with, many of the radical social, political and cultural changes associated with 
postmodernism and, in particular, with the impact of modern electronic media, capitalist 
consumerism, rampant commodification and the rise of international terrorism. 
Wittgenstein’s work, on the other hand, features negligible engagement with social, 
political or cultural concerns. Indeed, Wittgenstein was notoriously disengaged from the 
spirit and culture of his times.
2
 His work, explicitly at least, is mostly concerned with 
the philosophy of logic, language, and the mind, and is considered to belong to the 
tradition of analytic philosophy. He wrote very little on literary or aesthetic matters, and 
was largely conservative in his aesthetic tastes.  
 
Despite these ostensible differences, there are many advantages to reading DeLillo with 
Wittgenstein. Both are profoundly engaged with thinking about language, with its 
richness and mystery, ambiguity and wonder, as well as its ability to lead us into 
metaphysical temptation and yet provide clarifying illumination. Both repeatedly invoke 
notions of vision and clarity, and the importance of changing the way we see things. 
Both explore the human urge to metaphysics, to transcend human finitude, and the 
cultural and individual consequences of this apparent need for metaphysical meaning. 
Both frequently use colloquial expressions to demystify excessive theorizing, combine 
high seriousness with irony and comedy, and both convey a significant sense of spiritual 
                                                 
2
 For example, Marjorie Perloff notes how he ‘refused to listen to Mahler and Schonberg and paid little 
attention to the great art movements of his day’, ‘From Theory to Grammar: Wittgenstein and the 
Aesthetic of the Ordinary’, New Literary History, 25, 1994, p. 909 
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fervour and struggle in their writing. And neither attempt to establish any kind of 
privileged, external standpoint in relation to that which they subject to critique. Both 
compel readers of their work to reflect on their own textual practice and pursuit of 
meaning. They use humour, irony, textual subversion, and non-linear, fragmentary 
structures to critically engage and create active readers. And both are, in David 
Cowart’s words, ‘relatively easy to read but not so easy to sort out’.3 ‘There is a studied 
indirection’4 in DeLillo’s work, claims Cowart, and a similar kind of writing around his 
subjects can be felt in Wittgenstein.  
 
Though DeLillo makes reference to Wittgenstein in an early novel, End Zone, and 
speaks favourably of his work in an early interview – ‘I like the way he uses the 
language’, says DeLillo, ‘even in translation, it is very evocative’5 – I do not claim nor 
wish to claim that there is necessarily any sense in which DeLillo is influenced by, or 
seriously engaging with, Wittgenstein’s work (though neither do I wish to deny this). 
The aim of this thesis is not to trace DeLillo’s thinking to any particular philosophical 
sources. Neither is it to apply Wittgenstein’s philosophy to an interpretation of 
DeLillo’s novels, for as we will see, one of the significant aspects of a Wittgensteinian 
approach is that it brings such a model of reading into question; his later philosophy 
questions basic assumptions about the nature of interpretation. The intention, rather, is 
to establish a form of dialogue between DeLillo and Wittgenstein, to draw parallels and 
analogies, to establish connections and points of contact. I hope that the reading of 
DeLillo will illuminate our understanding of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, especially the 
nature and significance of its literary qualities, at the same time as showing that 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy can enrich our understanding of DeLillo. Furthermore, I hope 
that reading Wittgenstein’s work in relation to DeLillo will illuminate its value for 
literary and critical thinking, more generally, and at the same time provide a different 
way of thinking about his philosophy. 
 
To date there has been negligible sustained or in-depth work on possible connections 
between Wittgenstein and DeLillo. Wittgenstein is, however, alluded to a number of 
times in DeLillo criticism and his importance for understanding DeLillo’s work has 
                                                 
3
 Cowart, Don DeLillo: The Physics of Language, Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2002, p. 8 
4
 Cowart, Physics of Language, p. 9 
5
 DeLillo, cited in Cowart, Physics of Language, p. 243, ft. 2 
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been suggested by both Cowart and Peter Boxall. Cowart claims that ‘one can with 
considerable profit read [DeLillo’s] books against the insights afforded by a select 
group of philosophers, especially Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Benjamin’, 6  while 
Boxall writes that ‘DeLillo’s writing strikes a rich resonance with [...] Wittgenstein’.7 
Both Cowart and Boxall produce illuminating readings of this resonance but are mostly 
concerned with the relation between early Wittgenstein and early DeLillo, and in 
particular Wittgenstein’s famous remark that ‘what we cannot speak about we must pass 
over in silence’ (TLP 7). Cowart’s reading examines the significance of DeLillo’s 
reference to Wittgenstein in his early novel End Zone, the way the protagonist is 
engaged with Wittgenstein’s early ideas on the limitations of language and mystical 
claims concerning ‘the realities beyond language that silence harbours’. 8  Boxall 
examines Wittgenstein’s relevance to our understanding of End Zone, how the novel is 
engaged with a Wittgensteinian ‘poetic silence’ outside of language,9 but also examines 
how his thought is central to the concerns of Ratner’s Star. He suggests that the 
character Edna Lown embodies the contradiction between early and late Wittgenstein: 
that despite her belief that everything can be expressed, she remains ‘in the thrall of the 
Tractatus’ and the lure of the inexpressible. ‘Wittgenstein’s famous paean to silence’, 
he claims, seems to ‘offer the guiding spirit to her notes’.10   
 
The only instance of a substantive piece of work on later Wittgenstein and DeLillo 
remains Stuart Johnson’s ‘Extraphilosophical Instigations in Don DeLillo’s Running 
Dog’. The essay explores the consequences of Wittgenstein’s anti-foundationalism, that 
is, his argument against the appeal to general principles for a grounding of human 
understanding and knowledge. Johnson’s focus is DeLillo’s early novel Running Dog 
and the way it examines the question: ‘If we cannot transcend our immediate 
determining and defining contexts, what is left to us that is importantly human?’ 
Johnson argues that, ‘DeLillo is a student of the limitations of what can be thought or 
coherently conceived, and his novels imagine the severe implications of these 
limitations for our vision of the condition of, and conditions on, human life’.11  Though 
                                                 
6
 Cowart, Physics of Language, p. 11 
7
 Boxall, Don DeLillo: The Possibility of Fiction, London: Routledge, 2006, p. 15 
8
 Cowart, Physics of Language, p. 28 
9
 Boxall, The Possibility of Fiction, p. 42 
10
 Boxall, The Possibility of Fiction, p. 67 
11
 Stuart Johnson, ‘Extraphilosophical Instigations in Don DeLillo’s “Running Dog”’, Contemporary 
Literature, 26, 1985,  pp. 75, 74 
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the essay is illuminating and a compelling reading of the novel it contains very little 
engagement with Wittgenstein’s work, featuring only a limited number of citations and 
a very brief account of Wittgenstein’s thinking on the limits of understanding.  
 
The main focus of my comparison between DeLillo and Wittgenstein, and the main 
argument of the thesis, is an exploration of the relation between metaphysics and the 
ordinary in their work. This will involve demonstrating a number of things: that 
DeLillo’s novels are, in various ways, philosophical or at least, raise philosophical 
questions, particularly in the way in which they are engaged with metaphysics and the 
possibility of transcendence; that this engagement is not only deeply ambiguous, but is 
connected, and needs to be seen in relation, to an equally ambiguous engagement with 
the ordinary; and that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy can illuminate these features of 
DeLillo’s work, since it too is engaged in various comparable ways with a dialectic 
between metaphysics and the ordinary.  
 
In order to show how Wittgenstein’s philosophy can illuminate these aspects of 
DeLillo’s novels (and in the process, how DeLillo’s novels can illuminate aspects of 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy) I will illustrate the way and sense in which this engagement 
with metaphysics and the ordinary is manifested in their work, and how and why they 
are engaged with them. This will involve examining not only the nature of their 
engagement with both metaphysics and the ordinary but, more importantly, with the 
relation between metaphysics and the ordinary, how it functions and its significance, in 
particular its significance for questions of, and our understanding of, language, 
perception and meaning.  
 
Though the thesis examines different aspects of the relation between metaphysics and 
the ordinary – the aesthetic paradox of the ordinary, the limits of language, the hidden 
and the importance of clear vision, spiritual yearning, and the logical sublime – there are 
a number of unifying threads. The issues are examined in the context of particular 
examples using close textual reading of the different texts, but themes are returned to 
again and again, approached from different angles. These themes – the familiar and 
hidden, exile and home, looking at the overlooked, loss and longing – are all closely 
related, they interlink or ‘criss-cross’ (PI p. vii). The thesis repeatedly returns to these 
themes partly in order to show the way in which DeLillo’s work is engaged with a 
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recurring set of concerns, how his novels consistently return to and rework certain 
philosophical and aesthetic ideas. However, this approach is mostly a result of the 
nature of Wittgenstein’s work, which also repeatedly returns to core subjects. In 
describing his method he notes how ‘the same or almost the same points were always 
being approached from fresh directions’ (PI p. vii). As we will examine in detail in the 
second part of this introduction, Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is highly anti-
systematic, anti-schematic and critical of theorizing, and thus puts a strong emphasis on 
‘seeing connections’, noticing aspects, illuminating concepts and problems, and 
drawing comparisons and analogies. He does not attempt to define, explain or uncover 
the essence of things but suggests we look for ‘family resemblances’. More importantly, 
Wittgenstein’s thought is enacted on a formal level. Subsequently, in order to develop a 
Wittgensteinian reading it is necessary to adopt key features of his method. This is not 
to say that I will adopt a mock Wittgensteinian structure or form simply that the focus 
will be less on explaining and theorizing than on illustrating and illuminating aspects of 
DeLillo’s work.  
 
 
II. STRUCTURE 
 
Following an extended introduction to the themes and approaches of my argument, the 
main body of the thesis consists of individual readings of five DeLillo novels: Falling 
Man, The Body Artist, Underworld, Libra and The Names. All five novels are examined 
in relation to aspects of Wittgenstein’s thought and method. I have chosen to 
concentrate on these particular novels for a number of reasons. To date, DeLillo is the 
author of fourteen novels, as well as three plays and numerous short stories. In order to 
produce detailed, close readings of the novels it was necessary to be selective. However, 
it was important to cover a broad span of DeLillo’s work in order to trace the 
continuities in his work and also address the apparent shift that occurred after 
Underworld. The five novels were chosen because they illustrate a number of important 
thematic, conceptual and aesthetic links between different periods of DeLillo’s work in 
relation to the temptations of metaphysics and the significance of the ordinary.  
 
There are several compelling reasons for venturing no earlier into DeLillo’s oeuvre than 
The Names and for concentrating on more recent work. The Names is widely considered 
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to mark an important shift in DeLillo’s work. Hugh Ruppersburg and Tim Engels, for 
example, write: ‘the general critical consensus regarding The Names, is that it represents 
an advance to a higher level of authorial maturity.’12 And DeLillo himself concurs with 
this idea when he says in an interview that The Names ‘marks the beginning of a new 
dedication’. 13  Furthermore, The Names has been a somewhat neglected text, 
overshadowed by the prodigious interest in White Noise – Anne Longmuir notes that, 
‘of the novels that Don DeLillo wrote in the 1980s, The Names has received the least 
attention’.14  
 
There has been a considerable amount of critical work addressing DeLillo’s early 
career, most of the major books on DeLillo examine his early novels. To date, however, 
there has been little work on his more recent output, which may be simply a question of 
time, but may also be because it seems less engaged with the broader social, cultural 
and theoretical concerns on which his critical reputation is largely based. Indeed, such is 
its difference in both style and content from earlier work that his post-Underworld work 
can be seen to indicate another significant shift in DeLillo’s writing. Both The Body 
Artist and Falling Man, the novels considered in the thesis, are notable for their pared 
down prose; slim, elliptical plots; fragmented, discordant narratives; and close focus on 
the minutiae of daily life.  
 
The thesis will not only attempt to examine the nature and significance of these novels 
in themselves, but also reassess DeLillo’s earlier novels in light these readings. The 
thesis is structured to reflect this by reading his oeuvre retrospectively, and asking to 
what extent a retrospective reading of DeLillo’s work alters the way we perceive it? I 
intend to show that the elements foregrounded in his more recent novels are not 
radically new, but part of a continued investigation into his most central concerns.  
 
The first chapter is on Falling Man as it is the most recent of DeLillo’s novels with 
which I had sufficient time to critically engage. By looking closely at the role still life 
painting plays in Falling Man and by drawing parallels with Wittgenstein’s conception 
                                                 
12
 Ruppersburg and Engels, ‘Introduction’, Critical Essays on Don DeLillo, Hugh Ruppersberg & Tim 
Engels (eds.), New York: G. K. Hall & Co., 2000, p. 18 
13
 DeLillo, cited in Cowart, Physics of Language, p. 6 
14
 Anne Longmuir, ‘The Language of History: Don DeLillo's The Names and the Iranian Hostage Crisis’, 
Critique, 46, 2005, p. 105 
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of the ordinary, the chapter explores the paradoxical nature of DeLillo’s aesthetic and 
philosophical engagement with the ordinary. It looks at aesthetic issues as a way of 
examining why a novel concerned with the terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre in 
2001 – a public, dramatic event of enormous social and political significance – would 
turn away from the social and political and retreat to the domestic. I examine the 
possible meaning and significance of this retreat.  
 
Chapter Two draws a series of comparisons between the Philosophical Investigations 
and The Body Artist, in order to explore their shared engagement with an insistence 
upon, and yet recognition of the temptation to transcend or doubt, the ordinary. In 
particular, I will show how the treatment of the protagonist’s grief can be read as 
analogous with Wittgenstein’s struggle against scepticism and metaphysics. The Body 
Artist is important to the thesis not only because it marks the beginning of a significant 
shift in DeLillo’s writing, but because of its significant philosophical engagement with 
language.  
 
The third chapter concerns Underworld and focuses on the paradoxical status of the 
hidden in DeLillo and Wittgenstein. Underworld is pivotal for not only is it DeLillo’s 
most comprehensive and critically successful novel, it marks an important change of 
direction in his oeuvre. Underworld, despite or because of its completeness, its reach 
and scope, marks a transition between work more explicitly engaged with the social and 
political, with a broad sweep of concerns, and work engaged with the private and 
domestic.  
 
The final two chapters look further back through DeLillo’s oeuvre to Libra and The 
Names, both published in the 1980s. Though not without his trademark flashes of dry 
humour and ironic regard both novels reveal a commitment to the exploration of 
complex ideas concerning solipsism, metaphysical striving and the tension between 
transcendence and the ordinary. By reading both novels in the light of DeLillo’s later 
fiction I challenge the dominant postmodern reception of his earlier work.  
 
The Libra chapter explores the novel’s paradoxical depiction of religious striving and 
draws a parallel between DeLillo’s ironic and ambiguous portrayal of the protagonists’ 
metaphysical outlook and his critique of the metaphysics underlying conspiracy theory. 
11 
 
  
The reading focuses on solipsism and the ambiguity of the way both DeLillo and 
Wittgenstein engage with  religious ways of seeing. It examines Wittgenstein’s critique 
of the modern philosophy of the self-conscious individual – how he demolishes Platonic 
and Cartesian ideas of autonomy and the ‘inner’ – as a way of illuminating DeLillo’s 
treatment of Lee Harvey Oswald.  
 
The last chapter looks back not only to early DeLillo, but also to early Wittgenstein, 
arguing that the shift from Wittgenstein’s early approach to language to his later one can 
illuminate a similar shift that occurs in The Names. The chapter explores the relation 
between logic and language, and the attraction and dangers of the sublime, by looking at 
how the novel traces a spiritual quest for transcendent meaning that takes place in 
thinking about language: a journey towards the logical sublime which ends with a return 
to the ordinary, marked by the kind of transformation of vision that Wittgenstein calls 
for in his philosophy.  
 
 
PART 2 
 
I. THE TENSION BETWEEN METAPHYSICS AND THE ORDINARY IN 
DELILLO AND WITTGENSTEIN 
 
Given the Wittgensteinian approach adopted in the thesis, there will be no attempt to 
define or explain transcendence or the ordinary, rather I will attempt to illustrate the 
various ways in which they feature or function in both Wittgenstein’s and DeLillo’s 
work. In order to provide an initial sense and picture of how the tension between 
metaphysics and the ordinary is at work in DeLillo’s fiction, and the way in which it 
relates to Wittgenstein, this next section will examine a number of emblematic 
illustrations from both writers.  
 
In DeLillo’s 2005 play Love-Lies-Bleeding there is a conversation, an act of literary 
translation, which exemplifies a tension between metaphysics and the ordinary that can 
be felt throughout his work. The play concerns a land artist, Alex Macklin, who has 
suffered a stroke and is in a persistent vegetative state. During one of the play’s 
flashbacks to an earlier period when Alex was still active he is visited by his ex-wife, 
12 
 
  
Toinette, and they discuss his current project, an empty space inside a mountain in the 
desert, near where he lives. In response to Toinette’s question as to why he has left New 
York to live in the desert Alex cites an Italian poem, Mattina (morning), by the Italian 
poet, Ungaretti, though the author and title are not revealed in the play. Alex and Toni 
attempt to translate it:  
 
ALEX 
M’illumino d’immenso. I glow, I shine, I bathe myself in light. I turn luminous in 
this vast space. D’immenso. This vast space, this immensity. Fairly literal 
translation.  
 
TOINETTE 
Needs work. 
 
ALEX 
Okay, what? 
 
TOINETTE 
M’illumino d’immenso. I bathe myself. That’s not bad. But vast space, vast space. 
 
ALEX 
D’immenso. 
 
TOINETTE 
Do we want space in the physical sense? Or spiritual immensity? Something 
unnameable. 
 
ALEX 
Let’s not get too ambitious. We’ll keep it local. This space and this light.15  
 
 
The scene illustrates a vital feature of the nature of DeLillo’s engagement with the 
transcendent, revealing an attraction to it, but also a reservation, a sense of limits and 
limitations. At the very moment when profound, significant questions are posed 
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 DeLillo, Love-Lies-Bleeding, London: Picador, 2005, pp. 64-65 
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concerning the possibility of metaphysical meaning there is a jocular, modest return to 
the specific. Alex’s self-deprecating, colloquial rejoinder, with its sense of humility and 
emphasis on the particular, is typical of the way DeLillo draws back at the very moment 
he seems to be moving towards ‘something unnameable’; typical of the way he frames 
or locates moments or the idea of transcendence in concrete, specific situations.  
 
Throughout DeLillo’s work there exists a tension between this movement towards, and 
yearning for, ‘spiritual immensity’ and a return to the local or particular. This continual 
pull between an ineffable, mysterious ‘something else’16 and the material, ordinary, 
physical nature of things, manifests itself in numerous ways. We can see it in the image 
of the falling shirt, ‘arms waving like nothing in this life’, that bookends Falling Man 
(FM 246); in the ambiguous appearance of Esmeralda in Underworld – a vision or a 
play of light; in the totemic baseball in Underworld celebrated for its mysterious aura 
and ‘irreducible thingness’;17 in Axton’s ambivalent attitude to the Parthenon in The 
Names; or in the language of Mr. Tuttle in The Body Artist. In relation to the last 
example, Philip Nel writes: the ‘novel holds out the possibility of pure speech and then 
withdraws it again’. 18  This gesture of offering and withdrawing, suggesting and 
subverting, is central to DeLillo’s equivocal engagement with the transcendent. Again 
and again in his work, DeLillo holds out the possibility of some form of transcendence 
– something pure, sublime, rapturous, sacred, deeper – and then withdraws it, either 
through irony, ambiguity, or humour; through some form of return to the ordinary or 
everyday. Within this tension or movement, between the ordinary and transcendent, 
between the ‘thick lived tenor of things’ (U 827) and what is frequently referred to as 
‘something else’, we can locate a crucial element of DeLillo’s unique aesthetic 
achievement. 
 
The scene in Love-Lies-Bleeding is typical not only for the tension it embodies between 
the transcendent and the ordinary, between spiritual immensity and the local, but also 
for the location and the language used to express it. The desert is recurring site in 
                                                 
16
 The phrase ‘something else’ – which can have a mundane, colloquial meaning as well as express the 
transcendent or mysterious – acts like a leitmotif in DeLillo’s work, it is first used in Americana and 
recurs repeatedly in a variety of contexts in his novels. It takes on particular significance in Falling Man 
and The Body Artist.  
17
 David H. Evans ‘Taking Out the Trash’: Don DeLillo’s Underworld, Liquid Modernity, and the End of 
Garbage’, The Cambridge Quarterly, 2006, p. 122 
18
 Nel, ‘DeLillo’s Return to Form: The Modernist Poetics of The Body Artist’, Contemporary Literature, 
43, 2002, p. 746 
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DeLillo’s work: a place of exile or retreat, of ascetic spiritual purification, it acts as a 
metaphysical frontier where a sense of transcendent meaning can be intimated. It 
features in almost all of his novels, from his first, Americana, to his most recent, Point 
Omega.
19
  
 
The tone and sentiment of Alex’s ‘let’s not get too ambitious’, and the way it is 
juxtaposed with intimations of transcendence, echoes right through DeLillo’s oeuvre: 
Harkness imploring ‘let’s keep things simple’ in the opening of End Zone (EZ 4); 
Underworld’s Brian Glassic exhorting ‘let’s eat fast and get out of here and go sit in the 
stands like real people’ (U 92); or Ann Maitland in The Names joking, ‘let’s not have 
metaphysics this evening. I’m a plain girl from a Mill Town’ (N 57). These playful, 
colloquial statements frequently appear after a passage of metaphysical lyricism or 
philosophical speculation, or in response to a sense of abstract disconnection or spiritual  
longing. They mark some form of return to the ordinary, a return from the suggestion of 
metaphysical possibility. In a different, less playful vein, such lyricism, and sudden shift 
of tonal register, can also be seen in DeLillo’s later work, such as in Falling Man when 
Lianne muses on her son’s statement that ‘the sun is a star’, a possible allusion to the 
final sentence of Thoreau’s Walden, ‘the sun is but a morning star’20:  
 
The sun is a star. It seemed a revelation, a fresh way to think about being who we 
are, the purest way and only finally unfolding, a kind of mystical shiver, an 
awakening. Maybe she was just tired. It was time to go home, eat something, drink 
something. (FM 187)  
 
The ‘maybe’ here conveys the ambiguity of these typical DeLillian moments, but this 
return home, to the body, to ordinary and everyday matters powerfully symbolises a 
resistance to, and debunking of, unequivocal metaphysical reflection. And this return is 
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reflected in the idiomatic simplicity and straightforwardness of the prose, in the 
brusqueness of ‘just’ and the repetition of ‘something’.  
 
Perhaps the most powerful or most dramatic illustration of this movement from 
metaphysics to the ordinary, this shift of register, occurs in Libra during Branch’s initial 
reflections on the Kennedy Assassination: 
 
We will build theories that gleam like jade idols, intriguing systems of assumption 
four-faced, graceful. We will follow the bullet trajectories backwards to the lives 
that occupy the shadows, actual men who moan in their dreams. Elm street. A 
woman wonders why she is sitting on the grass, bloodspray all around. Tenth 
street. A witness leaves her shoes on the hood of a bleeding policeman’s car. A 
strangeness, Branch feels, that is almost holy. There is much here that is holy, an 
aberration in the heartland of the real. Let’s regain our grip on things. (L 15) 
 
This sudden call to ‘regain our grip on things’ marks a return to the physical and 
ordinary, it indicates the drawing of limits. It is a colloquial expression, but rich and 
ambiguous, as the phrase, though figurative, highlights the importance of touch and 
materiality. ‘Things’ refers to the abstract concept of the issue at hand, suggests actual 
events, but also Branch’s need to stay grounded, to reconnect, and the importance as 
well as the elusiveness of the concrete and real.  
 
This movement from the metaphysical to the ordinary is enacted not only on a linguistic 
level, or in particular instances of ambiguous visionary experiences or reflections on 
works of art, but also in the way in which DeLillo’s novels are structured as quests. 
From David Bell’s quest in Americana to explore ‘America in the screaming night’21 to 
Jim Finley’s quest to make a film in Point Omega, in almost of all of DeLillo’s novels 
the protagonists are involved, in one way or another, in some kind of spiritual quest. 
Though the nature of these quests varies considerably – from Jack Gladney’s or Lee 
Harvey Oswald’s quests for identity and a sense of meaning in White Noise and Libra to 
Axton’s quest to find the murder cult in The Names – they are all, to a greater or lesser 
extent, characterised by a yearning for transcendence, or longing to exceed the human, 
and result in a return of some kind to the ordinary. The one possible exception is Falling 
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Man, which, though it features a significant return to the ordinary, may be seen as 
something of an anti-quest novel; as an examination of stasis and stillness. 
 
This tension between metaphysics and the ordinary, this idea of the sense of limits and 
the need to return home, to the body and the everyday, as well as the importance of 
quests, can be felt in certain crucial respects in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. A 
lyrical passage from the Philosophical Investigations, in which Wittgenstein describes 
the intolerable conflict between metaphysical theorizing and ordinary life, encapsulates 
these elements:  
 
The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict 
between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, 
not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.) The conflict becomes 
intolerable; the requirement is now in danger of becoming empty. – We have got 
onto slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions 
are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so 
we need friction. Back to the rough ground! (PI 107) 
 
This passage illustrates a tension that Wittgenstein explores in his later work between 
our metaphysical needs and impulses (and the dangers of trying to satisfy them), and an 
attempt to return to the ordinary, which is never wholly successful. It also highlights 
central features of his later thought: the sense of a journey or return, and the idea of the 
ordinary as a destination, the object of an ‘ongoing quest’;22 the stylistic importance of 
colloquial and ordinary language; the use of figurative speech and metaphor; the 
emphasis on practical, everyday activity – ‘walking’; and the complex significance of 
‘rough ground’, the fact that the ordinary is a place of indeterminacy and ambiguity, a 
place where we are susceptible to feel lost, a potential wilderness.  
 
The passage also reveals certain important parallels with DeLillo. Both contrast 
metaphysics, which they refer to in terms of its luminescent qualities – ‘gleaming 
theories’ or ‘crystalline logic’ – with the ordinary and the concrete, with the importance 
of contact – ‘friction’ or ‘grip’. Like DeLillo, Wittgenstein frequently uses colloquial 
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expressions, puts a significant emphasis on humility, and on paying attention to 
particular concrete details. But equally, like DeLillo, Wittgenstein recognises the urge to 
metaphysics, the human desire for ‘spiritual immensity’ and ‘something unnameable’. 
Naomi Scheman notes that Wittgenstein’s return to the rough ground fails ‘to still the 
urges that sent us off in search of the perfection of ice’ and that ‘an inability to stay on 
the rough ground manifests itself as an inability to feel at home there’.23 Scheman cites 
Terry Eagleton’s poetic reimagining of the above citation in which he envisages 
Wittgenstein, having dug up the ice to uncover the rough ground, being ‘homesick for 
the ice, where everything was radiant and absolute,’ and so, unable to live on the rough 
ground, ending up ‘marooned between earth and ice, at home in neither’.24  
 
This conflict between a longing for transcendence, for metaphysical purity, and a need 
to return to the ordinary, which Espen Hammer describes as ‘an inescapable dialectic 
[...] between metaphysics and the difficult peace of the ordinary’,25 is, I argue, at the 
heart of both DeLillo’s engagement with metaphysics and Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy. Though in significantly different ways, both DeLillo and Wittgenstein 
explore this sense of homelessness; of striving to transcend the ordinary, and yet 
returning to it; of longing for, and yet, resisting absolute radiance and crystalline 
perfection; of both the temptations and dangers of metaphysical yearning.   
 
Before turning to Wittgenstein and an account of the features of his thought most 
relevant to this thesis, I will now provide an overview of the critical background in 
DeLillo studies. This critical review aims to cover the principal ways in which DeLillo 
has been read, but is particularly concerned with the critical approach to the 
metaphysical aspects of DeLillo’s work, and will also serve to demonstrate the benefits 
of reading his work through a Wittgensteinian lens.  
 
 
III. CRITICAL APPROACHES TO DELILLO 
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From the beginning, DeLillo’s work has been engaged with philosophical concerns. His 
work is full of aphorisms, philosophical dialogue and speculation, and contains a certain 
amount of implicit and explicit engagement with specific thinkers, such as, St. 
Augustine, Wittgenstein, Kierkegaard and Theilard De Chardin. Critics of his work 
have frequently viewed his novels as philosophical or metaphysical, or at least as more 
concerned with ideas than conventional narrative aims. Louis Menand, for example, 
writes that DeLillo seems ‘indifferent to most of the textbook principles of storytelling – 
things like character development, plots that reward expectation, verisimilitude to 
ordinary experience’, adding that his characters seem as little more than mouthpieces 
for his ideas, or ‘authorial meditations’; their speech loaded up with ‘metaphysical 
speculation’.26 He is consistently branded a novelist of ideas – David Foster Wallace, 
for example, describes him as a ‘conceptual novelist’27 – but any clear and distinct idea 
of a DeLillian philosophy is very hard to grasp. Nevertheless, the philosophical nature 
of DeLillo’s novels, the way they engage with and raise epistemological, ontological 
and existential questions; their examination of the limits and meaning of language; and 
the spiritual or religious fervour animating them seems to call for a philosophical 
reading of his work, one that is attuned to its ambiguity and questioning nature, and 
avoids any attempt to reduce it to a particular philosophical position.  
 
Not surprisingly, DeLillo’s work has provoked numerous references to philosophy and 
philosophers in the critical response. Most commonly found are references to thinkers 
such as Derrida, Baudrillard, Lyotard and Jameson, usually in support of postmodern 
readings of his work. But there are also references to thinkers as varied as Heidegger, 
Wittgenstein, Foucault, Kristeva, Deleuze, Bergson, Kant, Burke, Benjamin, Barthes, 
and Serres. Indeed, DeLillo’s work has provoked an incredibly broad array of critical 
readings, encompassing a range of theoretical perspectives. Even a brief survey of the 
critical literature reveals political, cultural, psychological, linguistic, historical and 
cinematic readings. But though much of the existing work on DeLillo includes 
philosophical reflection, or emphasises important philosophical aspects of his work, and 
makes reference to a wide range of thinkers, there has been little sustained work on the 
relation between DeLillo’s novels and philosophy. This bold claim depends, of course, 
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on the assumption that philosophy is a different kind of practice, discipline or discourse 
than theory, for there is no question that there is a great deal of work aligning DeLillo 
and theory. Indeed, it is precisely the prevalence of this pairing of DeLillo and theory 
that has, I will argue, hindered the development of alternative approaches. I will also 
argue that Wittgenstein’s philosophy is significantly different from theory.  
 
Although it is impossible to provide a schematic account of the different ways DeLillo’s 
work has been critically interpreted, it is not too bold a claim to suggest that there are, 
broadly speaking, two dominant approaches. One approach is to view his work in 
relation to, or as an example of, postmodern scepticism: as an ironic, critical account of 
contemporary culture and capital that undermines traditional, logocentric, foundational 
forms of discourse and epistemology. This approach typically adopts the work of 
seminal postmodern theorists such as Baudrillard, Jameson, and to a lesser extent 
Derrida, as a means of thinking through many of the issues DeLillo’s novels raise.28 The 
other approach challenges this earlier, more orthodox reading with the view that his 
work bears greater resemblance to either modernist or romantic works of literature, and 
is animated by either a religious or metaphysical impulse. Such readings emphasise the 
various ways transcendence features in DeLillo’s oeuvre and some go as far as to argue 
that certain key aspects of his work presume or suggest some kind of metaphysical 
foundation underpinning his aesthetics. Support for such readings is found in a variety 
of sources, ranging from Heidegger and Romanticism to Catholic theology and Georges 
Bataille.
29
  
 
It should be noted that very few critics adopt the extreme of either approach, and a 
majority acknowledge, in varying degrees, the sense in which DeLillo’s novels 
incorporate elements of both postmodern scepticism and metaphysical possibility. They 
do so, for the most part, however, without pursuing or further investigating the apparent 
ambiguity at the heart of DeLillo’s work. As we will examine further, one of the central 
aims of this thesis will be precisely to examine this ambiguity, which will not only bring 
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the central concerns of DeLillo work into coherence but also challenge both sides of the 
critical divide.  
 
There are many highly persuasive reasons for the prevalence of postmodern theory in 
readings of DeLillo’s work. Above all, there is the dominance of postmodern theory in 
the study of literature generally, but there is also the fact that DeLillo’s novels, or at 
least significant elements of them, seem to address the very same concerns as 
postmodern theory. To such an extent, indeed, that his work has been seen by many 
critics as embodying theories of the postmodern. John N. Duvall, for example, in an 
introduction to a special issue of Modern Fiction Studies devoted to DeLillo’s fiction, 
notes how DeLillo’s novels have been read as ‘portraying a world that frequently 
resembles the totalizing picture of postmodernity that Fredric Jameson paints’ and as 
capturing ‘crystallizing examples of what Baudrillard identifies as the hyperreal and the 
simulacrum’.30  However, this picture of DeLillo as a postmodern novelist, and the 
importance of Baudrillard and Jameson in reading him, owes a great deal to the critical 
and commercial success of White Noise. 
 
White Noise marked DeLillo’s entry into the critical mainstream. Ruppersburg and 
Engels write that only with the publication of White Noise in 1984 ‘did scholarly 
interest in DeLillo’s fiction begin to simmer’.31 The fact that it was this novel – his most 
comic, most ostensibly postmodern, and in many ways, least characteristic – that 
established DeLillo as a major literary figure is not without significance. It would to a 
large extent determine the critical framework and theoretical reference points for 
interpreting his work more generally, at least until the appearance of Underworld. White 
Noise was celebrated, writes Cornel Bonca, because it seemed to ‘illuminate reigning 
theories of postmodernism, as if it were written as an example of what Frederic 
Jameson, Jean-Francois Lyotard, or Jean Baudrillard have been saying about our socio-
cultural condition: White Noise as postmodern prototype.’32 The academic success of 
White Noise ensured that DeLillo became perceived as a postmodern novelist and that a 
great deal of critical discussion focused on the nature of his postmodern engagement. 
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As Boxall notes, ‘debate in DeLillo criticism has been organised around DeLillo’s 
response to postmodernity’.33 To such an extent that many of the arguments that suggest 
an alternative to the dominant postmodern approach remain framed around questions of 
postmodernism. So, for example, readings that emphasise DeLillo’s modernism do so 
by making a case against the idea of his work being postmodernist.
34
 At the same time, 
however, even one of the most sustained, substantial and influential postmodern 
readings of DeLillo, Leonard Wilcox’s essay ‘Baudrillard, DeLillo’s White Noise, and 
the End of Heroic Narrative’, concludes by pointing out significant differences between 
DeLillo and postmodern theory.   
 
Looked at in the context of his work as a whole, however, White Noise seems more like 
the exception rather than the rule or, at least, as the culmination of a certain comic and 
ironic mode, characteristic of his early output. All of DeLillo’s subsequent novels are 
marked by their lack of comic register. Though there are flashes of humour and comedy 
in novels such as Underworld, Mao II and even The Body Artist, the dominant narrative 
mode can hardly said to be that of comedy. Indeed, one way in which we might want to 
trace the development of DeLillo’s oeuvre is precisely as moving away from the archly 
ironic and comic. David H. Evans, for example, sees Underworld as representing ‘the 
culmination of a movement in DeLillo’s oeuvre away from a style whose deadpan 
ironies and post-nostalgic cool made his works seem to many the latest word in the 
discrediting of realist novel’. For Evans, Underworld is ‘less an example of artistic 
postmodernism than an assault on its premises and implications’.35   
 
With the publication of Underworld and the novels that followed it – The Body Artist, 
Cosmopolis, Falling Man and Point Omega – the central concerns of postmodernism 
have come to seem less relevant to our understanding and appreciation of DeLillo’s 
work. Furthermore, his more recent output suggests that perhaps DeLillo was a different 
kind of novelist all along, and that the massive wave of critical work on White Noise 
determined the critical engagement with his work to such an extent that many elements 
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of his work that didn’t seem to obviously fit in with theories of postmodernism were 
overlooked.  
 
This shift in DeLillo’s work, that itself marks a broader cultural shift away from the 
postmodern,
36
 has not surprisingly produced a shift in the critical reception of his work. 
That is, there has been a notable shift in both the nature of DeLillo’s novels and in the 
critical reception and understanding of his work, which evidently reflect one another. 
Amy Hungerford, for example, traces the shift in the critical reception of DeLillo’s 
work in terms of the increased engagement with religious concerns. She writes that 
‘Underworld has started many critics thinking about religion in DeLillo’s work in a 
sustained way’,37 noting in relation to an essay collection on Underworld, that ‘nine out 
of the fourteen essays in the volume make an argument that bears upon religion, 
whereas religion was only an occasional subject in DeLillo criticism before the novel’s 
appearance’.38  
 
There has also been considerable and increasing recognition of the ways in which 
DeLillo’s work resists postmodern readings and far from embodying postmodern 
theory, in fact critiques it. According to Paul Maltby, for example, ‘to postmodernize 
DeLillo is to risk losing sight of the (conspicuously unpostmodern) metaphysical 
impulse that animates his work’.39 While Thomas Carmichael writes:  
 
DeLillo’s narratives, to twist a phrase, install postmodernism seemingly in order to 
subvert it, or, perhaps more accurately, point to the persistence in the lived 
experience of the contemporary of older intensities that would seem properly to 
belong to now discarded orders of subjectivity and economies of meaning.
40
 
 
In the last decade, it has become more or less orthodox to note the way in which 
postmodern readings of DeLillo are unpersuasive or fail to account for significant 
features of his work. Cowart, Boxall and Jesse Kavadlo, authors of book length studies 
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on his work, all argue against postmodern readings of DeLillo. Kavadlo argues that the 
prevailing postmodern lens through which DeLillo is read is ‘shortsighted’;41 Boxall 
observes that ‘the tendency to read him with or against the grain of postmodernism and 
of poststructuralism has skewed his critical reception’;42 and Cowart claims that, ‘to 
read DeLillo [...] is to encounter radical thinking that – specifically vis-a-vis the 
conceptualisation of language – proves healthily resistant to certain of the more 
reductive elements in deconstruction and its theoretical congeners.’43 For Cowart, ‘it is 
the task of criticism to gauge the extra dimensions of DeLillo’s thinking about 
language’.44 DeLillo’s fiction, he argues, ‘does not defer to the poststructuralist view of 
language as a system of signifiers that refer only to other signifiers in infinite 
regression. DeLillo’s texts in fact undermine this postmodern gospel’. 45  Indeed, 
concludes Cowart, ‘DeLillo’s engagement with the postmodern [...] is or has come to be 
adversarial.’46  
 
A recurring argument in readings that argue against the idea of DeLillo as a postmodern 
novelist or against the use of postmodern theories to examine his novels, is that such 
approaches overlook the important ways in which DeLillo is engaged with metaphysics 
and forms of transcendence. One example of such an approach, which is also one of the 
few critical texts to produce a philosophical reading of DeLillo, is an essay by Cornel 
Bonca entitled ‘Being, Time and Death in DeLillo’s The Body Artist’. The essay makes 
a trenchant case for the importance of Heidegger’s philosophy for a critical reading of 
DeLillo’s work, it aims to show how Heidegger’s thought ‘illuminates DeLillo’s most 
urgent and vulnerable spiritual yearnings better than anyone else’.47 Bonca seeks to 
rescue DeLillo’s work from the dominant critical reception of his work that locates it 
within a predominately postmodern context and either uses theories of the postmodern 
to analyse it or views the novels as in some way illustrative of certain postmodern 
theories. Like Cowart, Bonca acknowledges that there is a great deal in DeLillo’s work 
that invites postmodern readings. However, he believes that a postmodern reading will 
inevitably fail to address some of the core features of DeLillo’s work, as it cannot help 
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but overlook the importance of DeLillo’s engagement with immanence. He writes: 
‘there is too great a yearning for, and too great a noticing of, immanence in his work’ 
for DeLillo to be considered or treated as a postmodernist. By immanence, he means, ‘a 
kind of ontological indwelling or presence – God for many, Being for Heidegger – 
which is hidden but inherent in the physical world’.48 
 
This approach of critiquing postmodern readings because of their failure to engage with 
a significant metaphysical or transcendent element of DeLillo’s work can be seen in 
numerous guises in the critical literature. Indeed, a great deal of the readings that 
challenge postmodern theory or theory in general do so by arguing for the significance 
of metaphysical features of DeLillo’s work. The main difference between these readings 
lies in the specific metaphysical feature focussed on. Where Bonca, for example, points 
to immanence, others point to mystery, the miraculous or the sacred as elements 
possibly overlooked because of a postmodern approach. Duvall, for example, notes that, 
‘as much as the frames of Benjamin and Baudrillard allow us to see, they may deflect 
attention from the persistence of the miraculous in DeLillo’.49 While Daniel Born writes 
that:  
 
unfortunately, the totalising theoretical insistence we find in Jameson informs 
much of the writing about DeLillo. The result—astute in its apprehension of 
predictable post-modern themes including endless commodification and knowledge 
as power—has played down DeLillo’s fascination with the sacred.50  
 
These claims concerning the importance of the sacred, the miraculous or immanence 
can be seen as aspects of a more general sense in which critics have acknowledged the 
metaphysical features of DeLillo’s oeuvre: Ruppersburg and Engels, for example, refer 
to DeLillo’s ‘quasi-religious mysticism’;51 Kavadlo claims ‘DeLillo does not explain as 
much as explore mystery’ 52 ; while for Mark Osteen ‘the unfulfilled yearning for 
transcendence’ is one of the major themes in DeLillo’s work, DeLillo’s characters, he 
argues, seek ‘forms of magic – quasi-religious rituals, pseudodivine authorities, 
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miraculous transformations’;53 Cowart states that DeLillo is ‘deeply sympathetic to [...] 
spiritual yearning’;54 Vince Passaro claims that a ‘subdued religious element [...] runs 
through all his work’;55 and John A. McClure observes that DeLillo’s work makes ‘all 
sorts of room for religious or spiritual discourses and styles of seeing’ – he ‘repeatedly 
constructs contemporary Americans as a people driven by homeless spiritual 
impulses’.56  Finally, Pankaj Mishra argues that even the more political features of 
DeLillo’s work are mostly metaphysical, in his view: ‘the resonant views on terror, 
conspiracy, mass society and art [DeLillo] articulated through his characters are 
metaphysical, even religious, rather than political’.57  
 
Furthermore, there is a growing sense of how important this metaphysical element is for 
an appreciation of DeLillo’s fiction. For Duvall,  
 
DeLillo’s final significance may lie in the way that [...] he insists on the novel as a 
counterforce to the wound of history through the persistence of mystery. Beyond 
the play of plots and plotlessness, determinism and chance, there lurks in DeLillo’s 
writing the possibility – never overtly confirmed – of spiritual transcendence.
58
  
 
As this brief survey shows, readings of DeLillo that examine the importance of the 
transcendent in his work are as varied as readings concerned with his relation to the 
postmodern. There is considerable consensus on the existence and importance of an 
engagement with transcendence in his work, but little concerning its nature, although 
most critical readings acknowledge that DeLillo resists traditional notions of 
transcendence. Few of these readings, however, are explicitly or primarily concerned 
with DeLillo’s engagement with transcendence. The notable exception is Maltby’s ‘The 
Romantic Metaphysics of Don DeLillo’, which argues that DeLillo’s novels reveal and 
endorse highly traditional notions of transcendence. Though significant for bringing 
attention to the way DeLillo is engaged with the possibility of metaphysical experience 
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in a commodified world, critics have noted that Maltby dismisses the significance of 
irony, humour and subversion in his novels, and so fails to appreciate the ambiguity of 
DeLillo’s engagement with metaphysics. Cowart, for example, writes that Maltby 
‘seems to underestimate the degree of irony with which DeLillo occasionally invokes 
visionary or sublime experience.’59 A glaring example of this can be seen in Maltby’s 
reading of the Toyota Celica passage in White Noise. For Maltby, the ‘tenor of this 
passage is not parodic; the reader is prompted by the analytical cast and searching tone 
of Gladney’s narration to listen in earnest,’60 but, I would argue, the analytical cast and 
searching tone of Gladney’s narration is one of the most evident elements of irony in the 
novel.  
 
It must be acknowledged, however, that there is a strong temptation to read DeLillo as 
an unequivocally metaphysical writer. DeLillo himself has mentioned the possible 
influence of Catholicism on his writing, stating that ‘there’s a sense of last things in my 
work’;61 that ‘a sense of something extraordinary hovering just beyond our touch and 
just beyond our vision […] is something that has been the background of my work’; and 
that his work ‘has been informed by mystery’.62 His work is full of references to depth, 
secrets, and hidden meanings – to ‘deeper connections and second meanings’ (U 88); it 
contains descriptions of miracles, visionary moments, and religious ways of seeing; and 
features a succession of idealist, solipsistic protagonists, obsessed with the pursuit of 
transcendent meaning, who embody the kind of ‘modernist thematic of alienation, 
anomie, solitude, social fragmentation and isolation’ that Jameson argues is dependent 
on the metaphysical distinction of inside and outside.
63
  
  
But all this has to be seen in conjunction with the vital strain of irony, subversion and 
demystification running through his work, and the importance of the colloquial, 
material, concrete, and the ordinary. Though it is evident that the idea of some larger 
significance – a sense of ‘something unnameable’ or mysterious – is a marked feature of 
DeLillo’s work, his treatment of, and approach to, this ‘something else’ is deeply and 
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significantly ambivalent. His work explores the human need or urge to believe in 
‘spiritual immensity’ or ‘something unnameable’, and the different ways it is 
manifested in culture. It looks at the craving for generality, for something bigger, but 
doesn’t necessarily assert or endorse the existence of some transcendental realm. 
DeLillo addresses spiritual, mystical and religious themes without advancing a spiritual, 
mystical or religious position, and, as Cowart notes, to ‘transcribe a social and 
psychological reality is not to endorse’ one.64 Indeed, it is vital to recognise that DeLillo 
both celebrates and criticises the way these themes are manifest in contemporary 
culture.  
 
The dominance of postmodern readings of DeLillo, and the way in which they are 
mostly challenged by readings focused on metaphysical or transcendent elements in his 
work, has prevented a clear view of DeLillo’s concern with the materiality of daily life, 
with the importance of engaging with and seeing ordinary things. In an interview with 
Anthony DeCurtis, DeLillo talks of his ‘sense of the importance of daily life and of 
ordinary moments,’ adding: ‘there is something that we tend to miss’. 65  Critics’ 
overriding concern with image culture, the apparent loss of the real, and the 
commodification of materiality, has prevented any serious engagement with the role of 
the ordinary in DeLillo’s work, with what John Lanchester calls his ‘feel for ordinary 
life’.66  
 
There is, however, a small but significant body of work that more closely examines 
DeLillo’s engagement with the ordinary. Rather than look to metaphysics as a way of 
challenging postmodern readings of DeLillo’s work, and ‘postmodernism’s disavowal 
of reality’,67 these critics look to the ordinary and real. What’s more, their work shares 
significant points of contact with a Wittgensteinian orientation. These readings: David 
H. Evans’ ‘Taking Out the Trash: Don DeLillo’s Underworld, Liquid Modernity, and 
the End of Garbage’ and Jacqueline A. Zubeck’s ‘“The Surge and Pelt of Daily Life”: 
Rediscovery of the Prosaic in Don DeLillo’s The Names’ focus on the importance of the 
ordinary and the real, and draw attention to the sense in which DeLillo’s work is not 
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only resistant to postmodern theory but to theory in general, or a certain kind of 
theoretical approach. 
 
Zubeck’s essay is predominately concerned with ethics, but in the attempt to trace the 
moral journey of the principal characters in The Names ‘from postmodern abstraction to 
prosaic actuality’, 68  she points to the novel’s emphasis on the significance of the 
ordinary and the everyday. The novel, she argues, ‘redresses the postmodern virtuality 
that has replaced prosaic virtue and discovers the strength weighted in the quotidian’.69 
Zubeck argues that the quests undertaken by the novel’s protagonists are ‘exercises in 
self-awareness’ that reveal their ‘emerging respect for prosaic detail and regard for the 
actual embodied particularity of human existence’.70  
  
In ‘Taking Out the Trash’, Evans argues that Underworld rejects ‘the appeals of 
postmodern scepticism and paranoid systems theory’, claiming that ‘the novel’s 
ultimate dedication is to a restoration of access to the real’.71  The essay is largely 
concerned with the significance of garbage in the novel, which he relates to the novel’s 
realism and engagement with the ordinary. Evans examines the way DeLillo emphasises 
‘the unpredictable and singular elements of ordinary life’, and ‘makes space for 
everyday things’. 72  Furthermore, the essay provides a critique of metaphysical and 
overly theoretical readings of DeLillo, specifically in relation to the occurrence of 
miracles in his work. He writes:  
 
miracles are not exceptions to the ordinary; they are simply the ordinary, attended 
to for itself, in its uniqueness, uselessness, and non-identity. There is nothing 
mystical or spiritual in this claim; on the contrary, it is the dream of converting 
ordinary individual things into the connected elements of an integrated and 
comprehensive system, of denying space to the singular [...] that makes the world 
immaterial and unreal.
73  
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The resonance between Zubeck’s and Evans’ arguments and Wittgenstein’s philosophy 
will be explored in much greater detail in the respective chapters on Underworld and 
The Names, but as we will now see, the rejection of both scepticism and systematic 
theory, an emphasis on raising self-awareness, and the importance of prosaic detail and 
ordinary individual things are central to Wittgenstein’s thought. In the following section 
I will provide a rough sketch of the aspects of Wittgenstein’s later thought most relevant 
for reading DeLillo’s work, and a brief overview of his relation to literary theory more 
generally.  
 
 
IV. WITTGENSTEIN 
 
Wittgenstein is widely considered to be one of the most significant philosophers of the 
twentieth century. His influence can be felt in an impressively broad range of disciplines 
and practices, and artists of all kinds continue to be deeply engaged by his writing. 
‘Wittgenstein’, claims Eagleton, ‘is the philosopher of poets and composers, 
playwrights and novelists’.74 In order to get a sense of the value of reading literature 
through Wittgenstein we need an idea of his methods and the nature of his philosophical 
enterprise, for, as Wolfgang Huemer writes: ‘the significance of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy for our theoretical understanding of literature is not so much based on his 
occasional remarks on aesthetics, [...] but on his general philosophical position’.75 And 
yet, as introductions to Wittgenstein frequently point out, his work is almost impossible 
to summarize or get a firm grip on, and ‘notoriously difficult to understand’.76  
 
Though his writing is notably lucid it lacks many of the features expected, if not 
required, in a work of philosophy. Wittgenstein, writes Beth Savickey, ‘does not engage 
in philosophy in the terms established and used by the discipline of philosophy’.77 
Wittgenstein’s first philosophical text, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, though 
unconventional, does have a very clear structure. It consists of very specifically 
numbered propositions, in which the numbering system indicates the logical importance 
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of the proposition. But in his later work, which is the main focus here, Wittgenstein 
rejected, to a large extent, both the method and the arguments of the Tractatus, and 
developed a radically new approach, which can best be seen in the Philosophical 
Investigations. Though not published during his lifetime, the Investigations was 
prepared for publication by Wittgenstein and remains the primary source of his later 
thought. In the preface, which puts a strong emphasis on the artistic element of his 
enterprise, Wittgenstein describes the text as an ‘album’, consisting of ‘a number of 
sketches of landscapes’ made in the course of ‘long and involved journeyings’ (PI vii). 
The result, notes Austen E. Quigley, ‘is a peculiar aggregate of loosely related 
paragraphs which offers no detailed statement of intended goals, no sustained 
elaboration of a narrative thread, and no triumphant summary of achieved 
conclusions’.78 
 
It is this novel approach of his later work that accounts for its difficulty. Marie McGinn 
comments:  
 
It is Wittgenstein’s unique way of treating the topics he deals with that makes the 
Investigations so difficult to understand. It is not that his style is technical or 
abstract, rather it is just not possible to see, in the style of the book, what 
Wittgenstein’s method is or how it is supposed to work.79  
 
In other words, as Duncan Richter notes, ‘it is not so much what he says but why he 
says it’ that is difficult to grasp.80 ‘The Investigations’, claims Eagleton, ‘reads [...] like 
an assemblage of ironic fables or fragments of a novel, deceptively lucid in their 
language but teasingly enigmatic in their thought.’81 Not surprisingly, this difficulty and 
enigmatic quality has led to wildly varying interpretations and accounts of his work. 
Indeed, one of the few things on which critics of his work agree is the extent to which 
no-one agrees: ‘neither his critics nor supporters’, writes Richter, ‘agree on what his 
work means’;82 while for Hans Sluga, ‘there is no consensus among the interpreters on 
how Wittgenstein’s work should be approached and what is of lasting significance in 
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it’.83  This lack of consensus, however, is perhaps understandable given the radical 
nature of his method and what he was aiming to achieve. According to Quigley,  
 
Wittgenstein’s aim is to reconceive the nature of philosophy and of theory. His 
interest is in philosophizing as a form of philosophy, in learning how to move 
around rather than in how to arrive, in showing how to continue an intellectual 
journey rather than how to end it prematurely.
84
 
 
Wittgenstein subverts philosophical expectations, he is not trying to change people’s 
opinions, theories or beliefs, but their whole approach – ‘what has to be overcome’, he 
suggests, ‘is a difficulty having to do with the will, rather than with the intellect’ (CV 
17). His aim, argues Perloff, is to provoke us to ‘question the generalisations and 
abstractions we have hitherto accepted as normative’;85 it ‘is to bring about a change in 
our attitude, or in how we see things, that goes against the grain of our natural 
inclinations’ and so, concurs McGinn, inevitably provokes a great deal of resistance and 
misunderstanding.
86
 Our normative approach and natural inclination, in philosophy, but 
also in literary criticism, it would seem, is to theorise, to seek explanations. 
 
Rather than provide explanations – something he explicitly warns against – 
Wittgenstein offers descriptions and does so as a means of clearing up confusion, 
confusion caused by an abstract, theoretical approach. This at first sight may seem 
paradoxical, since the aim of theory is to simplify multiple phenomena into a coherent 
schema for the sake of clear understanding. But, Wittgenstein argues, such an approach 
in fact prevents a clear view of things. Looking at reality or language through the 
limited blinders of a logical or theoretical construct leads to misunderstanding and 
confusion, and to metaphysical illusions. ‘The constraints imposed by any theoretical 
orientation’, writes Susan B. Brill, ‘may serve to impair our actual view’.87 
 
Wittgenstein believes we are led to theorize not because this is the only way 
philosophical questions can be answered but because we misunderstand the logic of our 
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language. Wittgenstein’s target is not just the philosophical tradition but deeply 
embedded, seemingly natural ideas of language and meaning. To overcome these ideas 
he offers a close, detailed look at the kind of statements we make about things in 
concrete cases. His aim is to solve philosophical problems by ‘looking into the 
workings of our language […] in such a way as to make us recognise those workings: in 
despite of an urge to misunderstand them’ (PI 109). This urge to misunderstand is a 
result of certain metaphysical assumptions about how language works, which prevent us 
from commanding a clear view of the use of words. For Wittgenstein, the difficulty of 
philosophy lies in relinquishing a picture that holds us ‘captive’ (PI 115): the picture 
central to a metaphysical outlook underlying our conceptions of language and meaning 
that leads us to ‘feel as if we had to penetrate phenomena’ (PI 90). We are led to think 
that in order to understand a thing properly we need to get beneath the surface and use 
analysis to dig out the truth. We think there is some mysterious process at work because 
the forms and logic of our language ‘seduce us into thinking that something 
extraordinary, something unique, must be achieved by propositions’ (PI 93). But 
Wittgenstein shows that ‘nothing out of the ordinary is involved’ at all (PI 94), and 
rather than construct a theory of understanding, what Wittgenstein proposes is therapy. 
 
Wittgenstein aims to engage his readers in an active process of working on the way they 
see things. He writes: ‘I ought to be no more than a mirror, in which my reader can see 
his own thinking with all his deformities so that helped in this way, he can put it right’ 
(CV 18). Wittgenstein attempts to cure his readers of the metaphysical or theorizing 
urge by luring them into seemingly natural modes of thought only to demonstrate their 
absurdity or untenablility. The Investigations thus in part consists of an ironic portrayal 
of our false picture of the world that reveals the dangers inherent in such a picture. The 
irony is used as a means of enabling readers to free themselves from seemingly natural 
but misleading ways of thinking; we are forced to question the uses and expressions of 
our language and realise the philosophical dead-ends they can lead us into. ‘The success 
of his writing’, notes Alice Crary, ‘depends on its leading us to identify, successively, 
with the images of ourselves expressed by the different voices at play in it and on its 
thereby bringing us to the recognition that certain words we are tempted to utter in 
philosophy are nonsense’.88 
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Though Wittgenstein’s writing has a great deal to offer to literary studies he still 
remains a marginal figure in the field and only a limited amount of the critical work on 
Wittgenstein is concerned with literature. Given the amount of interest in Wittgenstein 
found in literature and the arts, and the fact that the fundamental concerns of his thought 
– ‘the concepts of meaning, of understanding’, ‘states of consciousness’ (PI vii), the use 
and practice of language – are central to an understanding of literature, this is perhaps 
surprising. Both his marginal status and the artistic interest in him might, however, be 
due to the very nature of his work; to its highly unconventional, non-systematic, oddly 
poetic style, and its radical critique of both philosophy and theory. Due above all to the 
fact that, as K. T. Fann notes, Wittgenstein’s ‘method cannot be followed as a recipe or 
formula, it is rather an art. Wittgenstein was above all an artist who created a new style 
of thinking, a new way of looking at things’.89 
 
There are also more prosaic reasons for his marginal status. His work is largely 
perceived to belong to the disciplines of analytical philosophy and the philosophy of 
language, and contains little that is explicitly concerned with literary or aesthetic 
matters. More important, however, is the fact that his work ‘does not advance any kind 
of theory’ (PI 109); it makes no substantial assertions about the nature of things, about 
reality, knowledge or being. Savickey writes: ‘as a form of investigation which leads to 
clarity rather than progress and construction, his method [...] does not result in theories, 
arguments or explanations’. 90  And this is compounded by the highly unsystematic 
nature of its form, by what Quigley describes as ‘his constant wanderings from point to 
point, from paragraph to paragraph, and from image to image’. Indeed, the lack of 
theory, the seemingly fragmentary and diffuse nature of the form, and his unique, 
idiosyncratic method have led many, claims Quigley, ‘to question whether Wittgenstein 
actually has a philosophical position to offer us, whether he has indeed a summarizable 
set of philosophical beliefs, and whether there is or could be a Wittgensteinian approach 
to things in general.’91 
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Wittgenstein, argues W.J.T. Mitchell, ‘does not give us what we think we want when 
we go to philosophy for answers to literary problems.’92 His philosophy is not a means 
of interpretation; it cannot be used as a set of concepts for analysing thematic issues or 
explaining the meaning of a text. According to Quigley, this is because  
 
Wittgenstein offers us no clearly defined system of analysis, no elaborate set of 
theoretical distinctions, and (apart from a sprinkling of characteristic metaphors) no 
highly developed technical vocabulary. [...] There is no elaborate jargon [...], no set 
of presuppositions to be posited and illustrated, no characteristic goals that 
pronounce themselves in advance.
93
 
 
What at first sight may seem problematic in the attempt to use Wittgenstein’s thought in 
literary theory or textual practice may, however, be one of its main advantages. 
‘Perhaps’, suggests Mitchell, Wittgenstein ‘can cure us of our infatuation with 
systematic philosophy, and dispel our fantasy that philosophy exists to provide a secure 
foundation of theories and methods for us to follow.’94 It is precisely the fact that it is 
not a means of interpretation, that it lacks jargon, that it is an account, and initiation, of 
a process rather than a theory, wherein lies its value. A Wittgenstein approach, writes 
Brill, enables us to work with ‘texts rather than forcing them to fit into preconceived 
networks of criticism’.95  
 
More importantly, Wittgenstein’s work is itself literary, and in certain crucial respects: 
it is an account of a journey or series of journeys, that Stanley Cavell, for example, 
reads as resonant with the spiritual quests of Dante and Thoreau, a journey from being 
lost to finding oneself, from darkness to light; and, in a similar vein, Perloff notes that 
‘Wittgensteinian “thought” is charged with drama: we witness its continuous 
unfolding’. 96  Furthermore, Wittgenstein’s grammatical investigation is a reading of 
language, of how words are used: it is attentive to the nuances and varieties of everyday 
communication, to distinctive patterns of use; it consists of description rather than 
explanation, the use of metaphor, striking imagery, ‘objects of comparison’ (PI 130), 
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dialogue, and the invention of characters and scenarios; and it is alive to the power and 
wonder of words. 
 
My reading of Wittgenstein is largely supported by a growing body of work that argues 
in a variety of ways that a more literary reading is truer to the spirit and aims of 
Wittgenstein’s work, or that, as McGinn argues, ‘understanding Wittgenstein’s method 
and its connection with the form of the text is the key to understanding the 
Investigations’.97  Increasingly, we are seeing work either explicitly concerned with 
Wittgenstein’s art or that engages in significant ways with the more formal and literary 
elements of his writing. That is to say, there has been a notable shift away from thinking 
about what Wittgenstein said, the content of his work, to the way he said it, the form.  
 
In a recent book on Wittgenstein, Richter makes a distinction between two main 
approaches to Wittgenstein’s work, in his attempt to give an ‘overview of the 
interpretative battleground’. He describes the orthodox, traditional interpretations as 
concentrating on what Wittgenstein said, or is taken to have said, and so concerned with 
issues such as what is required to follow a rule, or whether a private language is 
possible. Against this approach stand the ‘new Wittgensteinians’, who, writes Richter, 
‘insist that we should take Wittgenstein at his word when he claims not to be putting 
forward theses or arguments’. What Wittgenstein offers is not new theories, or any 
theory of any kind, but therapy: ‘he offers a method, or perhaps a set of methods, for 
getting rid of problems, not novel or significant ideas about this or that issue’.98 Richter 
is referring here, in part, to an important collection of critical writings entitled The New 
Wittgenstein, writings which share fundamental and ‘quite unorthodox assumptions’ 
about Wittgenstein’s conception of the aim of philosophy. In the introduction, Crary 
argues that the papers in the collection ‘have in common an understanding of 
Wittgenstein as aspiring, not to advance metaphysical theories, but rather to help us 
work ourselves out of confusions we become entangled in when philosophizing’.99  
 
The second, and related, key point of agreement between ‘the new Wittgensteinians’ is 
the emphasis on the importance of Wittgenstein’s style or form, the fact that, as Cavell 
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puts it, ‘Wittgenstein’s writing is essential to his philosophizing’.100 A pioneer in this 
regard is Perloff. All of her writings on Wittgenstein display an illuminating 
attentiveness to his use of language. But we can also see a shift in approach in more 
explicitly philosophical readings of his work. Texts as varied as Beth Savickey’s 
Wittgenstein’s Art of Investigation, Alessandra Tanesini’s Wittgenstein: A Feminist 
Interpretation and Stephen Mulhall’s Inheritance and Originality and Wittgenstein’s 
Private Language all focus in different ways on both the therapeutic aspect and the 
significant formal and literary elements of Wittgenstein’s writing. Tanesini argues that 
‘we must read his work in ways that bear some similarity to how we interpret poems’;101 
Savickey explores in considerable depth the sense in which his method is an art, how 
his writings are ‘creative’, ‘imaginative’, ‘playful’ and ‘provocative’, and argues that we 
must take ‘his methodological claims and practices seriously’;102 and Mulhall writes 
that the sense that ‘what is said is not sharply distinguishable from how it is said’ puts 
‘an unusually high premium on the exploitation of what one might call the more literary 
dimensions of language (especially the resources of figurations, imagery, and metaphor, 
often deployed in the telling of imaginative tales)’.103  
 
A great deal of credit for this approach is surely owed to Stanley Cavell. Cavell is one 
of the few notable Wittgensteinians who, from the beginning of his career, has not only 
been engaged with critical thinking about the arts (and the relation between philosophy 
and the arts), but also with emphasising the importance of Wittgenstein’s form. Crary 
acknowledges Cavell’s importance for establishing a new approach to Wittgenstein: 
‘Cavell was one of the first philosophers to develop a therapeutic reading of 
Wittgenstein’s later thought’,104 and both Mulhall and David G. Stern, among others, 
note the significance of the ways in which ‘Cavell emphasises the importance of 
Wittgenstein’s style’.105 Cavell’s reading of Wittgenstein has its detractors,106 but for 
anyone engaged with the more literary aspects of Wittgenstein’s thought, or with the 
relation between Wittgenstein and literary questions, Cavell’s oeuvre is an invaluable, if 
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not essential, resource. Timothy Gould states that, ‘I still have not found any 
commentator who comes close to Cavell’s persistent and methodical (if somewhat 
intermittent) pursuit of the actual structure of Wittgenstein’s words and paragraphs’.107 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, however, Cavell is most significant for his ability to 
tease out the way in which Wittgenstein’s thought is dialectical, for his emphasis on the 
areas of tension in Wittgenstein’s later thought: between scepticism and metaphysics, 
the ordinary and transcendent, confusion and peace, illusion and clarity, nonsense and 
sense. Cavell draws attention to the ‘spiritual struggle’ in Wittgenstein’s work, which he 
figures as an ongoing journey from the darkness of confusion to the light of clear vision. 
This struggle is most evident in the recurring conflict between the two dominant voices 
of the Investigations. The following summary by Stern encapsulates this crucial feature 
of Cavell’s reading of Wittgenstein: 
 
Cavell characterises Wittgenstein’s writing as a dialogue between “the voice of 
temptation,” the voice that tempts the reader to theorise, and the “voice of 
correctness”, which aims to return the reader to ordinary life. [...] On Cavell’s 
reading, neither the voice that tempts us [...] nor the voice that returns us [...] sets 
out Wittgenstein’s real views. Instead, he construes them as two opposing voices  
[...]. On this reading, the aim of Wittgenstein’s dialogues is not to lead his reader to 
any philosophical view, neither an idealized, frictionless, theory of language, nor a 
pragmatic theory of ordinary language, but rather to help us see through such ways 
of speaking and looking.
108   
 
This picture of Wittgenstein as veering between the slippery ice of an ideal world of 
abstract, theoretical purity and the rough ground of ordinary language is full of literary 
resonance, and can be seen as almost an inversion of the Romantic and Modernist 
despair at ordinary language, our mortality and the banality of everyday reality. 
Wittgenstein is not yearning for the ideal world of perfection but the ambiguous, rough 
world of indeterminacy and ‘difficult peace’. Unlike Keats, say, for whom ‘heard 
melodies are sweet, but those unheard are sweeter’109 and who despairs at the contrast 
between his paltry existence and the immortal beauty embodied in a Grecian Urn, or 
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Proust, who denigrates materiality and laments the inadequacy of ordinary forms of 
expression, the ‘whole heap of verbal concepts and practical goals which we falsely call 
life’,110 Wittgenstein’s aim is to silence the desire for transcendence and yearning for 
the ideal. He calls for a return to the ordinary: ‘what we do’, he writes, ‘is to bring 
words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use’ (PI 116). And this return is 
embodied in his writing. Wittgenstein, notes Savickey, ‘begins with ordinary language 
and everyday events. His writings are filled with ordinary (everyday) objects like chairs, 
tables, apples and tools. In his writings we find ordinary people who engage in ordinary 
activities like playing, reading, building and shopping’.111  
 
For Wittgenstein, it is metaphysics or the theorizing attitude that creates despair, or 
philosophical headaches and confusion, not the apparent inadequacy of everyday life or 
our finitude. Wittgenstein is attuned to the frustration and disappointment felt at the 
apparent limitations of language. He recognizes the importance and power of the desire 
to transcend the ordinary, to find deeper meanings, but finds that this desire leads to, 
 
that dead-end in philosophy, where one believes that the difficulty of the task 
consists in our having to describe phenomena that are hard to get hold of […] 
where we find ordinary language too crude, and it looks as if we were having to do, 
not with the phenomena of everyday, but with ones that “easily elude us”. (PI 436) 
 
For Wittgenstein, it is precisely when philosophers are most in search of light, when 
they attempt to ‘penetrate phenomena’ (PI 90) or construct a theory that will enlighten 
or elucidate a problem, that they are most in the dark. It is when they seek to transcend 
the concrete, to reach the higher climes of pure thought, that they actually descend into 
pits of confusion. His solution is apparently simple and yet surprisingly difficult: it is to 
not take off, but stay grounded and take a proper look around, or rather, since taking off 
is seemingly inevitable, it is to come back down, down to the ‘rough ground’ of 
ordinary language and everyday forms of life. His solution is to change what to look for, 
and how and where to look. With this different point of view the ordinary will be seen 
with clarity and purpose, and will provide precisely the kind of luminescent sense of 
awe and wonder sought for in metaphysics.  
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Curiously, given his profoundly metaphysical outlook, Proust can provide an insight 
into Wittgenstein’s inversion of metaphysical despair, for in an essay on Chardin we 
find an approach to the everyday that resonates with Wittgenstein’s. Chardin’s still life 
paintings, writes Proust, have ‘some wonder to make shine, some mystery to reveal; 
everyday life will delight’. Chardin, he concludes, initiates us into ‘the neglected life’ of 
things and brings us out from a ‘false ideal […] by opening the real world to us’.112 In 
the Investigations, Wittgenstein states that we are ‘dazzled by the ideal’ and thus fail to 
see the actual (PI 100): the ideal, he writes, ‘is like a pair of glasses on our noses 
through which we see whatever we look at. It never occurs to us to take them off’ (PI 
103). Wittgenstein illustrates how and why we are tempted by this false ideal and 
attempts to prevent us from succumbing to it. In the process he provides a way of seeing 
neglected things. Like a still life painter, ‘his writings reflect details which might 
otherwise escape our attention’, notes Savickey, and so ‘we are able to see numerous 
different angles, details and perspectives’.113 By taking off the glasses we can see the 
simple and familiar. And it is in these details, in the simple and familiar, that we can see 
the wonder of ordinary language – the remarkable fact of its existence – and everyday 
life. Wittgenstein does not demystify language, merely metaphysical illusions. The 
ordinary for Wittgenstein does not indicate the banal or a state of disenchantment. On 
the contrary, he deconstructs metaphysical illusion precisely to enable a clear vision and 
understanding of the remarkable state of ordinary things. He rejects theory and 
metaphysics because they diminish wonder rather than draw our attention to it. Fergus 
Kerr writes: ‘Wittgenstein’s work puts an end to metaphysics by inviting us to renew 
and expand our sense of wonder’.114  
 
This process of reawakening wonder reveals what Cavell sees as the ‘moral and 
religious fervour’ of the Investigations, how its ‘moral work is not separate from its 
philosophical work’,115 and also the way in which Wittgenstein’s task is closer to that of 
an artist than of a traditional philosopher. Indeed, the process can be viewed from an 
artistic, critical as well as religious perspective. Baker, for example, emphasises the 
artistic or creative nature of Wittgenstein’s enterprise. In arguing against the idea that 
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there can be a perspicuous representation of all aspects of ‘the use of our words’, he 
writes: 
 
in respect of each particular aspect, it is a creative achievement (not a mechanical 
procedure) to find a means for bringing it to another’s notice, and it is a task of 
persuasion (not a demonstrative proof) to bring it about that another sees things 
differently.
116
 
 
Louis A. Sass, however, looks at this process in terms of his critical project, his case 
against theory and explanation:  
 
Wittgenstein criticizes explanation in order to make way for wonder. Clarity for 
him was largely in the service of awe: his critical energies were directed at 
unmasking what he saw as the pseudo-explanations that tend to come between us 
and the world, blinding us to the sheer wonder of its existence.
117
  
 
While Philip R. Shields sees it in religious terms: Wittgenstein ‘is trying to shift our 
perspective from the mundane to the religious, and to recapture the special sense of 
wonder and awe he felt was extinguished by the prevailing scientific 
Weltanshauung’.118  
 
Crucially, however, it is only when we return from the sublime heights of metaphysical 
speculation or theorizing that the ordinary can be seen clearly: its importance can only 
be fully understood in relation to the desire to transcend it. Furthermore, the ordinary in 
Wittgenstein is never fully or finally attained: the urge to metaphysics has to be 
repeatedly confronted, and this has important consequences for it makes Wittgenstein’s 
work a continual process rather than a fixed theory. Quigley writes:  
 
Though Wittgenstein warns us against our “craving for generality” and our 
“contemptuous attitude towards the particular case,” his aim is not to substitute the 
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particular for the general but to locate a relationship between the two that prevents 
them or us from coming to a final and definitive resting point.
119
 
 
This relationship between the particular and general, between metaphysics and the 
ordinary, is not only relevant for the way it alters the way we see things, but also for the 
way Wittgenstein’s thought enables us to avoid both scepticism and foundationalism, 
and thus some of the problems commonly associated with postmodern theory, as we 
will now examine in more detail. 
 
 
V. WITTGENSTEIN AND POSTMODERN THEORY 
 
A Wittgensteinian approach to DeLillo implies some form of challenge to other 
theoretical or philosophical modes of reading and, in particular, to the kind of 
postmodern and metaphysical readings of his novels outlined above. Wittgenstein’s 
thought has radical consequences for how we perceive and think about language, and 
how we perceive and think about literature. An important point of contact between 
DeLillo and Wittgenstein in this thesis is a complex but somewhat suspicious attitude 
towards theory, an attitude that in itself poses a challenge to certain ways of reading 
DeLillo’s work.  
 
Cowart notes that ‘DeLillo is resistant to the seductive appeal of totalizing theories’.120 
One of the aims of this thesis is not only to show that this is indeed the case, but to 
examine the significant ways in which both DeLillo and Wittgenstein explore the nature 
of this appeal and modes of resistance to it. For though, as Quigley argues, Wittgenstein 
displays significant resistance to the ‘temptation to offer any kind of totalizing, all-
embracing theory’121 he also explores this temptation; he is alert to it, and recognises its 
force and importance.  
 
By reading DeLillo’s work through Wittgenstein we can overcome the divide that 
seems to exist between the critical reception and treatment of DeLillo as either a 
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postmodern sceptic or a romantic metaphysician, which reflects a broader divide 
between postmodernist and traditional ways of reading literature. Though the thesis 
only intermittently engages with the different sides of this divide and the broader critical 
debate, these debates form the background and context to my reading. And it is partly in 
relation to this background that the significance of a Wittgensteinian approach can be 
seen. This aspect of my reading is largely implicit because a ‘refusal to engage in 
adversarial criticism’ is, notes Savickey, an essential part of Wittgenstein’s method, 
which eschews argumentation and criticism.
122
 Wittgenstein does not attempt to combat 
any particular philosophical theories, he teaches a descriptive method by example and 
makes no philosophical assertions or claims. Following this, rather than attempt to 
explicitly challenge any particular theoretical positions in critical readings of DeLillo, 
and thereby risk becoming embroiled in problematic theorisation or an explanatory 
mode, I offer an alternative mode of reading his work, elaborated and illustrated 
throughout the thesis.  
 
Brill argues that Wittgenstein can provide a mediation between the opposing camps in 
literary and critical theory who struggle ‘to either maintain the supposed stability of an 
earlier logocentric foundationalism or to subvert such absolutist discursive structures’. 
She adds that, in relation to  
 
the problematic of being caught within a particular theoretical or explanatory mode 
such that the only apparent alternatives seem to be either an acceptance of the set 
theoretic or a reactive overturning of that theoretic (a response that is just as 
dependent upon the original – rejected – orientation as is the initial stance),  the 
Wittgensteinian response would not engage in the endless repetition of antithesis, 
but would avoid the problem altogether by choosing to play a different game.
123
  
 
Wittgenstein, writes Brill, enables us to ‘move forward beyond the dialectical pulls of 
our contemporary modern/postmodern aporia’. 124  As we have seen, such a 
modern/postmodern aporia, or division between traditional and sceptical approaches, is 
much in evidence in critical work on DeLillo. Wittgenstein can help us overcome this 
apparent divide between viewing him as either a postmodern sceptic concerned with 
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depthless image culture and free-floating irony or as a romantic, modernist or humanist 
whose work presumes traditional, metaphysical conceptions of visionary insight, 
language and the self. By appealing to Wittgenstein we can think through the ways in 
which DeLillo is engaged with both metaphysics and scepticism, is deeply ironic and 
yet serious, and how a rejection of traditional paradigms does not lead to an unstable 
world of endless free play and empty simulacra. We will be able to read the 
metaphysical aspects of his work without recourse to metaphysical paradigms and 
accept the anti-theoretical thrust of postmodernism, while avoiding the reductive and 
problematic elements of its scepticism.  
 
It is thus important to clarify the sense in which Wittgenstein is critical of theory, and 
the significant ways in which his critique differs from postmodernist accounts. Brill 
argues that Wittgenstein ‘is rejecting one specific usage of the term “theory”’, that is, 
theory as ‘a preconceived hypothesis (generally abstract and systematic) against which 
the world is measured, evaluated, and explained’. It is rejected for ‘being static and 
unresponsive to the actual contingent realities of our world’.125 Wittgenstein’s critique 
is thus, in this respect, not dissimilar to the kind of postmodernism exemplified in 
thinkers such as Baudrillard, Foucault, Derrida, or Lyotard, all of whom, argues Brill, 
are critical of theoretical approaches that are ‘discursively limiting and hegemonically 
elitist’. 126  Wittgenstein and postmodernists both reject the totalizing imperative of 
theory and, argues Eagleton, both have an ‘allergy to depth’. 127  There are indeed 
significant points of contact between Wittgenstein and certain strains of postmodern 
theory – Eagleton cites Wittgenstein’s claim that ‘nothing we do can be defended 
absolutely and finally’ (CV, p. 16), as ‘a keynote of much modern thought’, arguing that 
‘this sense of the provisional nature of all our ideas is [...] central to post-structuralism 
and postmodernism’128 – but there are also crucial differences. 
 
There exist a whole series of debates on the possible links between Wittgenstein and 
postmodernism, but it is beyond the scope of this thesis to address these debates in 
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detail.
129
 However, though the arguments are dense and complex certain key points arise 
from a number of these discussions, namely, the way in which Wittgenstein avoids 
problems of both foundationalism and scepticism.  
 
Postmodernism, it is argued, at least by Wittgensteinians such as Quigley, Martin Stone 
and Charles Altieri, is largely a form of scepticism: it is an attack on all forms of 
essentialism and foundationalism, rejecting notions of reason and truth, in favour of a 
socially-constructed linguistic account of reality and the self. But, argues Horace L. 
Fairlamb, ‘postmodern positions continue to be shaped by the foundationist conception 
they are trying to subvert’.130 Fairlamb argues that critics of foundations are infected 
with a reductive ideal of epistemology and are thus subject to theoretical constraints and 
embroiled in problematic contradictions. The main problem for these critics lies in 
trying to critique foundationist theory while establishing the legitimacy of their own 
theoretical ground.  
 
Unlike a great deal of postmodern theory, Wittgenstein’s position is not shaped by the 
foundationist or metaphysical conception he is trying to subvert. Perloff writes:  
 
Wittgenstein gets around a problem that has beset deconstruction, the problem of 
denouncing a metaphysic of presence in a metalanguage in which presence is 
inevitably reinscribed. [...] For Wittgenstein, there need be no metalanguage, for 
each of us has access to the “language full-blown (not some sort of preparatory, 
provisional one),” the language that is given to us.
131
  
 
Wittgenstein’s alternative to theory is reflected in the style and method of the 
Investigations. He does not make a theoretical argument against theory. Quigley writes:  
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Wittgenstein’s alternative to existing theory is not an anti-theory, any more than his 
alternative to existing philosophy is an anti-philosophy. It is instead a philosophical 
procedure displayed in action, a philosophical technique variously exemplified, a 
philosophical process that refuses to become a reified product.
132
  
 
For Wittgenstein, any attempt at a theoretical account of meaning or language will 
distort the complexity and vast entanglements involved in how language actually 
functions. We are unable to find a core essence of meaning or language because, he 
writes, ‘all that we call language’ has ‘no one thing in common [… but] are all related to 
each other in many different ways’ (PI 65); Wittgenstein’s argument against the 
tendency to theorise and in favour of what he calls ‘family resemblances’ rests on an 
instruction to observe whether or not things share an essence. He compares language to 
games:  
 
Don’t say: “There must be something common, or they would not be called 
‘games’” – but look and see whether there is anything common to all. – For if you 
look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, 
relationships, and a whole series of them at that; [...] a complicated network of 
similarities overlapping and criss-crossing. (PI 66, 67)  
 
Wittgenstein demonstrates his method in the description of various examples and he 
repeatedly emphasises that none of these examples are definitive. He ‘offers us 
examples of many kinds’, explains Quigley, ‘so that we can see by the light of their 
variety and thus resist the tendency to absorb the multiplicity of language into some 
reductive explanatory schema.’ 133  This emphasis on multiplicity and the anti-
foundational thrust of his writing has, argues Quigley, led some critics to view 
Wittgenstein as a sceptic and place him alongside postmodern thinkers such as Derrida. 
Quigley notes possible reasons for the association of Wittgenstein with Derrida and 
scepticism, notably the brilliance with which Wittgenstein displays the multiplicity and 
contingency of language, but argues that such parallels overlook the strong anti-
sceptical strain in his work. According to Altieri, Wittgenstein ‘recognises that 
scepticism is only the reverse demonic side of essentialist thinking’. 134  For both 
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Wittgenstein and Derrida there is no necessary relation between language and reality or 
word and thing, but for Wittgenstein, the impossibility of connecting language to reality 
is irrelevant for language to function meaningfully. And whereas Derrida, for example, 
at least in his early work, ‘makes the rejection of essences the cornerstone of his 
scepticism’, leaving only free play or an endless process of signifiers, ‘Wittgenstein 
seeks to establish grounds for knowledge in a new, less problematic way’. 135  He 
rethinks the concept of essence in terms of grammar and human social behaviour, and 
avoids any abstract ontology. Quigley writes:  
 
Seduced by the siren-song of continuous contingency, deconstructionists have a 
great deal of difficulty locating any clear goal beyond it. But Wittgenstein’s 
exploration of contingency is designedly therapeutic – it refuses us one kind of 
closure while opening up access to others. Wittgenstein’s technique of positioning 
does not imply the endless deferral of locating a position.
136
  
 
Wittgenstein provides a picture of knowledge and the meaning of language as based on 
a provisional and historical form of stability, in which things ‘stand fast’ (OC 151), but 
not permanently. This can most clearly be seen in his image of the river-bed from On 
Certainty. Wittgenstein argues that the background against which anything we say 
makes sense is like a river-bed. It shifts slowly over time and there is no sharp division 
between it and the river – language use – running through it. Quigley shows that these 
images of continuity, such as ‘family resemblances’ or the ‘river-bed’, illustrate stability 
– of meaning, rules, criteria – without an essentialist foundation, a stability, which ‘is 
neither feeble nor foundational but provisional and historical’.137  
 
Broadly speaking, what distinguishes Wittgenstein from postmodern theory is the 
importance of the ordinary in his later work. Though metaphysical philosophy is a 
primary target for Wittgenstein, as it is for postmodern theory, he sees a way out from 
the seeming inescapability of scepticism resulting from the rejection of essentialist 
foundations. Stone claims that 
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a central aim of Wittgenstein’s discussion [of rule-following] is to suggest that if 
(1) a certain metaphysical idea of meaning and (2) the deconstruction of that idea 
seem to exhaust the philosophical options, that is owing to our failure to see 
another possibility – namely, a return to the ordinary or everyday.138  
 
This return to the ordinary is anything but simple. Mulhall writes: ‘what Wittgenstein 
means by “the ordinary” – whether with respect to language or to life – is not 
necessarily either obvious or ordinary’. 139  It does not indicate common sense or 
conventional modes of thought; it is not a ‘network of commonsense certainties and 
unproblematized practices’. 140  Wittgenstein’s ordinary, argues Perloff, ‘is best 
understood as quite simply that which is, the language we do actually use when we 
communicate with one another’.141 The fact that the ordinary lacks a specific, abstract, 
technical definition is in itself of considerable significance to Wittgenstein’s thought.  
 
But, as we have shown above, the ordinary has to be seen in relation to the urge to 
metaphysics; it is not part of a pragmatic theory of language. Wittgenstein does not try 
to establish exactly what the ordinary is as this would amount to the very kind of 
metaphysical gesture he is attempting to overcome; he attempts to return to and look at 
it. For Cavell, ‘the ordinary occurs essentially in the Philosophical Investigations as 
what scepticism denies, and metaphysics transcends’,142 and thus the ordinary is a site 
of struggle; it is in tension with both scepticism and metaphysics and can only be 
understood in relation to both.  
 
These concerns are not only relevant to indicating the significant differences between 
Wittgenstein and postmodern theory, but also for how to adopt a Wittgensteinian 
approach to reading literature. One of the principal aims of this thesis is not only to 
demonstrate the way in which both Wittgenstein and DeLillo challenge and undermine 
certain theorizing attitudes, impulses and modes of reading, but to challenge such 
attitudes in readings of their work. Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the tension between the 
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ordinary and metaphysics, on looking and seeing, on the therapeutic quality of 
contingency and on ‘overlapping and criss-crossing’ similarities is therefore crucial to 
both the method and main arguments of the thesis.     
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Falling Man, Still Life and the paradox of the ordinary 
 
Just look. You have to look.  
    Don DeLillo
1
 
 
The everyday, or the commonplace, is the most basic and richest artistic category. 
Although it seems familiar, it is always surprising and new.  
Jeff Wall
2
   
           
 
DeLillo’s 2007 novel, Falling Man, is an elliptical account of the aftermath of the 
September 11 terrorist attacks that focuses on an estranged couple living in New York. 
This chapter begins by briefly reviewing the novel’s negative critical reception and sets 
out to challenge the idea that DeLillo’s narrow focus on the ordinary indicates some 
kind of failure. It does so by considering the significance of two still life paintings by 
Giorgio Morandi described in the novel, arguing that they illustrate the novel’s formal 
and thematic concerns, as well as its dominant mood. And moreover that, as still lifes, 
they represent an aesthetic form central to DeLillo’s aesthetic and philosophical 
engagement with the ordinary more generally. The chapter draws on Norman Bryson’s 
book on still life, Looking at the Overlooked, in order to illuminate the aesthetic and 
philosophical features of the novel’s treatment of still life, and then analyses the 
significance of these features in light of Wittgenstein’s engagement with the ordinary.  
 
Though still life is a branch of painting that covers works of art from diverse historical 
and cultural contexts, there are nevertheless, according to Bryson, certain key ‘family 
resemblances’ that make it a ‘coherent category’.3 I will argue that the elements Bryson 
identifies and scrutinises – a non-linear structure and turn away from narrative and 
spectacle; the importance of gesture, ritual and repetition; the intimate spatial quality; 
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and, above all, the close focus on and paradoxical transfiguration of the ordinary – are 
central to Falling Man’s formal and aesthetic qualities. I will also examine the 
significant parallels between Bryson’s account of still life and later Wittgenstein.4 Like 
still life, the Philosophical Investigations is concerned with drawing our attention to 
what is familiar or apparently insignificant, with demystifying the illusory importance 
of grand narratives, and it repeatedly emphasises the importance of looking and seeing 
things clearly. In the Investigations Wittgenstein states: ‘the aspects of things that are 
most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is 
unable to notice something – because it is always before one’s eyes)’ (PI 129). In a 
similar fashion, Bryson describes the way still life ‘forces the subject, both painter and 
viewer, to attend closely to the preterite objects in the world which, exactly because 
they are so familiar, elude normal attention’. 5  And for still life painting, as for 
Wittgenstein, ‘the enemy is a mode of seeing which thinks it knows in advance what is 
worth looking at and what is not.’6  
 
A Wittgensteinian focus on still life painting will enable us to examine the broader 
significance of the role of Morandi’s still life paintings in the narrative and provide a 
mode of thinking about the paradoxical nature of DeLillo’s aesthetic and philosophical 
engagement with the ordinary – the way the ordinary can be transfigured by a different 
way of ‘seeing’, and things can be simultaneously ordinary and extraordinary.  
 
 
I. RETREAT  
 
In a Guardian article discussing 9/11 fiction Pankaj Mishra argues that Falling Man 
shows ‘DeLillo [...] retreating to the domestic life’. The overall thrust of his argument is 
that DeLillo’s narrow scope signifies a failure of some kind. The word ‘retreat’ suggests 
a giving up, or backing away; a withdrawal. For Mishra the fact that ‘DeLillo confines 
himself to recording the emotional and existential struggles of 9/11 survivors’ 7  is 
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indicative of a lack of ambition and political nerve. Mishra is not alone in viewing 
Falling Man as a failure. Andrew O’Hagan, Michiko Kakutani and other critics 
consider the novel to have failed, above all it would seem, for not matching the kind of 
panoramic and incisive depiction of social and political life characteristic of DeLillo’s 
earlier fiction.  
 
The initial reception of Falling Man, however, has to be seen in light of the tremendous 
sense of expectation created by the apparent similarities between core features of 
DeLillo’s earlier fiction and the events of 9/11. For, as Sam Anderson notes: 
 
all of DeLillo’s signature obsessions clearly intersect in the chaos of that 
morning—a secret plot leading to a spectacular mass disaster that’s immediately 
absorbed into the permanent impermanence of the 24-hour news cycle. It’s like the 
JFK assassination magnified exponentially and, just as a bonus, imported to the 
city he grew up in and writes best about.
8
 
 
Indeed, the resonance between key aspects of DeLillo’s previous fiction and the events of 
September 11 was perceived to be so striking that not only did barely a single review of Falling 
Man fail to mention the apparent parallels between them, but they did so in the most hyperbolic 
of terms. Tom Junod, for example, writes: ‘It was a day he himself might have authored. 
The man has been writing the post-9/11 novel for the better part of four decades’;9 John 
Leonard claims: ‘It wasn’t a question of whether Don DeLillo would write a 9/11 novel, 
or even when. He has been writing it all along’;10 and, according to O’Hagan, ‘DeLillo’s 
been on the road to having September 11 as his subject long before the events of that day 
happened’.
11
 
 
It is not surprising therefore that for many reviewers Falling Man was something of a 
disappointment, if not a failure. Its main focus – the private, ordinary, domestic world 
of an estranged couple, brought back together in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist 
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attack – is far removed from the kind of acute reflections on consumer capitalism, 
image culture, spectacle and terror found in DeLillo’s previous novels.  
 
Falling Man is notable for its lack of typical DeLillian features: it lacks the epic scope 
and blistering prose of Underworld, and the sober, straight-laced dialogue is far 
removed from the witty banter of White Noise or edgy gravity of Libra. Furthermore, 
there is very little engagement with forms of electronic media or consumer culture. 
Though the novel begins and ends with the protagonist Keith Neudecker leaving the 
North Tower of the World Trade Centre moments before it collapses, the narrative 
account of such a spectacular event lacks the kind of charged, dramatic tension that 
DeLillo has produced in previous novels. In Libra and Underworld, for example, he 
masterfully recreates the awe and intensity of historical events. In Libra, the build up to 
and moment of Kennedy’s assassination is thrillingly wrought. DeLillo uses a tight 
narrative structure that moves ever more rapidly to the cataclysmic event of Kennedy’s 
murder. Similarly, in the prologue to Underworld, which recounts the winning of the 
play-offs by the New York Giants, the historical moment of collective euphoria is so 
powerfully rendered that the reader feels a visceral thrill. But in Falling Man such 
DeLillian narrative displays are almost entirely absent, even the one dramatic event in 
the text – the moment of impact – is oddly muted; it is depicted from inside the tower 
and inside the plane, creating a feeling of enclosed space and close-up intimacy. The 
event is portrayed on a small scale, seen from the perspective of the characters’ inner 
lives and not as a spectacular image or in terms of its social and political significance. 
 
The novel chronicles the lives of a fractured, somewhat dysfunctional family in the 
days, months and years following the September 11
 
terrorist attack. The main narrative 
is made up of three parts: the first and second parts deal with the first thirty-six days 
after the attack, while the third takes place several years later. The different parts are 
divided by three short sections tracing the sinister progress of one of the terrorists, 
Haddad. The novel opens as protagonist Keith Neudecker has just escaped from the 
World Trade Centre and makes his way to the house of his estranged wife Lianne. The 
narrative then roughly alternates between Keith and Lianne’s respective points of view 
and charts the renewal of their marriage as they both learn to cope with life ‘after the 
planes’ (FM 8). The novel’s main focus is not the development of a series of events, but 
the everyday ‘ordinary thoughts’ (FM 22), and seemingly inconsequential activities of 
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its somewhat anonymous principal characters. Though we learn about the fact that Keith 
has a brief affair with a woman who also escaped from the towers and the fact that his 
wife Lianne is an editor and runs a workshop for Alzheimer sufferers, these features are 
no more or less significant than the things they see or do more generally.  
 
Why, we might ask, does a novel that is ostensibly concerned with so public and 
historical an event limit its focus to the intensely private and domestic? Why, when 
dealing with such a dramatic, cataclysmic event, does DeLillo – who has written about 
cataclysmic, historical, highly mediatised events so successfully in the past – choose to 
remain within the confines of the seemingly uneventful, routine, everyday concerns of 
ordinary people?  
 
One of the possible reasons for the lack of socio-political analysis in the novel could be 
linked to the ethical issues surrounding 9/11. The magnitude of what happened, the 
sheer unthinkable human loss and tragedy, as well as the oversaturated media coverage 
of the event, make the artistic representation of it both ethically and aesthetically 
problematic (and to a certain extent, the figure of the performance artist, Falling Man, 
embodies this problematic). It is perhaps therefore unsurprising that DeLillo adopts 
such an oblique approach, that he avoids the subjects presumed to be most worth 
addressing, just as he avoids 9/11 idiom in favour of ordinary language – referring to 
seemingly neutral, abstract terms like ‘the planes’, ‘the towers’ and ‘that day’, rather 
than 9/11 or Ground Zero or the Twin Towers.
12
 When discussing the issue of writing 
about the holocaust, the German writer W.G. Sebald explained in an interview that, 
‘you would have to approach it from an angle, and by intimating to the reader that these 
subjects are constant company; their presence shades every inflection of every sentence 
one writes’.13 Sebald’s novel The Emigrants is implicitly about the holocaust and yet 
explicitly concerned with the everyday minutiae of its characters’ lives. Similarly, we 
can read Falling Man as a profound meditation on the aftermath of September 11
 
precisely in the detailed way it focuses on individual lives involved in domestic, 
ordinary routine. Even though in many significant ways Falling Man doesn’t seem to be 
about September 11 at all, its emotional and poetic force derives from its angled 
                                                 
12
 For a cultural study of the ‘rhetorical and political work performed by the event’s loomingly proper 
names,’ see Marc Redfield, ‘Virtual Trauma: The Idiom of 9/11’, Diacritics, 37, 2007, pp. 55-80 
13
 W.G. Sebald, The Guardian, 21 December 2001, 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2001/dec/21/artsandhumanities.highereducation>  
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approach: the way, as Linda S. Kauffman observes, everything in the novel ‘seems 
contaminated by September 11’.14 
 
However, in order to understand more fully why DeLillo turns away from painting the 
kind of broad, historical and political canvases seen in novels such as Libra or 
Underworld towards the kind of still life intimacy evinced in Falling Man, we need to 
view DeLillo’s focus on the domestic and the ordinary not merely as a reaction to 
9/11,
15
 but in relation to the broader concerns of his work. We need to examine his 
significant aesthetic and philosophical engagement with the ordinary. 
 
The incorporation in the novel of two still life paintings by Giorgio Morandi can be seen 
as indicative of the significance of this engagement in DeLillo’s work. Morandi, who 
DeChirico called ‘the painter of the metaphysics of common objects’,16 was unaffected 
by the vagaries of the cultural and political landscape of his time and his work lacks the 
kind of postmodern cultural commentary on the image and image culture with which 
DeLillo is commonly associated. Morandi devoted himself almost exclusively and 
obsessively to still life and landscape painting, and his monastic lifestyle and aesthetic 
practice – a rigour of ‘self-imposed restrictions’17 – has strong parallels with many 
DeLillo characters, including Keith Neudecker.  
 
Morandi’s modest and intimate paintings, characterised by their ‘austere formalism’,18 
are an important part of Falling Man’s aesthetic; they are emblematic of the novel’s 
formal and thematic concerns and a visual expression of the novel’s dominant mood and 
narrative structure. Prior to the publication of Falling Man, excerpts of the novel were 
published in the New Yorker under the title ‘Still Life’, an indication of the way that 
each scene of the novel functions in a sense like a still life – lost moments frozen in 
time, isolated and imbued with melancholy, but also a serenity and meditative 
                                                 
14
 Kauffman, ‘The Wake of Terror: Don DeLillo’s “In the Ruins of the Future”, “Baader-Meinhof” and 
Falling Man’, Modern Fiction Studies, 54, 2008, p. 365 
15
 An interesting parallel might be drawn here between DeLillo and the Belgian artist Luc Tuymans, who 
in 2002 was asked to present a piece of work at the Documenta art exhibition. The exhibition’s theme was 
social and political engagement and Tuymans was expected to present paintings of images relating to 9/11. 
Instead, Tuymans presented a still life. 
16
 Giorgio DeChirico, cited in Matthew Gale, ‘white bottle – red earth’, Giorgio Morandi, Matthew Gale 
& Donna de Salvo, (eds.), London: Tate Gallery, 2001, p. 92 
17
 Karen Wilkin, Morandi, http://www.artchive.com/artchive/M/morandi.html 
18
 Matthew Gale, ‘white bottle – red earth’, Giorgio Morandi, p. 87 
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musicality. As Michael Wood notes, the novel is ‘less a narrative than a series of takes 
on a condition. [...] Its paragraphs vivid variants on the phrase “This was the world 
now.”’19 The novel’s fragmentary structure and narrow focus ensures that these ‘series 
of takes’ are thrown into relief, and maintain an elusive, haunting quality. Like the 
Morandi paintings, each scene (and the novel as a whole) has an ‘odd, spare power’ 
(FM 49).  
 
Morandi’s paintings are not only significant in themselves, however, but also for the 
fact that they are still lifes, and thus representative of an aesthetic form that has 
considerable resonance for the aesthetics of Falling Man and DeLillo’s work in general. 
In The Body Artist DeLillo seems to suggest a way of thinking about this resonance 
when he offers an analysis of Lauren Hartke’s performance piece: ‘Maybe the idea is to 
think of time differently [...]. Stop time, or stretch it out, or open it up. Make a still life 
that’s living, not painted’ (BA 107). Though DeLillo is referring here to a work of 
performance art it is also functions as a description of his own late style of writing. In 
general, the works of art in his novels, especially those in The Body Artist, Falling Man 
and his latest novel, Point Omega, are used to reflect upon and embody key aesthetic 
questions and features with which the novels themselves are engaged. They are not 
merely decorative or used to illustrate a specific point.  
 
In order to examine this claim further, and to investigate DeLillo’s significant treatment 
of the ordinary I will begin by tracing DeLillo’s engagement with still life back to the 
final paragraph of Underworld, which I will read in relation to the aesthetics of Falling 
Man. I will then draw a parallel between the different paintings described in 
Underworld and Falling Man, before going on to examine the significance of the 
Morandi still lifes to Falling Man more generally. 
 
 
II. STILL LIFE 
 
Despite the differences between the late style of Falling Man and the expansive, 
complex, multi-layered aesthetic of Underworld, we can perhaps see an indication of 
                                                 
19
 Wood, ‘Picture of a Gone World’, Bookforum , June, 2007, 
<http://www.bookforum.com/inprint/200703/244> 
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the future direction of DeLillo’s writing, in particular the significance of still life, in 
Underworld’s final paragraph where the narrator turns to look at:  
 
things in the room, offscreen, unwebbed, the tissued grain of deskwood alive in 
light, the thick lived tenor of things, the argument of things to be seen and eaten, 
the apple core going sepia in the lunch tray, and the dense measures of experience 
in a random glance […] and the chipped rim of the mug that holds your yellow 
pencils, skewed all crazy, and the plied lives of the simplest surface, the slabbed 
butter melting on the crumbled bun, and the yellow of the yellow of the pencils. (U 
827) 
 
The emphasis on light, tenor, colour, and the very content of this passage evokes the 
image of a still life painting. It reveals a profound engagement with the material of daily 
life or what a character refers to as ‘the depth and reach of the commonplace’, and 
seems to announce the formal and thematic concerns of DeLillo’s later work (U 542). 
The attention to detail, the Hemingwayesque prose, the concern with ordinary things, 
with looking at the overlooked, and the extraordinary nature of these things when 
looked at closely, are all elements foregrounded in his later novels.  
 
In Looking at the Overlooked Bryson provides a definition of still life by contrasting it 
with history painting. He writes: ‘while history painting is constructed around narrative, 
still life is the world minus its narrative, or, better, the world minus its capacity for 
generating narrative interest.’ 20  Bryson elaborates this contrast by drawing on the 
distinction made by Charles Sterling between “megalography” and “rhopography”. He 
writes:  
 
megalography is the depiction of those things in the world which are great – the 
legends of the gods, the battles of heroes, the crises of history. Rhopography (from 
rhopos, trivial objects, small wares, trifles) is the depiction of those things which 
lack importance, the unassuming material base of life that ‘importance’ constantly 
overlooks.
21
  
 
                                                 
20
 Bryson, Looking at the Overlooked, p. 60 
21
 Bryson, Looking at the Overlooked, p. 61 
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This distinction is one way of reading the shift from Underworld to DeLillo’s later 
novels and indeed, from the opening of Underworld to its ending. We can thus read the 
contrast between the novel’s undramatic, unpeopled, serene ending and its dynamic, 
multi-perspectival, heavily populated prologue as symbolic of a shift in DeLillo’s work. 
The prologue is a clear example of megalography – a narrative-driven portrayal of a 
legendary baseball game used to illustrate the historical crisis of the Cold War, featuring 
heroes, villains and modern-day gods like Frank Sinatra and J. Edgar Hoover. Whereas 
the novel’s final paragraph, with its emphasis on ordinary things that ostensibly lack 
importance, has the characteristics of rhopography. This shift can also be seen in the 
difference between two paintings that DeLillo refers to at these different stages in the 
novel: Brueghel’s The Triumph of Death and Whistler’s Arrangement in Grey and 
Black. A reproduction of the Brueghel painting is scrutinised by J. Edgar Hoover while 
he is at the baseball game: it is described as dramatic, violent, eventful, as a ‘visionary 
landscape of havoc and ruin’ (U 41). The Whistler painting, on the other hand, 
embodies a certain stillness and serenity. The painting, which Klara Sax owns a small 
print of, plays a significant role in the novel’s final chapter, providing its title and the 
following piece of art appreciation:  
 
[Klara] hung it in a corner of the spare room because she thought it was generally 
unlooked at and because she liked the formal balances and truthful muted colours 
and because the picture was so clashingly modern [...] but Klara also liked looking 
right through the tonal components, the high theory of colour, the theory of paint 
itself, perhaps – looking into the depths of the picture, at the mother, the woman, 
the mother herself, the anecdotal aspect of a woman in a chair, thinking, and 
immensely interesting she was, so Quaker-prim and still. (U 748) 
 
Even though the painting is a portrait it has many of the hallmarks of a still life, as 
indicated by the abstract title, Arrangement in Grey and Black, which highlights the 
importance of the painting’s formal qualities, or what DeLillo refers to as Whistler’s 
‘doctrinal priorities’ (U 748). Its subject matter is ordinary and concrete yet the 
depiction is moving towards the abstract: the emphasis in the painting is on rhythm, 
balance and tonal composition. Its mood is calm, meditative, subdued and, as in a still 
life, very little of apparent significance takes place.   
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In Falling Man, DeLillo once again makes use of specific, though less well known, 
works of art
22
 in the body of the text, which not only inspire a series of illuminating 
descriptions of and reflections on painting, but also provide an aesthetic model rich in 
resonance for the novel as a whole. The paintings described in the novel are two still 
lifes by Morandi, hanging on the wall in the apartment of Lianne’s mother, Nina Bartos, 
an art historian. The paintings were given to her by her lover, Martin Ridnour, who, on 
looking at one of them, thinks he can see the twin towers:  
 
The painting in question showed seven or eight objects, the taller ones set against a 
brushy slate background. The other items were huddled boxes and biscuit tins, 
grouped before a darker background. The full array, in unfixed perspective and 
mostly muted colors, carried an odd, spare power. [...] Two of the taller items were 
dark and sombre, with smoky marks and smudges, and one of them was partly 
concealed by a long-necked bottle. The bottle was a bottle, white. The two dark 
objects, too obscure to name, were the things that Martin was referring to. (FM 49) 
 
The significance of this painting, which, like Whistler’s Arrangement in Gray and 
Black, is characterised by its emphasis on rhythm, balance and subtle shifts of colour 
and tone, goes beyond the resemblance that Martin sees between these objects and the 
Twin Towers. Its significance also goes beyond the importance of the contrast between 
Morandi’s work and that of the performance artist ‘Falling Man’. As Kauffman notes, 
‘the pleasures of the text in DeLillo’s […] novel revolve, to an unprecedented degree, 
around visual art’.23  
 
DeLillo’s description is a wonderfully sober, contained evocation of the painting: the 
restrained, understated prose, which captures what Lance Esplund describes as the 
‘elegiac-yet-unassuming, almost-seismic weight’ 24  of Morandi’s objects, makes an 
illuminating contrast with the single sentence paragraph detailing Klara’s reaction to the 
Whistler. The passage from Underworld is of Proustian length, full of multiple sub-
clauses, repetition and shifts of register; is expansive and vibrant, contains description 
as well as analysis, and reflects a personal, individual response to the painting. In 
                                                 
22
 Though it is not possible to be certain, judging by DeLillo’s description, the Morandi painting 
discussed would appear to be one of several still lifes titled Natura Morta 1956 
23
 Kauffman, ‘The Wake of Terror’, p. 370 
24
 Lance Esplund, ‘Morandi’s Subtle Spectacle’, The New York Sun, September 18, 2008, 
http://www.nysun.com/arts/morandis-subtle-spectacle/86073/ 
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Falling Man there is no analysis – of technique, theory or significance – and only the 
faintest value judgement is betrayed in the appreciation of its ‘odd, spare power’. 
Rather, the description reflects the painting itself: it is plain-spoken and economical, 
vague yet precise, and the short, uncomplicated sentences convey the painting’s mood 
of ‘disquietude and anxiety’.25 The passage is not simply a description but a literary 
embodiment of the painting’s rhythm and tonal register.  
 
Though the passage is quite prosaic, DeLillo nevertheless manages to express the 
enigmatic poetry of Morandi’s painting in the tautological simplicity of the phrase ‘the 
bottle was a bottle, white’. This odd use of repetition recalls the ‘yellow of the yellow of 
the pencils’ from Underworld’s final paragraph and also Mr. Tuttle’s ‘the word for 
moonlight is moonlight’ from The Body Artist (BA 82). These zen-like phrases, which 
economically emphasise the ‘thingness’ of things at the same time as expressing a 
curious sense of mystery, mirror the operation at work in a still life. They isolate the 
words in a similar way in which still life isolates aesthetic space, and in the act of 
isolation suggest further, deeper meanings.  
 
Though Morandi paints ordinary, everyday objects – bottles, boxes, bowls – these 
objects are transformed in the painting into ‘something else’, something elemental or 
transcendent. As DeLillo notes, the paintings depict ‘kitchen objects but removed from 
the kitchen, free of the kitchen, the house, everything practical and functioning’ and 
‘take you inward, down and in’, conveying ‘something deeper than things or the shape 
of things’ (FM 49, 111). Morandi’s still lifes share not only a mood and tonal register 
with Falling Man, but also a similar engagement with the ordinary and the 
transformation of the ordinary, a similar combination of austerity and depth, apparent 
insignificance and heightened meaning.  
 
Morandi’s still lifes, writes Esplund, portray ‘a middle ground — an arena, in both 
substance and space, somewhere between the everyday and the eternal.’ 26  The 
importance of this ‘middle ground’ in DeLillo’s reading of Morandi is made apparent in 
the first appearance of the paintings in the novel. The description occurs in one of the 
                                                 
25
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opening scenes, while Lianne is describing her mother’s ‘serenely self-possessed’ 
apartment, in which  
 
what she loved most were the two still lifes on the north wall, by Giorgio Morandi, 
a painter her mother had studied and written about. These were groupings of 
bottles, jugs, biscuit tins, that was all, but there was something in the brushstrokes 
that held a mystery she could not name, or in the irregular edges of vases and jars, 
some reconnoitre inward, human and obscure, away from the very light and color 
of the paintings. (FM 12) 
  
This passage, contrasting the humble, seemingly insignificant content – emphasised by 
the idiomatic phrase ‘that was all’ – with the unnameable ‘mystery’ of the brushstrokes 
or irregular edges, demonstrates a tension embodied in the paintings that is central to the 
novel’s own aesthetic: between the ordinary and extraordinary, plain and mysterious, 
between the way something can be both seemingly unremarkable and yet highly 
significant.  
 
The phrase ‘that was all’ is typical of the way the novel engages with the ordinary – it is 
a colloquial, plain-speaking mode of address, used to indicate something that seems 
ordinary and without significance. Indeed, the same colloquial tone and almost exact 
wording is used in the previous scene when Lianne is reflecting on a postcard she has 
received, the face of which is a reproduction of the cover of Shelley’s poem Revolt of 
Islam. Lianne is struck by the card and the uncanny timing of its arrival ‘three days after 
the planes’. She thinks: ‘it was a matter of simple coincidence, or not so simple’ before 
concluding, ‘this was all’ (FM 8). Though the expression and tone are somewhat 
dismissive, paradoxically, it is precisely in this moment that the possible significance is 
emphasised. The passage, like the one describing the still life, reveals that, equally 
typical and important to the novel is the way this emphasis on the ordinary is contrasted 
with, and yet tied to, a concern, expressed in ordinary terms, with ‘something else’, 
something ‘not so simple’.  
 
Again and again in the narrative Lianne and Keith reflect on the ordinariness or 
apparent insignificance of the everyday sights and events in their lives; the way ‘things 
were ordinary in all the ways they were always ordinary’ (FM 67). And yet these 
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seeming non-events are, like Morandi’s objects, imbued with a nameless mystery. As 
with the many recurring gestures and rituals in the novel, these small moments, when 
looked at more closely suggest ‘something else’, some mystery or ‘something deeper’. 
The novel is full of such moments: Keith correcting the spelling on his mail or 
‘checking the running time of rented movies before he took them out of the store’ (FM 
31/32, 121); Lianne pressing ‘herself naked to the full-length mirror,’ leaving ‘the 
fogged marks of her face, hands, breasts and thighs stamped on the mirror’ (FM 106); or 
their son, Justin, sharpening his pencils, described as a ‘ritual more thorough and 
righteous than the formal signing of some document of state’ (FM 39). Though 
seemingly insignificant, such moments are nonetheless central to the mood, rhythm and 
meaning of the novel, to the way it conveys the ‘off moments of living the lives others 
think we are living’ (FM 121).  
 
The next section will examine in detail the various ways in which Falling Man can be 
seen to embody an aesthetics of still life, by looking at its form, structure and use of 
language and imagery. And will then consider the significance of this aesthetics for 
understanding the novel’s engagement with the ordinary. 
 
 
III. STILLNESS 
 
Falling Man is on the surface a simple narrative. Like still life, the novel is pitched ‘at a 
level of material existence where nothing exceptional occurs’27 – a world of ‘sitting 
alone in still rooms’, where ‘pretty much everything seemed to be unremarkable’ (FM 
20, 187). But it is in this unremarkable, intimate stillness that the novel’s aesthetic 
interest lies. In its engagement with the everyday Falling Man’s point of focus is 
strikingly similar to that of still life painting, which Bryson describes as ‘the everyday 
world of routine and repetition, at a level of existence where events are [...] the small-
scale, trivial, forgettable acts of bodily survival and self-maintenance’.28 The parallel 
with still life can also be felt in the novel’s quiet, meditative and understated tone – ‘an 
intimacy of clean, physical detail’ (FM 30).  
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Rather than drama, DeLillo emphasises stillness and slow time, and rather than linear 
perspective, the novel, like still life, ‘proposes a much closer space’,29 the characters are 
portrayed, like Morandi’s objects, in ‘unfixed perspective’, disconnected from the 
strictures of plot; they are shown ‘outside the tide of voices and faces, God and country, 
sitting alone in still rooms’ (FM 49, 20). The novel is claustrophobically intimate: 
almost everything is seen from either Lianne’s or Keith’s perspective, and both of them 
are withdrawn, isolated and trapped in ‘self hell’ (FM 182). The emphasis is less on 
linear development than on recurring acts of ‘bodily survival and self-maintenance’, 
which can be seen most clearly in the frequent descriptions of idiosyncratic rituals and 
gestures. This focus on the gestural and ritualistic is found throughout the novel: in the 
account of the rules in Keith’s weekly poker game; in Rumsey’s habit of counting toes; 
in Lianne’s communication with her son, Justin, through body language; and, perhaps 
most strikingly, in Keith’s ‘wrist exercises’ and Lianne’s retrogressive counting. Keith 
continues to perform these exercises, ‘that resembled prayer in some remote northern 
province’, even once the wrist has fully recovered (FM 59, 106, 235-6), and Lianne’s 
counting is described as ‘her form of lyric verse [...] a little songlike but with a rigor, a 
tradition of fixed order’ (FM 188). These rituals and gestures function like recurring 
motifs in the novel: they are given such weight that they seem to be imbued with deep 
significance, which, as the reference to prayer and lyric verse suggests, can be seen as 
both aesthetic and spiritual.
30
   
 
This emphasis on rituals and gestures is closely linked to the intimate space and 
circularity of the narrative, and reflects the characters’ disorientation in space and time. 
This disorientation can be seen most dramatically in the novel’s opening pages: ‘It was 
not a street anymore but a world, a time and space of falling ash and near night’ (FM 3). 
This apocalyptic world is, in a sense, the world of the novel as a whole. It is a world full 
of ‘otherworldly things’ in which time is no longer the same and space, or at least the 
perception of things within it, has radically altered. This world, in which ‘nothing 
seemed familiar’, is both the setting for and expression of the main characters’ liminal 
condition (FM 65). The characters exist in a kind of suspended present, belief in the past 
has been shattered: they are left with posthumous experience, ‘everything now is 
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measured by after’ (FM 137). This experience of time is exemplified by Keith’s visits to 
Las Vegas, an unreal place, which exists in a permanent present, ‘where there was 
nothing outside, no flash of history or memory’ (FM 225).  
 
Lianne reflects on her family’s new situation that ‘their lives were in transition’ (FM 
67). All her family members seem to be on some kind of threshold, exemplified most 
strikingly by the image of Keith, ash-covered, ‘up from the dead’ and standing in the 
doorway to her apartment (FM 8). They are in a state of abeyance or spiritual retreat:
31
 
Keith is a ‘dim figure’, a ‘hovering presence’, ‘not quite returned to his body yet’, ‘it 
was like he was dead’ (FM 23, 59, 104); Justin intentionally speaks solely in 
monosyllables; Nina, Lianne’s mother, is ‘entering a kind of withdrawal’ and Nina’s 
lover, Martin, lives in constant transit, ‘coming from a distant city on [his] way to 
another distant city and neither place has shape or form’ (FM 43, 42). Lianne herself 
seems to be on a philosophical or religious threshold as she struggles with and resists 
the idea of God and veers between spiritual yearning and pragmatic scepticism, neither 
believing nor disbelieving.  
 
This condition of stasis or suspension is also embodied in the figure of the performance 
artist, Falling Man, who carries out dramatic stunts around the City, jumping from a 
high point and remaining suspended in a pose that resembles the people who jumped 
from the Twin Towers. Although this gesture brings back the memory and image of 
those jumpers, it can also be seen to symbolise the novel’s characters’ suspended 
condition.  
 
In order to reflect this liminal state and disorientating change in space and time, the 
novel as a whole is made up of elliptical fragments which appear to have ‘no seeming 
connection’ to each other or to the development of a plot (FM 30): they are attempts to 
capture what are referred to in the novel as ‘lost moment(s)’, or ‘moments frozen in the 
run of routine hours’ (FM 8, 127). The narrative regularly loops back on itself, often 
returning to certain powerful motifs, and the chronology is sometimes out of sequence 
such as when Lianne reflects on Martin’s advice ‘to be equal to the situation’, twenty 
                                                 
31This is a recurring predicament of DeLillo’s protagonists which can be seen, for example, in Nick 
Shay’s ‘Lontananza’ in Underworld, Bill Gray’s reclusive isolation in Mao II, or Owen Brademas desert 
exile in The Names. It will be examined in detail in the next chapter.  
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pages before we hear Martin give the actual advice (FM 23, 42). This sense of 
recurrence and circularity hints at the musical element of Falling Man (an element that 
can also be felt in Morandi’s paintings): its structure recalls, for example, Bach’s 
Goldberg Variations – short, taut passages that return to themes and scenes with subtle 
changes in mood and tempo. In the novel’s final scene the text loops back to the 
moment leading up to the beginning of the narrative, thereby subverting the notion of 
narrative progress. This undermining of linearity has the effect of disorientating the 
reader and tightening the focus on a given scene irrespective of any consequences for 
the overall narrative. The passing of narrative time ceases to be important with regards 
to plot and only has importance with regards to the distance from ‘that day’.  
 
The discontinuity of the temporal sequence, in conjunction with the pared-down prose, 
slows the narrative down. Justin’s attempt to speak solely in monosyllables, as a way of 
framing ‘clear thoughts’, since ‘it helps [him] go slow when [he] think[s]’, can be read 
as a self-reflective expression of the novel’s own method (FM 66). Despite the lucid, 
uncluttered nature of the prose and the straightforward plot it is a slow, dense read. It 
shares what Cornel Bonca sees as The Body Artist’s ‘austere refusal to offer the easy 
pleasures of narrative.’32 DeLillo has stripped the narrative of momentum and the reader 
is forced to go slow, compelled to focus on each specific scene, as if it is a still life.   
 
The poetic economy of Falling Man’s short, frequently monosyllabic sentences 
exemplifies its minimalist aesthetics and the deceptive simplicity of its focus on the 
ordinary. The simplicity is deceptive because though the novel’s narrative style, as well 
as many of the domestic scenes, may, for example, resemble Raymond Carver’s 
minimalist stories with their short, simple sentences, characterised by monosyllabic 
words and repetition, detailing the pain of fraught human relationships, there are 
significant differences. The parallels – for example the incessant repetition of the 
personal pronoun – can clearly be seen in the following excerpts from Carver and 
Falling Man: 
 
My husband eats with a good appetite. But I don’t think he’s really hungry. He 
chews, arms on the table, and stares at something across the room. He looks at me 
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and looks away. He wipes his mouth on the napkin. He shrugs, and goes on 
eating.
33
 
  
They slept in the same bed because she could not tell him to use the sofa and 
because she liked having him here next to her. He didn’t seem to sleep. He lay on 
his back and talked but mostly listened and this was all right. She didn’t need to 
know a man’s feelings and not this man. She liked the spaces he made. She liked 
dressing in front of him. (FM 18)     
 
Unlike Carver, DeLillo’s adoption of this style is not a means of reflecting a particular 
American social class or an attempt at gritty realism. Though the parallels indicate the 
extent to which DeLillo has indeed retreated ‘to the domestic’ there are nevertheless 
significant ways in which his late work shares core concerns with his earlier work and 
differs from novels whose principal subject matter is the everyday, domestic concerns 
of American life. What distinguishes Falling Man from works by writers such as 
Carver, who champion the ordinary, is its formal, aesthetic and philosophical focus on 
the ordinary.  
 
Bryson observes how, in still life painting it is precisely because certain features are ‘so 
ordinary, [that] the quality of attention brought to bear on the objects stands quite 
outside normal experience and the normal domestic round’.34 Similarly, in Falling Man 
the focus is of such intensity and narrow range that what seems ordinary no longer is. 
The very frequency with which the word ordinary is used in the novel is itself an 
example of the way the ordinary ceases to be ordinary. The unfussiness of the prose, its 
plain ordinariness, is pitched at such a level that it ceases to be ordinary at all and 
becomes poetic and elegiac. The narrative technique and the taut prose draw attention to 
the extraordinary features of the ordinary, and the tight focus serves to emphasise both 
the concrete and the numinous nature of ordinary things. The apparent plainness is 
deceptive because the focus on the ordinary simultaneously masks and reveals DeLillo’s 
ambiguous and complex engagement with the possibility of transcendent meaning.  
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This sense of the simultaneously concrete and numinous nature of ordinary things is 
perhaps best exemplified in the recurring image of the falling shirt that Keith sees and is 
captivated by when leaving the North Tower. On walking away from the Tower Keith’s 
senses are bombarded by the terrifying noise, stench and shocking sights: he observes 
‘otherworldly things’ speeding past, people running frantically, and the horror of figures 
‘dropping into free space’ (FM 4). Yet it is not this that arrests his attention, but 
something that seems disconnected from the mass destruction taking place:  
 
There was something else then, outside all this, not belonging to this, aloft. He 
watched it coming down. A shirt came down out of the high smoke, a shirt lifted 
and drifting in the scant light and then falling again, down toward the river. (FM 4) 
 
The first sentence emphasises the transcendent nature of the image: each of the short 
clauses stresses the fact that it is different, that the drifting shirt does not correspond to 
the madness and otherworldly horror of everything else around him. Yet the fact that it 
is different from something so otherworldly suggests that, paradoxically, perhaps it is 
somehow more real or ordinary. It is something he can see clearly.  
 
The description of the shirt ends after these three short sentences, without developing 
into what Philip Nel calls ‘typical DeLilloesque exegesis’.35 Rather, DeLillo lets ‘the 
latent meanings turn and bend in the wind, free from authoritative comment’ (FM 12). It 
is left isolated, one of many unexamined but striking moments, images or gestures that 
occur throughout the novel. The reader can only infer the possible significance or 
metaphorical qualities of the shirt. DeLillo merely describes a physical event, an 
ordinary object falling through the sky, and there is no attempt made to develop it into a 
metaphor. As we have seen, the novel is full of such understated poetic tropes – 
apparently ordinary, physical events, moments or gestures described in pared down 
prose that, despite their literality, within the structure and tenor of the narrative are 
heightened to a pitch of suggestive significance. The most obvious example of such a 
trope is the very title of the novel, which on one level refers quite simply to the 
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performance artist known as Falling Man, but which is also full of religious and literary 
resonance and connotations.
36
  
 
Although DeLillo does not examine or analyse Keith’s sight of the falling shirt, its 
importance is emphasised by its recurrence at the end of the novel in the final 
paragraph: ‘then he saw a shirt come down out of the sky. He walked and saw it fall, 
arms waving like nothing in this life’ (FM 246) and by the fact that when he returns to 
Lianne’s house after escaping from the Towers, one of the first things he says to her is: 
‘there was a shirt coming down out of the sky’ (FM 88). The image of the falling shirt 
seems to relate in some way both to the title and the performance artist ‘Falling Man’. 
The most obvious association is perhaps its metonymic function, symbolising the men 
and women who jumped from the burning towers. However, though it inevitably 
symbolises the terrible loss of life, in some ways it is a hopeful, uplifting image with a 
powerful, transcendent element. For, despite the fact that it is falling towards the river, 
there is a beauty and magical quality to the shirt’s ethereal drifting: the shirt is ‘aloft’, 
separate from the carnage. And yet there is an equally strong sense in which the power 
of the image is derived from its literal quality: the fact that, in itself, the image of a shirt 
falling from the sky is relatively quite banal. It is a very ordinary, very human object, 
but in extraordinary, inhuman circumstances, and it is this juxtaposition that makes it 
shocking and horrifying, yet beautiful and peaceful. The shirt’s ambiguous ordinariness 
recalls the pair of shoes left on ‘the hood of a bleeding policeman’s car’ in Libra, 
described as a ‘strangeness [...] that is almost holy’ (L 15). Both are metonymic objects 
that in their haunting emptiness symbolise loss and death at the same time as being 
banal, functional things.  
 
This combination of the physical and metaphysical, this emphasis on the ‘thingness’ of 
things and the paradoxical way these things transcend their physicality, or how the 
actuality of what is portrayed is transfigured ‘in order to show something else’,37 are 
major characteristics of still life. But in DeLillo, as in still life, this transfiguration or 
transcendence is intrinsically related to a change in the way things are seen and not in 
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the object itself. Thus it does not imply the existence of a metaphysical or transcendent 
realm; merely a different mode of seeing.  
 
In the next section we will pursue this relation between the ordinary and extraordinary 
by looking at the ambiguity of the ordinary and the importance of point of view in 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. We will make a series of connections between Falling 
Man, still life and Wittgenstein that will illuminate the paradoxical status of seeing the 
ordinary, particularly in relation to the ‘strangeness hidden in the familiar’,38 and will 
show how a mode of seeing can transform ordinary objects, making them seem strange, 
unfamiliar, even uncanny, but also wonderful.  
 
 
IV. WITTGENSTEIN AND STILL LIFE 
 
In a celebrated passage from Culture and Value Wittgenstein imagines the possibility of 
observing everyday life from an aesthetic point of view.
39
 His reflections on this 
imagined scenario address a number of important issues for our discussion, especially 
with regards to the paradox at the heart of seeing the ordinary. He writes:  
 
Nothing could be more remarkable than seeing a man who thinks he is unobserved 
performing some quite simple everyday activity [...] – surely this would be 
uncanny and wonderful at the same time. We should be observing something more 
wonderful than anything a playwright could arrange to be acted on stage: Life 
itself. But then we do see this every day without its making the slightest impression 
on us! True enough but we do not see it from that point of view. (CV p.4) 
 
Though the passage does not concern still life it nevertheless draws attention to a crucial 
question surrounding the aesthetics of the ordinary, which is central to Falling Man, still 
life and features of Wittgenstein’s own philosophy; the question of point of view. 
Further on in the passage Wittgenstein explains that this point of view is akin to that 
experienced when confronted by a work of art. ‘A work of art forces us’, he writes, ‘to 
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see it in the right perspective’ (CV p. 4). With regards to seeing the ordinary, however, 
such a perspective would mean that things are no longer seen as one would ordinarily 
see them and thus they no longer would seem ordinary; they would seem uncanny – 
both familiar and unfamiliar, normal and strange, ordinary and extraordinary.  
 
This paradox is at the heart of the aesthetics of the ordinary, and also of a vital tension 
in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. A tension between being at home and yet lost, 
situated and yet restless, seeking a clear view of things, yet also needing to be grounded, 
to see things in their dense, complex forms of life. In ‘Wittgenstein’s “Imperfect 
Garden”’, an avowedly ‘more “literary” reading of the Investigations than is 
traditionally offered, open to the philosophical force of metaphor and form,’40 David 
Schalkwyk explores this tension in Wittgenstein’s later work and draws on Freud’s 
reading of the uncanny as having ‘deep roots in the idea of the strangeness hidden in the 
familiar’ in order to illuminate the paradoxical status of the idea of home in the 
Investigations. Schalkwyk writes:  
 
the home to which Wittgenstein wishes to restore language so that it will cease to 
exercise its uncanny bewitchment of our intelligence has precisely the character of 
home in the Freudian and (double) German sense: a place of great familiarity in 
which we dwell without reflection, where everything is “open to view”, but which 
is at the same time and in the same place unknown, unfamiliar, even terrifying.
41
  
 
Schalkwyk’s essay examines Wittgenstein’s turn away ‘from the search for an 
unsituated – we might say “philosophical” – perspective, to the insight that language 
can be defined only in terms of its situation’.42 In the process he teases out a tension in 
the later work between Wittgenstein’s idea of the importance of a ‘perspicuous 
representation’, of commanding ‘a clear view of the use of our words’ (PI 122), and the 
need for language to be ‘described in all its dense, intractable, living “hurly-burly”’.43 
The problem is that when we are entangled in this ‘hurly-burly that constitutes living in 
a language’ we do not have a clear view. And this is why, analogously, for the most 
part, everyday life or the ordinary strikes us as neither wonderful nor uncanny. It does 
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not, in fact, make the ‘slightest impression on us, for we do not see it from that point of 
view’. Despite the fact that ‘everything lies open to view’, what is most important for us 
is hidden because of its simplicity and familiarity; hidden, that is, because we are not 
looking or have forgotten how to look. ‘Don’t think, but look’ implores Wittgenstein in 
the Investigations (PI 66), implying that it is our apparent need to theorise, to explain, to 
build complex intellectual explanatory constructions that blinds us to ‘what is most 
striking and most powerful’ (PI 129). This need to theorise, however, is embedded in 
our language. Schalkwyk writes: ‘both the forms of our language and our own 
homogenizing myopia prevent us from seeing’ things clearly.44  
 
This homogenizing myopia can be compared to what, in relation to still life, Bryson 
describes as ‘the blurs and entropies of vision that screen out everything in creation 
except what the world presents as spectacular’.45 In philosophy the spectacular can be 
seen as the grand narrative, the all-encompassing theory of things, which Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy is directed against. Indeed, in its turn against the spectacular, in its 
overriding concern with the everyday, with the ‘unassuming material base of life’, the 
Investigations may appear, notes Perloff, as ‘an almost simple-minded discussion of the 
everyday use of language’.46 Wittgenstein is aware that his approach may provoke a 
certain consternation or disappointment. He asks: ‘where does our investigation get its 
importance from, since it only seems to destroy everything interesting, that is, all that is 
great and important’ (PI 118)? Traditional philosophy, the philosophy that Wittgenstein 
attempts to cure, is concerned with big, important questions, with the essential nature of 
things: time, God, meaning, existence. But for Wittgenstein the attempt to answer such 
questions, or to uncover the essence of things, results in nothing but houses of cards, a 
series of grand illusions that his focus on the apparently trivial or unimportant, on the 
use of such supposedly philosophical words in everyday language, will clear up. He 
writes: ‘if the words “language”, “experience”, “world”, have a use, it must be as 
humble a one as that of the words “table”, “lamp”, “door”’ (PI 97). 
 
Like still life, Wittgenstein’s later thought is anti-narrative. In the kind of 
philosophising Wittgenstein’s thought is directed against the attempt to give an account 
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of the essential nature of things is normally expressed in a narrative of some kind, albeit 
a theoretical one. The Investigations, on the other hand, marks a turn against narrative. 
Not only does it lack ‘conventional narrative coherence’,47 but it challenges the idea of 
narrative in philosophy, of a systematic, theoretical account of how things are. Indeed, 
this turn is due to the very nature of, and is essential to, his investigation, which, writes 
Wittgenstein, ‘compels us to travel over a wide field of thought criss-cross in every 
direction’ (PI p. vii). Perloff explains how Wittgenstein ‘understands that his mode of 
“investigation” cannot have a beginning, middle, and end, [...] cannot have organic 
unity, a causal, logical, or sequential structure, an underlying theme or masterplot’.48 
Instead, ‘the same points or almost the same points [are] always being approached 
afresh from different directions’ (PI v). Themes are returned to from different angles. 
Like Morandi, with whom he shares an obsessive, repetitive approach to material, 
Wittgenstein ‘repeatedly draws on the same corpus, revising and adjusting his 
examples’.49   
 
The Investigations is concerned with showing how ordinary language functions in 
ordinary circumstances, primarily as a means of dispelling certain metaphysical 
confusions brought about by philosophy being misled by a misuse of language. This 
misuse, however, is due to ordinary language itself, which bewitches our intelligence 
and sends ‘us in pursuit of chimeras’ (PI 94). ‘Our ordinary forms of language’, writes 
Wittgenstein, ‘easily make us overlook’ important distinctions; ‘our forms of expression 
prevents us in all sorts of ways from seeing that nothing out of the ordinary is involved’ 
in how language functions (PI 132, 94). The capacity of ordinary language to mislead 
lies deeply embedded within our grammar and so it is unlikely that this capacity and the 
resultant problems can be cleared up once and for all. Rather they need to be returned to 
again and again, and it is for this reason that Wittgenstein writes in the preface to the 
Investigations of his ‘long and involved journeyings’ and in the text itself of the 
philosopher’s work as that of ‘assembling reminders’, which may prevent us from 
taking false steps (PI p. vii, 127). ‘Truth’, argues Perloff, ‘is not something that can be 
discovered; it can only be rediscovered, day after day’.50 For Wittgenstein, we need to 
                                                 
47
 Austin E. Quigley, ‘Wittgenstein's Philosophizing’, p. 209 
48
 Perloff, ‘From Theory to Grammar’, p. 909 
49
 Perloff, ‘From Theory to Grammar’, p. 909 
50
 Perloff, ‘“But isn’t the same at least the same?” Wittgenstein and the question of poetic translatability’, 
The Literary Wittgenstein, p. 40 
72 
 
  
be constantly striving to get a clear view of things for we are liable to get lost or 
‘entangled in our own rules’ (PI 125), and thus, observes Schalkwyk, we are 
‘condemned to trace and retrace, over and over again a landscape where we are both at 
home and do not know our way about’.51  
 
This need to return repeatedly to the struggle to achieve perspicuity is mostly due to the 
ambiguous status of ordinary language; due, that is, to the fact that it is not possible to 
step outside language, to gain a vantage point from where we can survey language 
whole, and so are compelled to use ordinary language itself to clear up problems caused 
by language. Cavell writes: ‘Wittgenstein’s insight is that the ordinary has, and alone 
has, the power to move the ordinary, to leave the human habit habitable, the same 
transfigured’.52 The Investigations thus uses examples, imagery and situations that are 
concerned with or derived from the ordinary and the everyday. Wittgenstein writes: ‘we 
must stick to the subjects of our everyday thinking’ (PI 106), and adds: ‘When I talk 
about language [...] I must speak the language of every day’ (PI 120). This use of 
ordinary language and focus on the ordinary are crucial features of the way Wittgenstein 
attempts to get his readers to look at the ordinary and in the process change the way 
they see things.  
 
Wittgenstein’s therapeutic philosophy, argues Gordon Baker, can be seen as a ‘kind of 
homeopathy’, in which philosophical problems are dissolved by ‘effecting changes of 
aspect’.53 The lack of clarity in our grammar can be remedied by ‘representations’ of 
grammar that make things clearer. Things can be made clearer through a concentration 
on ‘particular concrete cases’ or ‘concrete details’, through the adoption of a narrow 
focus: ‘In order to see more clearly’, notes Wittgenstein, ‘we must focus on the details 
of what goes on; must look at them from close to’ (PI 51). Such narrow focus however 
is not meant to be an accurate description of the way things are or must be, rather these 
‘representations’ function as ‘objects of comparison which are meant to throw light on 
the facts of our language by way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities’ (PI 
130). Wittgenstein’s task, claims Baker, is to ‘break our bondage to analogies absorbed 
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into the forms of our language’, which he does by exposing new aspects of systems of 
expression. ‘Wittgenstein’, explains Baker, in what can be seen as ethical or even 
religious terms, ‘tried to liberate our thinking from enslavement to particular analogies 
by bringing to light other analogies’.54  
 
Paradoxically, however, when things are seen clearly, when the familiar is revealed to 
us through this intense, narrow focus and the light provided by objects of comparison, it 
can seem strange, even uncanny: it is ‘striking’ and ‘powerful’. Indeed, as in the case of 
still life, in which ‘the departure from the habitual blurs and entropies of vision can be 
so drastic that the objects seem unreal, unfamiliar’, 55  so in the Investigations the 
ordinary can appear strange, but also wonderful or even magical. The change in the way 
we see things can be radical and thus may seem metaphysical, but it isn’t. We are seeing 
what is always there, but as with the case of Wittgenstein’s example of the duck-rabbit 
diagram, the sudden change of aspect may have the appearance of being magical and 
feed the need for a metaphysical explanation.  
 
As in still life, for Wittgenstein this strange and alienating experience is related to the 
idea of home or the homely. It is precisely because we are seeing things that are 
normally overlooked, but which lie open to view, that the experience is so profound. We 
are not seeing something new, but something anew, and it is precisely the fact that we 
are seeing something familiar and ordinary yet normally unnoticed that can make the 
experience both uncanny and wonderful.  
 
In Falling Man, the equivocal status of the ordinary is intimately linked to the question 
of vision. The novel repeatedly emphasises the experience and importance of looking, 
and not solely in its detailed attention to the material of everyday life. Keith and Lianne 
are regularly struck by things normally overlooked, things usually hidden because of 
their simplicity and familiarity. DeLillo writes:  
 
Prior to the attack Keith lived with the narrowest of purviews, that of not noticing. 
But now he looked. (FM 26) 
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He began to think into the day, into the minute […] things seemed still, they 
seemed clearer to the eye […]. He began to see what he was doing. He noticed 
things, all the small lost strokes of a day. (FM 65) 
 
The ordinariness, so normally unnoticeable, fell upon him oddly, with almost 
dreamlike effect. (FM 51)  
 
Something is always happening, even on the quietest days and deep into night, if 
you stand awhile and look. (FM 66) 
 
This focused attention, this experience of ‘looking at the overlooked’, is closely 
connected to a sense of alienation. Both Lianne and Keith are removed or detached from 
things, from society at large, ‘staying down, keeping out’. Lianne feels a ‘separation, a 
distance’ (FM 182) and Keith is ‘away from routine stimulus [...] alone in time’, and 
thus ‘nothing seemed familiar, [...] he felt strange to himself’ (FM 65). And Keith’s 
estrangement is intimately connected to his returning home, to being ‘in a family again’ 
(FM 65).  
 
Schalkwyk observes how Wittgenstein repeatedly stresses the importance of keeping 
words ‘safely and properly at home’ so that they no longer bewitch our intelligence, but 
also how Wittgenstein recognises the ease with which ‘the domestic may become 
strange’. The Investigations, notes Schalkwyk, regularly returns to the idea of being 
lost, to the ‘bewilderment of discovering that what you thought you knew well has 
become strange, the familiar alien’. 56  Thus, though Wittgenstein writes of bringing 
‘words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use’, of looking at a word in ‘the 
language game which is its original home’ (PI 116); this does not necessarily provide 
the sought after clarity. For, paradoxically, though a metaphysical use of words is 
ultimately misleading, causing the understanding to run up against the limits of 
language, it seems clear: a metaphysical picture of things is captivating and has the 
‘crystalline purity of logic’ (PI 107). The return from these ‘ideal conditions’ is to the 
‘rough ground’ or the complex hurly-burly of ordinary language, which Schalkwyk, 
adapting Wittgenstein’s metaphor, describes as returning to ‘the frightening alienation 
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of a “wilderness”’.57 It is a wilderness precisely because it lacks logical purity, because 
things don’t necessarily fit it into neat and tidy schema. It is for this reason that 
Wittgenstein writes: ‘language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and 
know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer 
know your way about’ (PI 203).  
 
The paradoxical status of home and ordinary language in Wittgenstein’s later work is 
related to the problem of point of view, for, explains Schalkwyk, ‘it is not as if some 
actual transformation occurs in the object: it is the same object viewed under different 
aspects’.58 And it is here that we can most clearly draw a parallel with still life, which, 
notes Bryson, ‘estranges what is familiar and everyday’. 59  In still life, the close 
attention, or narrow focus, on ordinary, normally neglected objects transforms them, 
and this, Bryson argues, ‘isolates the viewer from the lazy visual field the subject 
normally inhabits’. He adds, ‘by bringing into consciousness and into visibility things 
that perception normally overlooks, the visual field can come to appear radically 
unfamiliar and estranged’.60  
 
Crucially, however, this sense of isolation from the ordinary, in both still life and 
Wittgenstein, can lead not only to a sense of estrangement, but to a sense of wonder. In 
still life, observes Bryson, ‘attention itself gains the power to transfigure the 
commonplace’ and ‘the intensity of the perception at work makes for such an excess of 
brilliance and focus that the image and its objects seem not quite of this world’.61 
Similarly, Wittgenstein’s therapeutic demystification and close, narrow focus, is not 
intended to make things seem banal. On the contrary, by ‘arranging what we have 
always known’, his aim is to clear away the confusion that hinders clear vision, and in 
the process to reawaken a sense of wonder (PI 109). Philip R. Shields writes:  
 
When [...] Wittgenstein shows us the strangeness of the familiar, he is trying to 
shift our perspective from the mundane to the religious, and to recapture the special 
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sense of wonder and awe he felt was extinguished by the prevailing scientific 
Weltanshauung.
62
  
 
In Falling Man this sense of the simultaneously insignificant and remarkable, the 
mundane and religious, and the strangeness of the familiar is implicit throughout the 
novel: in the image of the shirt, in Morandi still lifes, in the emphasis on rituals and 
gestures. However, it is made explicit when, on noticing the banal fact that Keith 
stopped shaving for a time, Lianne is provoked to a series of reflections on meaning and 
the ordinary that provide a direct expression of the novel’s engagement with the 
paradoxical status of the ordinary. ‘Everything seemed to mean something’, she thinks, 
before adding: ‘but things were ordinary as well’ (FM 67). The crucial word here is 
‘seemed’, a frequently recurring word in DeLillo’s work when intimations of 
significance are in play, not only because it stresses the ambiguity of the possible 
meaning, but above all because it reveals the importance of perception or, more 
specifically, the point of view from which things are seen. Things seem to mean 
something, in part, because Lianne ‘looked for signs’ (FM 67).  
 
The importance of Lianne’s equivocation – the way things can be simultaneously 
ordinary and extraordinary – is indicated by the recurrence and progression of Lianne’s 
reflection on this issue in the narrative. Several scenes later, in a montage of different 
events and thoughts, Lianne reflects that ‘what was ordinary was not more ordinary than 
usual, or less,’ before concluding: ‘but then she might be wrong about what was 
ordinary. Maybe nothing was. Maybe there was a deep fold in the grain of things, the 
way things pass through the mind’ (FM 105). This short passage is remarkable for the 
subtle, understated way it suggests ambiguous yet profound meaning that, in its 
ambiguity, resonates throughout the novel and DeLillo’s work in general. In the space 
of this ‘maybe’, of this possibility of transcendent meaning, lies the aesthetic core of the 
novel, if not DeLillo’s aesthetics more generally.  
 
The purpose of this chapter was to show that DeLillo’s apparent ‘retreat’ to the 
domestic is not quite how it may seem on initial viewing; that DeLillo’s treatment of 
and engagement with the ordinary is far from straightforward, since the ordinary turns 
out to be anything but ordinary. Indeed, as we will see, DeLillo’s engagement with the 
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ordinary is part of a career long engagement with the possibility of transcendent 
meaning and the philosophical question of ‘looking at the overlooked’. For, although 
his apparent retreat to the domestic indicates a shift of tone, the concern with awakening 
to the wonder of ordinary things, when clearly seen, can be felt throughout his work. By 
looking at the significance of Morandi’s still life paintings in the narrative and 
comparing this with the way the ordinary features in Wittgenstein’s later writings has 
considerable literary and artistic resonance I have sought to illuminate significant 
aesthetic and philosophical elements of DeLillo’s engagement with the ordinary. These 
elements – looking at the ordinary; the transfiguration of the ordinary; seeing hidden, 
familiar things; the tension between the ordinary and transcendent; and the significance 
of home and exile – will be further examined, from different angles, throughout the rest 
of the thesis. 
 
In the next chapter we will explore in greater detail the tension between the transcendent 
and the ordinary as we turn to The Body Artist. Like Falling Man, The Body Artist 
displays a profound engagement with the ordinary and everyday, examines the 
strangeness of the familiar, and the wonder of ordinary things when clearly seen. Both 
novels concern mourning, life – specifically, ordinary, everyday experience – after a 
tragic event, and examine it by making a subtle analogy with aesthetic experience, that 
is, the experience of grief is expressed in aesthetic terms, or as analogous to the 
experience of looking at a work of art. Both novels explore a shift in the way their 
characters see things and how their sense of time and space are radically altered. The 
next chapter will focus on the protagonist’s form of spiritual journey: how she goes 
from, in Lianne’s words, ‘dreaming toward something unreachable’ to returning to ‘the 
body and everything it carried, inside and out, identity and memory and human heat’ 
(FM 232, 236). 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
‘The Limits of the Human’: The Temptations of Scepticism and 
Metaphysics in The Body Artist  
 
what challenges one’s humanity in philosophy, tempts one to excessive despair or 
to false hope, is named scepticism.  
Stanley Cavell
1
   
 
 
In this chapter we shift our focus onto language and the temptation of metaphysics and 
threat of scepticism. If Falling Man explores aspects of a retreat to the ordinary, and the 
paradoxical nature of ordinary things when clearly seen, The Body Artist explores the 
desire to transcend the ordinary, but also a return to it. Both novels are concerned with 
grief, spiritual exile, and the importance of art, but in The Body Artist there is a 
significant philosophical element to the protagonist’s grieving. This philosophical 
aspect of the novel will be explored by drawing a parallel between the protagonist’s 
struggle with grief and Wittgenstein’s philosophical struggle with scepticism and 
metaphysics, and the importance of the ordinary in this struggle.  
 
The Body Artist is a short, and on the surface, simple tale of a woman’s bereavement. In 
relation to DeLillo’s previous novels, in particular the novel that directly precedes it, 
Underworld, which features a host of interconnected characters in a variety of settings 
and time frames, The Body Artist
 
can be viewed as a straightforward narrative in which 
not much happens, and also as the starting point of a marked shift in DeLillo’s writing. 
The contrast between The Body Artist and Underworld could hardly be greater, as we 
can see from Anne Longmuir’s useful summary of some of the superficial differences:  
 
Whereas Underworld is over eight hundred pages long, The Body Artist manages 
just over one hundred pages. Underworld's countless characters live through five 
decades of American history, while The Body Artist depicts the life of one woman 
                                                 
1
 ‘Declining Decline’, p. 327 
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over a period of a few months. Underworld makes specific reference to many 
actual historical figures and events, while The Body Artist gestures vaguely and 
only occasionally to ‘certain stories in the newspaper’. Underworld's depiction of 
the cold war and its aftermath is overtly political; The Body Artist seems to Michael 
Gorra, at least, to be ‘DeLillo with the politics left out, without conspiracies and 
secret histories, with no bomb and no environment—no world situation—to worry 
over.’ 2  
 
The Body Artist is characterised by its intense, philosophical focus on the nature of 
perception, time and the ordinary. The action mostly takes place in an isolated rental 
home in New England, in a single time span and predominately concerns the thoughts 
and emotions of a grieving widow, Lauren Hartke, the body artist of the title. There are 
two minor but important digressions from this central point of focus – an obituary 
marking the death of Lauren’s husband, Rey Robles, and a newspaper feature that is 
both an interview and an account of Lauren’s work of performance art, ‘Body Time’. In 
between these two sections Lauren discovers Mr. Tuttle, a mysterious figure who seems 
to be incapable of using language properly and with whom she becomes obsessively 
preoccupied. 
 
The apparent simplicity of The Body Artist both masks and enables a level of conceptual 
complexity that, with the possible exception of Ratner’s Star, makes it DeLillo’s most 
philosophical and intellectually demanding novel to date. Like Lauren’s performance 
art, it is ‘obscure, slow, difficult’ (BA 109). There seems to be a consensus in the critical 
response to the text regarding the challenging nature of its minimalist, but conceptually 
dense, aesthetic. It is ‘a more difficult and less accessible text than Underworld’,3 writes 
Longmuir, while Bonca notes that it refuses ‘the easy pleasures of narrative’.4 The novel 
is, in Cowart’s elegant phrase, ‘a miracle of thematic economy’, incorporating ‘a lot of 
conceptual and thematic material’.5 It raises complex questions on the nature of time, 
language and the creative process, and, unlike Ratner’s Star, its complexity is related to 
the simplicity of its subject matter. Within the straightforward narrative framework 
DeLillo has produced a poetic meditation on death, isolation, and the mystery of 
                                                 
2
 Longmuir, ‘Performing the Body in Don DeLillo’s The Body Artist’, Modern Fiction Studies, 53, 2007, 
p. 529 
3
 Longmuir, ‘Performing the Body’, p. 528 
4
 Bonca, ‘Being, Time and Death’, p. 60 
5
 Cowart, ‘DeLillo and the Power of Language’, Cambridge Companion to Don DeLillo, p. 156 
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communication, in which ordinary, mundane activity and experience is punctuated by 
strange events of elusive meaning and moments of heightened awareness and sudden 
insight.  
 
The philosophical nature of the novel and, in particular, Lauren’s philosophical 
approach to her suffering – the way in which she channels her grief not only through her 
body work but through intense speculation on fundamental questions of time, reality 
and the nature of existence – seems to demand a philosophical reading of the text. 
Bonca has shown the need for, and value of, such an approach in his paper on The Body 
Artist and Heidegger. Bonca reads the novel as a further exploration of DeLillo’s 
engagement with the fear and fact of death. For Bonca, DeLillo’s work reveals ‘a 
concentrated focus, even reliance, on death as epistemological and ontological 
mooring’; and The Body Artist is DeLillo’s ‘most explicit exploration’ of the vital 
concepts of being, time and death.
6
 The novel, he concludes, is about the ‘drama and 
difficulty of uncovering Being’s astonishment in death’s presence’.7 Though Bonca’s 
reading is illuminating, and demonstrates the importance of avoiding postmodern 
paradigms for reading DeLillo, it only touches on the significance of language in the 
novel. Moreover, the attempt to say what such an elusive novel is about and the use of 
abstruse terminology such as, Dasein, Lichtung and aletheia, strikes me as problematic. 
In this chapter I will, like Bonca, pursue a philosophical reading, but will do so in 
relation to the Philosophical Investigations, a text that enables us to avoid the use of 
complex terminology. I will show how Wittgenstein’s engagement with ordinary 
language as part of a struggle against the related claims of scepticism and metaphysical 
yearning can illuminate the novel’s significant focus on language and exploration of the 
possibility of ‘language outside language games’. 
  
Like The Body Artist, Wittgenstein’s later work, notably the Philosophical 
Investigations, is characterised by an apparent simplicity simultaneously masking and 
producing profound complexity. ‘What we say will be easy’, notes Wittgenstein, ‘but to 
know why we say it will be very difficult’.8 The Investigations is in part concerned with 
showing how ordinary language functions in ordinary circumstances. It uses examples, 
                                                 
6
 Bonca, ‘Being, Time and Death’, p. 60 
7
 Bonca, ‘Being, Time and Death’, p. 66 
8
 Wittgenstein, cited in Duncan Richter, Wittgenstein at his Word, p. 9 
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imagery and situations, and asks questions, that are concerned with or derived from the 
ordinary and everyday. It can at times seem as if it is merely dealing with banalities and 
uncontroversial truths, full of what Perloff describes as ‘deceptively simple’ language 
games and ‘“homely” metaphors’.9 This focus on the ordinary gets its significance, in 
part, from the way it is in tension with the metaphysical.  
 
This chapter will draw a series of analogies between the Philosophical Investigations 
and The Body Artist in order to explore the ways in which both are engaged with the 
ordinary and the way it functions as a site of return following the temptation to 
transcend or doubt it. The novel, like the philosophy of early and late Wittgenstein, 
explores the ‘limits of the human’ and the apparent human need to exceed those limits. 
This idea of excess can be seen in Lauren’s commitment to solitude, her grief-addled 
imagination and in the way she treats her body: in her desire to alter its visible form, 
writes DeLillo, ‘she calculated all the plausible requirements. Then she exceeded them’ 
(BA 97). Above all, however, this excess can be seen in Mr. Tuttle, in the way ‘he 
violates the limits of the human’, and bares Lauren ‘to things that were outside her 
experience’ (BA 100, 63).  
 
Cavell claims that ‘the ordinary occurs essentially in the Philosophical Investigations as 
what scepticism denies, and metaphysics transcends’,10 and I will explore this claim in 
relation to the philosophical nature of Lauren’s struggle to come to terms with her 
husband’s death. I will show the ways in which Lauren is led to both sceptical doubt as 
well as metaphysical yearning as a result of her grief and her contact with Mr. Tuttle. I 
will suggest ways of reading Tuttle in Wittgensteinian terms, and above all, argue that 
Lauren’s grief can be read as analogous to Wittgenstein’s struggle against scepticism 
and metaphysics.  
 
Much of the novel’s complexity, mystery and philosophical nature stems from Lauren’s 
interaction with Tuttle, whose use of language leads Lauren to both sceptical and 
metaphysical ideas about time, existence and epistemology. A Wittgensteinian reading 
of The Body Artist will illuminate the way in which Lauren’s own philosophical 
investigations are provoked by and centred on issues of language. Cowart argues that 
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 Perloff, ‘From Theory to Grammar’, p.911 
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Lauren ‘comes to a better understanding […] of “who she was” as a result of her 
unsought immersion, through interaction with the strange Mr. Tuttle, in language’,11 and 
this immersion in language will be the central focus of this chapter. Tuttle’s use of 
language will be viewed as analogous with the kind of misleading philosophical uses of 
language that Wittgenstein thinks bewitch our intelligence. In particular, we will view 
an aspect of Tuttle’s mode of speech as an example of what Cavell calls ‘language 
outside language games’, the attempt to say things that cannot be said, and thus as a 
species of the sublime. In doing so, we’ll be able to illustrate the way in which Lauren’s 
communication with Tuttle and her temptation to both doubt and transcendence enable 
her to return to herself and the ordinary with renewed self-understanding and clarity of 
vision. By looking at Cavell’s reading of the Investigations, and in particular James 
Noggle’s use of this reading in The Wittgensteinian Sublime, we can identify the sense 
in which it is only by attempting to doubt or transcend the ordinary that we can 
understand it.
12
 Viewing Lauren’s grief as a spiritual struggle and Tuttle as a facilitator 
in this struggle – serving as a kind of Wittgensteinian ladder – will not only serve to 
illuminate DeLillo’s novel but also illustrate Cavell’s reading of Wittgenstein.  
 
 
I. RETURN  
 
The Body Artist ends on an affirmative note of return – a return from the lure of the 
metaphysical and the threat of scepticism to the time-governed world of physical space 
and to a strong sense of self. In this first section I will explore how the novel traces 
Lauren’s grieving process as a form of spiritual journey, how her experience of loss 
leads to a series of sceptical doubts, about perception, the nature of reality and time, but 
also to the temptations of metaphysics, to a yearning to transcend time. I will examine 
Lauren’s return from a sense of loss in light of Cavell’s reading of the significance of 
loss and exile in the Investigations.  
 
Lauren’s ‘return to life’,13 as Osteen describes it, is enacted in a dramatic scene in the 
final chapter that encapsulates and completes the journey she undergoes through the 
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 Cowart, ‘DeLillo and the Power of Language’,  p. 157 
12
 Noggle, ‘The Wittgensteinian Sublime’, p. 612 
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 Osteen, ‘Echo Chamber’, p. 66 
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novel. Lauren is once again alone in the large house she has rented. She has completed 
her work of performance art and spends her days walking or cleaning. Her yearning for 
metaphysical escape leads her to tell herself stories that seem to ‘come from a deeper 
source […] a thing that was overtaking her’ and she feels an increasingly fragile sense 
of identity, ‘I’m Lauren. But less and less’ (BA 115, 117). She longs to see Tuttle again 
and occasionally continues to perform him, believing that maybe ‘she could deliver 
herself into his reality’ (BA 114). This hope seems to be connected with the possibility 
of transcending time and finding ‘a way to place [Rey] within reach’ (BA 116). Rey and 
Tuttle are possibly becoming one person in her mind, or rather, as J. Heath Atchley 
notes, her desire to see Tuttle again ‘intermingles with a desire to be again in Rey’s 
presence until the two desires themselves become indistinguishable’.14 This is illustrated 
by the fact that when she imagines she sees Rey, he is sitting in the exact posture in 
which she first found Tuttle, ‘on the edge of the bed in his underwear’, though unlike 
Tuttle he is ‘lighting the last cigarette of the day’ (BA 122).  
  
Lauren’s desperate hope that she can somehow recuperate Rey is intrinsically related to 
the despair, the ‘lurid ruin’, she implores herself to give in to. ‘Let death bring you 
down’, she urges, ‘sink lower […] go where it takes you’ (BA 116). In her desire, 
caused in part by her extreme isolation and loneliness, she imagines that first Tuttle then 
Rey is in the bedroom. As she walks towards the room she is ‘fitting herself to a body in 
the process of becoming hers’; she is disembodied, alienated from herself (BA 121). In 
this state, in which she seems to transcend time or enter ‘into his time’, she can see and 
touch Rey, before it actually happens (BA 115). Finally, however, Lauren does not find 
Rey in the bedroom. The room is empty, an emptiness that can be seen to symbolise 
Lauren’s return to the ordinary. Lauren is not surprised to find the room empty, ‘she’d 
known it was empty all along but was only catching up’, suggesting that her mind and 
body are unified again, that she has returned (BA 124). To make the return complete:  
  
She walked into the room and went to the window. She opened it. She threw the 
window open. She didn’t know why she did this. Then she knew. She wanted to 
feel the sea tang on her face and the flow of time in her body, to tell her who she 
was. (BA 124) 
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To fully understand this affirmative ending and the idea of Lauren returning to herself 
and the time-bound world we need to explore Lauren’s loss, both the loss of her 
husband and the accompanying sense of a loss of self. Lauren’s affirmative return to 
herself also marks a structural return to the novel’s opening paragraph, which features a 
similar emphasis on time, the experience of nature and self-knowledge, as we can see 
from the aphoristic phrase, ‘you know more surely who you are on a strong bright day 
after a storm’ (BA 7). The way the novel loops back to its beginning suggests that the 
opening chapter can only fully be understood retrospectively. The act of reading it a 
second time is not only informed by the haunting knowledge of Rey’s death, but by an 
awareness of the philosophical significance of the focus on ordinary life.  
 
The novel begins with a depiction of Lauren and Rey’s ordinary breakfast routine and in 
it we can see the very kind of transfiguration of the commonplace through intensity of 
perception exemplified in still life painting. As in Falling Man, time is transformed – 
they’re ‘off the calendar’ (BA 21) – and the everyday scene is rendered with such close 
attention to detail that the ordinary is transformed; it is so ordinary that the banal is 
infused with a sense of mystery and wonder. But this focus on the ordinary is cut short 
by Rey’s sudden death and Lauren’s subsequent drift into the fantastical, into the 
‘prospect of wonders’ (BA 123). 
 
In the second chapter of the novel we find Lauren in self-imposed exile following her 
husband’s suicide. She has decided to carry on staying in the ramshackle country house 
by the sea that she had hired with Rey. Her plan is ‘to organise time until she could live 
again’ (BA 37). The very size of the house, its location and its haunting emptiness all 
serve to vividly emphasise and enhance Lauren’s physical and spiritual isolation, she is 
‘alone in a large house on an empty coast’, quietly suffering in a landscape of 
estrangement (BA 36).  
 
Rey’s death is announced in an obituary punctuating the first and second chapters that 
dramatically disrupts the fabric and structure of the narrative so far, powerfully 
illustrating the tragic disruption to Lauren’s life. Lauren’s isolation is emphasised not 
only by this sudden and unexpected shift in the narrative but also by the content of the 
obituary itself. The obituary contains a pithy assessment of Robles’ work as a 
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filmmaker, which also serves to indicate the novel’s central themes:  
 
His subject is people in landscapes of estrangement. He found a spiritual knife-
edge in the poetry of alien places, where extreme situations become inevitable and 
characters are forced toward life-defining moments. (BA 29) 
 
This description foreshadows and comments upon the novel itself, for it concerns 
Lauren’s journey towards a life-defining moment brought about by an extreme situation 
in which she finds herself on a spiritual knife-edge.  
 
In order to explore the philosophical and spiritual aspects of Lauren’s journey, her loss 
and return, we shall now turn to Cavell’s literary reading of the Investigations. In a late 
essay on Wittgenstein entitled Declining Decline, Cavell looks at the way the ideas of 
exile, loss and return figure in the Investigations. By carrying out a close reading of 
Wittgenstein’s use of language – his metaphors, his range of examples and illustrations 
– Cavell is able to examine what Mulhall, in his introduction to Cavell’s essay, calls 
‘the air of spiritual fervour that pervades Wittgenstein’s philosophy’.15 In particular, 
Cavell illuminates his sense that the Philosophical Investigations is a ‘work of 
continuous spiritual struggle’ 16  and reveals the important link in the text between 
problems of language and the question of the self.  
 
Cavell argues that Wittgenstein exhibits ‘philosophizing as a spiritual struggle, 
specifically a struggle with contrary depths of oneself, which in the modern world will 
present themselves in touches of madness’.17 Cavell sees this as a struggle against the 
temptation to scepticism and the lure of metaphysical illusion, a struggle he sees as 
inevitable, without end and essential to being human. He writes, ‘The Investigations at 
every point confronts this temptation and finds its victory exactly in never claiming a 
final victory over (the temptation to) scepticism, which would mean a victory over the 
human’. 18  The way the Investigations carries out this confrontation is through an 
unceasing return to the everyday or ordinary, ‘in the particular and repeated humility of 
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remembering and tracking the uses of humble words’.19  For Cavell, Wittgenstein’s 
insistence upon the ordinary can only be understood in relation to the apparently 
inevitable desire to transcend the ordinary; what James Noggle calls, ‘our characteristic 
desire to escape ordinary human limits’.20   
 
Wittgenstein argues that philosophical problems occur when language is ‘like an engine 
idling’, when a word is no longer used ‘in the language game which is its original 
home’ (PI 132, 116). Thus there is a sense, argues Cavell, that in philosophy ‘words are 
somehow “away”, as if in exile’.21 Cavell holds that this condition is caused by the users 
of language, not by something in language, and so ‘it is up to us to seek their return’.22 
In his use of the terms home, exile, and return Wittgenstein is predominantly talking 
about words, but by examining the implications of Wittgenstein’s claims, Cavell is able 
to emphasise the important role of the subject that uses words. He shows how the ‘exile 
of words […] is exile from oneself’,23 how a misuse of language can lead to exile, to a 
loss of self, but crucially how it is through words, through ordinary language, that the 
return to the self is made. It is to ‘ordinary language’, writes Cavell, that Wittgenstein 
‘entrusts the health of the human spirit.’24  Thus, when Cavell reads Wittgenstein’s 
statement that, ‘what we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their 
everyday use’ (PI 116) he argues that this return involves the speaker of the words 
returning as much as the words themselves. He writes, ‘the behaviour of words is not 
something separate from our lives […] the lives themselves have to return’.25 
 
Cavell pursues the literary echoes of these ideas of exile and return by connecting them 
to the notion of loss. The idea of loss is central to Wittgenstein’s conception of the 
problems of philosophy, as is evident when he writes that ‘a philosophical problem has 
the form: “I don’t know my way about”’ (PI 123). Cavell notes that in the original 
German – Ich kenn mich nicht aus – there is an implication that ‘the issue is one of a 
loss of self-knowledge; of being, so to speak, at a loss’.26 This leads him to consider the 
identification of spiritual darkness as loss in the work of Dante and Thoreau, recalling 
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the famous opening line to The Divine Comedy, ‘In the middle of the journey of our life 
I came to myself within a dark wood where the straight way was lost’, and Thoreau’s 
claim in Walden that, ‘not till we are lost […] not till we have lost the world, do we 
begin to find ourselves’.27  
 
In The Body Artist the spectral Mr. Tuttle acts as Virgil to Lauren’s Dante, guiding her 
out of the darkness of her loss to the light of a more secure self-identity. Prior to her 
discovery of Mr. Tuttle we read that ‘the world was lost inside her’ (BA 37); she is 
alone, isolated, and alienated from the world and from herself, Bonca writes that, ‘all 
the phenomena around her […] alienate herself from herself’.28 She is even alienated 
from her body, experiencing a kind of Cartesian split between mind and body, ‘her body 
felt different to her in ways she did not understand […] slightly foreign and unfamiliar’ 
(BA 33).  
 
Her husband’s death causes Lauren to experience a perceptual, epistemological and 
spiritual crisis that manifests itself in profound scepticism, but also in metaphysical 
temptation. She is led either to question what she sees, to doubt or question the nature of 
reality, or to experience things metaphysically, ‘things she saw seemed doubtful – not 
doubtful but ever changing, plunged into metamorphosis, something that is also 
something else’ (BA 36). This crisis is first shown when Lauren is driving back to the 
house after Rey’s funeral, ‘everything is slow and hazy and drained and it all happens 
around the word seem. All the cars including yours seem to flow in dissociated motion’ 
(BA 31). According to Bonca, the abrupt shift ‘from the third person indirect narrative 
voice to a distancing second person’29 accentuates Lauren’s disconnectedness; it also 
dramatically illustrates Lauren’s sense of disembodiment and feeling of separation from 
herself. The rupture in Lauren’s perception of reality marked in this moment produces a 
blurred distinction between what is imagined and real that lasts for most of the novel, 
such as, the way she inhabits the stories she reads; sees a man and reads his entire life 
before realising it is only a paint can; or she sees a dead squirrel that turns out to be 
burlap.  
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Lauren’s altered perception of things is in part an expression of, and perhaps caused by, 
her grief, her experience of ‘excessive despair and false hope’30, which in turn is related 
to her scepticism and metaphysical yearning. The ‘spiritual fervour’ of Lauren’s process 
can be seen in the fanatical, ascetic, self-eradicating work she carries out on her body – 
work that can be read as analogous with sceptical doubt. Lauren literally enacts on her 
body a form of radical denial that Descartes attempts hypothetically in his meditations, 
she attempts to ‘become a blankness, a body slate erased of every past resemblance’;  
she ‘tries to shake off the body’ (BA  84, 104). The body leads her to a sense of 
alienation – in the various moments of disembodiment – but also ‘restores a sense of 
self,’31 such as when a ‘raging crap’ makes ‘mind and body one’ (BA 35). The dark fog 
of Lauren’s grief is interspersed with moments of brilliant, spiritual light, moments that 
possess, according to Longmuir, ‘a kind of visionary quality’. 32  Lauren ‘recovers 
herself’, argues Longmuir, ‘by performing her body’ 33  – an experience that, 
paradoxically, is deeply spiritual: ‘her bodywork made everything transparent. […] She 
came out the other end in a kind of pristine light’ (BA 57-58). 
 
 
II. MR. TUTTLE  
 
Lauren’s recovery, her journey from darkness to light, is also enacted through, and 
mirrored by, a profound engagement with language, provoked by her interaction with 
Mr. Tuttle. Like her body work, Lauren’s linguistic journeying both leads her astray and 
returns her home; Tuttle leads her to clarity but only once he has plunged her deeper 
into darkness. Tuttle helps Lauren by making her think about language. He does this by 
the way he speaks, ‘shadow-inching through a sentence, showing a word in its facets 
and aspects’ as well as by the elusive things he says (BA 48). Initially, Mr. Tuttle merely 
serves to exacerbate Lauren’s sense of alienation. His use of language, the way he acts 
and his very presence in the house leads Lauren to an experience of profound and 
alienating sceptical doubt, but also to the belief in the possibility of transcendence.  
 
Lauren discovers Tuttle living in the house upon her return from Rey’s funeral 
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(suggesting the possibility of reading Tuttle as a ghostly embodiment of Rey in 
purgatory). It seems he has been in the house for some time, but who he is, and how and 
why he has come to live there, are questions that remain unanswered. His sudden 
disappearance is equally mysterious. Most mysterious and troubling of all are his 
curious use of language and apparent capacity to experience the future, ‘I have seen 
what I will see’, he says, and at one point in the narrative repeats a phrase of Lauren’s 
that she has not yet uttered (BA 74-75). 
 
Osteen describes Tuttle as a ‘visitor who may or may not be an incarnate ghost’34 and it 
could be argued that, if he is viewed as some kind of ghost, Tuttle’s very existence is 
the result of Lauren’s predisposition to scepticism and metaphysics. But, regardless of 
whether he is viewed as a ghost or an actual physical presence in Lauren’s life, we can 
see that her interpretation and understanding of Tuttle is determined by her scepticism 
and metaphysical yearning. Tuttle provokes and embodies scepticism through his use of 
language and the way he brings into question fundamental notions of time, space and 
knowledge. Similarly, he embodies metaphysics – the possibility of transcendent 
meaning – through his other-worldliness, mysteriousness and the sense that he is 
possibly in tune with a ‘deeper source’ (BA 115). In Cowart’s words, he ‘seems like a 
modern version of what in primitive societies is taken as a figure of great mystery – a 
being in touch [...] with what ordinary people cannot see, hear, experience’.35 And again 
it is his language – his transcendental chant – that is crucial here. By reflecting on 
Tuttle’s language Lauren imagines she can exceed the limits of belief and transcend 
time, ‘maybe she believed she could deliver herself in his reality, working out the 
logistics of word and thought’ (BA 114).  
 
Mr. Tuttle seems unable to use language properly, ‘he is impaired in matters of 
articulation and comprehension’ (BA 97), and his apparent inability to distinguish 
between past, present and future tenses – the fact that ‘their talks had no time sense’ (BA 
66) – forces Lauren to think about the relation between time and language, and to 
question the very nature of time. One of Lauren and Tuttle’s first exchanges is about the 
rain, in which Lauren thinks that Tuttle must be making a grammatical mistake. ‘It 
rained very much’, says Tuttle, and Lauren replies, ‘it will rain. It is going to rain’ (BA 
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44). She then becomes insistent, saying ‘it did not rain. It will rain’ (BA 45), as if it is 
not simply a question of grammar but epistemologically important or perhaps even a 
question of sanity; as if what Tuttle says is a sceptical challenge to the nature of reality, 
which will in fact prove to be the case.  
 
In her didactic appeal to grammar and common sense Lauren’s attitude here recalls that 
of Jack Gladney, and her conversation with Tuttle about the rain recalls the comical 
exchange in White Noise between Gladney and his son, Heinrich, on the same subject. 
The Gladneys’ argument begins when Heinrich states that, ‘the radio says it’s going to 
rain tonight’, to which Gladney responds, ‘it’s raining now’ (WN 22). The argument 
proceeds with Gladney attempting, somewhat desperately, to prove that it is raining 
while Heinrich illustrates some of the ambiguities in the relation between language and 
time – ‘how can I say it’s raining now’, he argues, ‘if your so-called “now” becomes 
then as soon as I say it?’ (WN 23) 
 
Like Gladney, Lauren is forced to confront similar problematic issues of language and 
time. She is confronted by the disturbing fact that Tuttle ‘is a man who remembers the 
future’ (BA 100); that his ‘future is not under construction. It is already there’ (BA 98). 
At first, as in the conversation about the rain, she tries to see it as a language problem, 
thinking ‘he hasn’t learnt the language’ (BA 99), but this fails to satisfy her probing 
mind. Tuttle’s failure to distinguish between past, present and future, she realises, may 
be due to the way he experiences reality rather than a failure to have mastered grammar. 
And this realisation offers a radical challenge to her own conception and experience of 
reality, causing her to experience profound, sceptical doubt. Cavell writes that ‘to 
confront the threat of or temptation to scepticism is to risk madness’36 and it is evident 
that Tuttle’s behaviour and very existence leads Lauren not only to radical scepticism 
but also to ‘touches of madness’.37   
 
There are various ways in which Mr. Tuttle can be shown to illustrate some of the major 
themes of the Investigations, in particular, with regards to
 
language and its relation to 
the wider cultural context, what Cowart identifies as, ‘revelations about language as 
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environment’.38 Tuttle can be seen as a demonstration of Wittgenstein’s argument that 
language is a cultural construction – language is a form of life – and that without 
belonging to a culture it is impossible to use language properly. The fact, for example, 
that Tuttle’s language is separated from his body, that ‘all the references at the 
unspoken level, the things a man speaking Dutch might share with a man speaking 
Chinese’ are missing from his body language illustrates Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the 
way in which physical activity – the body – lies at the bottom of linguistic meaning (BA 
66). In the Investigations he writes, ‘the common behaviour of mankind is the system of 
reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language’ (PI 206). 
 
Tuttle, ‘marooned between earth and ice, at home in neither’,39 might even be viewed as 
resembling a character from the Investigations. Cowart seems to be alluding to 
Wittgenstein when he describes Tuttle as a ‘moon-addled language-gamer’ and hints at 
the possibility of a Wittgensteinian reading by arguing that Tuttle ‘embodies a primitive 
idea of language’.40 This idea relates primarily to the way Tuttle seems to suffer from 
echolalia – he repeats words that are said to him. This is roughly the conception of 
language learning put forth by St Augustine, with which Wittgenstein opens the 
Investigations – words name things, and, by hearing and repeating the sounds made as a 
teacher points to a thing, language is acquired. Tuttle seems not to have taken the leap 
from learning how to say a word and applying it in the appropriate context. Osteen 
writes, ‘lacking a strong grip on pragmatic conventions, Tuttle dwells in language like 
an unwelcome guest’ 41 , an idea rich in Wittgensteinian connotations. In the 
Investigations, Wittgenstein uses several metaphors to describe Augustine’s picture of a 
child learning language as being similar to a stranger in a foreign land or an outsider in 
an alien tribe trying to learn a language, and he writes, ‘one has already to know (or be 
able to do) something in order to be capable of asking a thing’s name’ (PI 130).  
 
Furthermore, some of Tuttle’s utterances can be read in Wittgensteinian terms. For 
example, his statement that ‘the word for moonlight is moonlight’, which Lauren 
describes as ‘logically complex and oddly moving and circularly beautiful and true’, is 
replete with Wittgensteinian resonance (BA 82). Its poetic functionality, its dismissive 
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tone and the way it challenges the idea that word and thing, or word and meaning, can 
somehow be separated in discourse is characteristic of Wittgenstein’s method in the 
Investigations. Wittgenstein notes that, ‘when I talk about language (words, sentences, 
etc.) I must speak the language of every day. Is this language somehow too coarse and 
material for what we want to say?’ Does the word moonlight somehow fail to express 
moonlight? Wittgenstein reveals the absurdity of trying to get outside language when he 
continues, ‘You say: the point isn’t the word, but its meaning, and you think of meaning 
as a thing of the same kind as the word, though also different from the word. Here the 
word, there the meaning’ (PI 120). In the same passage he writes, ‘your questions refer 
to words; so I have to talk about words’ a phrase that can be heard echoing in Tuttle’s 
inadvertent mocking and challenging of Lauren when he says, ‘say some words to say 
some words’ (BA 55). 
 
Cowart also suggests, perhaps inadvertently, an alternative way of viewing Tuttle 
through a Wittgensteinian lens when he describes him as an ‘emissary from beyond’, 
who is a ‘vehicle of insight into the mysteries of language and temporality’,42 for this 
points to the sublime or transcendent aspects of Tuttle’s language, which we can 
compare with what Cavell calls ‘Wittgenstein’s sense of philosophy’s drive to speak 
outside language games’. 43  Tuttle’s apparently transcendent experience of reality 
challenges Lauren’s sense of being human, and thereby plays a crucial role in Lauren’s 
spiritual journey. Osteen writes that Tuttle teaches ‘Lauren to stand outside of herself 
and, eventually, to return to herself’.44 Tuttle acts as a kind of facilitator who both 
embodies and intensifies Lauren’s temptation to both radical scepticism and the 
possibility of transcendence, but ultimately enables Lauren to return to the everyday or 
ordinary. He does this by leading Lauren astray, by bewitching her with his gnomic 
phrases and uncanny mimicking skills.  
 
Tuttle’s remarkable capacity to mimic other people’s voices, most notably, Rey’s, is 
what first leads Lauren towards transcendence. The mimicry initially seems merely 
child-like or a form of echolalia; he repeats or partially repeats words Lauren says to 
him. And yet as the novel progresses it becomes evident that there may be more to his 
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apparently simple or meaningless phrases. Although at times frustrated by his repeated 
failure to answer her questions or use the correct verb tense, Lauren soon becomes 
bewitched by his utterances. She is both exasperated and enraptured by Tuttle’s mode of 
speaking.  
 
The first time she hears him imitating her voice she finds it ‘unearthly almost’ and 
‘deeply disturbing’ (BA 50). She gets angry with him, asking him how he knows all 
these things she has said, calling him ‘a little creep’, and finally telling him to ‘shut up’ 
(BA 55/56). When she hears him speak as Rey, however, she is captivated, awestruck, 
unsure ‘how to think about’ it (BA 62). The experience ‘bared her to things that were 
outside her experience but desperately central, somehow, at the same time’ (BA 63). She 
yearns for Tuttle to repeat this feat, ‘talk like him. Say some words’ (BA 65), she 
implores, and in a later episode becomes quite desperate, begging with a sense of sexual 
urgency, ‘talk like him. I want you to do this for me. I know you are able to do it. Do it 
for me. Talk like him. […] talk like him. Do like him. Speak in his voice. Do Rey. 
Make me hear him’ (BA 71).    
 
When he does finally do it for her this sexual element comes to the fore, further 
exacerbating her divided self and sense of disembodiment. She has a near out of body 
experience:  
 
Rey is alive now in this man’s mind, in his mouth and body and cock. Her skin was 
electric. She saw herself, she sees herself crawling towards him. The image is there 
in front of her. She is crawling across the floor and it is nearly real to her. She feels 
something has separated. (BA 87/88) 
 
Lauren’s interest in Mr. Tuttle becomes obsessive – she records him speaking on a tape 
recorder so that she can listen repeatedly to his utterances – and she reflects with 
increasing intensity upon the possible consequences of his use of language and 
experience of reality. Tuttle’s effect on Lauren is similar to what Noggle sees as the 
bewitching effect characteristic of the ‘aesthetic power’ of certain literary utterances. 
Noggle explains, ‘the bewitchment of such utterances derives from their capacity to get 
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us to see all ordinary reality as illusory, or at least radically questionable’.45 Noggle sees 
this power as operating on a linguistic level ‘along the lines of the philosophical 
bewitchment that Wittgenstein admires and decries’, claiming that it causes us to ‘get 
caught up in language not ordinarily our own, which warps, for as long as it bewitches 
us, our attitude toward all ordinary life’.46 It is evident that Lauren is bewitched by Mr. 
Tuttle, ‘she was always looking’ at him, ‘she could not get enough’ (BA 85). There is, 
though, an ambiguity here for although Tuttle clearly warps Lauren’s attitude to 
ordinary life, it may be precisely because her attitude toward ordinary life is already 
warped that she is so bewitched by Mr. Tuttle. This ambiguity can be seen to parallel 
one that is at work in Wittgenstein: we are bewitched by metaphysics because of our 
failure to look at how ordinary language works, but we are unable to look at the 
ordinary or ‘see the actual’ because we are ‘dazzled by the ideal’ of metaphysics (PI 
100).  
 
More than the mimicry, however, Lauren is most bewitched by the moments when 
Tuttle’s language seems to suggest the sublime. He produces a poetic mode of speech 
that suggests a profound insight into something deeper. As Osteen notes, ‘not all of 
Tuttle’s utterances are mere echolalia […]. He sometimes chants an instinctive, almost 
Heideggerian poetry’.47 This point is elaborated by Philip Nel, who writes: ‘Tuttle’s 
language may be a more pure form of communication, so transcendent that it transmits 
echoes of a dead man’s memory’.48 Osteen and Nel are referring in particular to the 
occasion when Tuttle produces a ‘pure chant’ of ‘sensuous and empty’ words leading 
Lauren to experience ecstasy or the ‘stir of true amazement’, ‘some displacement of 
self’ (BA 75): 
 
Being here has come to me. I am with the moment, I will leave the moment. Chair, 
table, wall, hall, all for the moment, in the moment. It has come to me. Here and 
near. From the moment I am gone, am left, am leaving. (BA 75) 
 
Although the phrase ‘being here’ has obvious Heideggerian associations, it is perhaps 
the prose of late Beckett that we can hear in Tuttle’s chant. Compare the obsessive 
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repetition that evokes the coming and going in Stirrings Still – ‘rise and go in the same 
place as ever. Disappear and reappear in another where never’49 – or the play of tenses 
and short staccato sentences of Worstward Ho – ‘all of old. Nothing else ever. But never 
so failed. Worse failed.’50 – with the second half of Tuttle’s chant: 
 
Coming and going I am leaving. I will go and come. Leaving has come to me. We 
all, shall all, will all be left. Because I am here and where. And I will go or not or 
never. (BA 75) 
 
Just as in Worstward Ho the language itself is a reflection on the failure of language – 
‘fail again. Fail better’ – so we can see Tuttle’s chant in terms of what Noggle calls the 
Wittgensteinian sublime. According to Noggle, Cavell associates Wittgenstein’s idea of 
philosophical or logical sublimity with the Kantian sublime. The sublime for Kant is not 
‘a true image of absolute power of the infinite universe but rather an instance of our 
failure to grasp such things’. Likewise, for Wittgenstein, ‘philosophical utterances 
“sublime the logic of our language” not because they gesture outward toward some 
ineffable but metaphysically significant realm beyond the ordinary. Rather, they are an 
effect of language’s failure to do so’. Tuttle’s utterances function in a similar fashion; 
they are a ‘sublime failure to capture meaning beyond language’s capacities’.51 
 
Nel makes the important point in relation to Tuttle’s chant that ‘if Tuttle speaks the 
language of God, if his utterances have some connection with Truth, we don’t 
understand him. […] Whatever it is, Lauren can’t translate it’. 52  Tuttle is like 
Wittgenstein’s lion: ‘if a lion could speak’, he writes, ‘we could not understand him’ (PI 
p. 223e). We cannot understand the lion because a lion has a radically different form of 
life. Critics such as Osteen and Nel view Tuttle as an example of a DeLillian ‘babbler’, 
similar in certain respects to Micklewight in Great Jones Street, Tap in The Names and 
Wilder in White Noise. ‘Tuttle is the latest – and one of the most significant – in a long 
line of childlike figures who populate DeLillo’s novels’,53 writes Osteen. For Maltby, 
these characters illustrate DeLillo’s engagement with the ‘romantic myth of some 
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primal, pre-abstract level of language’; 54  their use of language indicates DeLillo’s 
endorsement of the ‘idea of a prelapsarian tongue that connects directly to the world’.55 
But, as discussed in the introduction, Maltby overlooks the ambiguity of DeLillo’s 
engagement with metaphysics. Nel argues that DeLillo ‘will never confirm’ the 
possibility of transcendent meaning, but ‘prefers to suggest that Tuttle, through the 
power of his childlike innocence and wonder, can mediate between physical and 
metaphysical worlds, accidentally bridging natural and supernatural’.56 
 
Rather than viewing Tuttle, Wilder or Tap as pointing towards an actual deeper meaning 
or metaphysical reality, it is perhaps less problematic to view them as illustrating our 
apparent need for it. They can be seen to represent our yearning for some ‘ineffable but 
metaphysically significant realm beyond the ordinary’,57 but not the existence of one. 
Such characters in DeLillo’s novels reveal the extent to which ordinary experience is 
mediated, but they also show that this mediation is necessary. They experience reality 
and language differently because they are free from social, cultural or linguistic 
conventions. But this merely serves to illustrate the importance of social, cultural and 
linguistic conventions and not that these conventions somehow block access to a less 
mediated, purer truth.  
 
For Wittgenstein, babbling is characteristic of language use outside of a language game, 
which can be both utter nonsense and highly profound. Noggle writes: ‘Wittgenstein 
insists that expressions outside language games from one perspective seem as deep and 
powerful as anything could be and from another nonsensical’.58 Significantly, however, 
this sublime language, this failure, is necessary for a clear-sighted understanding of 
ordinary language. ‘Language outside language games is an outward venture that leads 
us nowhere but backward’, explains Noggle, ‘to the untranscendental conditions of 
ordinary language’.59 
 
 
III. CLARITY 
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According to Noggle, ‘linguistic alienation’s value lies in its capacity to purge us of 
itself, to bring us back to the language games in which we live and breathe’; ‘to purge 
us of the philosophical desire to cling to the illusions of sublime transcendence’.60 
Lauren’s engagement with Tuttle, both the alienation and yearning he produced or 
exacerbated in her, ultimately purges her of the desire for transcendence. In the novel’s 
closing scene Lauren enters the bedroom in which she’d hoped to find Rey only to find 
that it is empty. Lauren has been spellbound by the idea that Rey is alive and in their 
bedroom – she has desperately tried to believe it is possible to transcend or go back in 
time, but at the final moment her fantasy comes to an end and she is faced with an 
empty room, the simple and familiar. This does not lead to disappointment but rather is 
experienced as a release. As Lauren’s crisis ends and she returns to herself, she seems to 
perceive things with the same intensity, clarity and insight as she does in the novel’s 
opening chapter, ‘the light was so vibrant she could see the true colors of the walls and 
floor. She’d never seen the walls before’ (BA 124). Both the experience and the 
language used to describe her return recall the ‘spiritual fervour’ with which Lauren 
sees the Jay outside the kitchen window in the novel’s first chapter, ‘she thought she’d 
somehow only now learned how to look. She’d never seen a thing so clearly’; ‘this must 
be what it means to see if you’ve been blind all your life’ (BA 21, 22).  
 
As we’ve already shown, her return from her bewitchment is marked by a return to the 
ordinary, something akin to Wittgenstein’s ‘rough ground’, where she can see and 
breathe. In a defiant gesture of renewal, and belief in the physical here and now, she 
throws open the window of her bedroom. She opens the window ‘because she wanted to 
feel the sea tang on her face and the flow of time in her body, to tell her who she was’ 
(BA 124). We can now see the extent to which, by affirming that time, nature and the 
body are essential for her sense of self, the ending can be read as an impassioned 
response to her earlier scepticism and yearning for transcendence.   
 
Lauren’s return to herself has an important philosophical parallel. Noggle argues that 
philosophical bewitchment can lead to a return to the ordinary, a return marked by fresh 
insight and a clearing away of the clutter of metaphysical thought processes. However, 
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it is only through this process of being led astray and returning that the ordinary can be 
fully understood; ‘only by departing from language games’, argues Noggle, ‘can we 
grasp their significance’.61 For Cavell, the philosophical or literary misuse of language 
paradoxically enables a clear sight of ordinary language. He writes: 
 
the philosophically pertinent griefs to which language comes are not disorders, if 
that means they hinder its working; but are essential to what we know as the 
learning or sharing of language, to our attachment to our language; they are 
functions of its order.
62
  
 
Noggle’s reading of Cavell leads him to make an important connection between late and 
early Wittgenstein. He argues that linguistic alienation serves a similar purpose to that 
of the Tractatus, whose propositions Wittgenstein claims ‘are elucidatory in this way: 
he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out 
through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder after he 
has climbed up on it)’ (TLP 6.54). Noggle claims that although Wittgenstein is averse to 
metaphysical language his work is also deeply invested in it. The value of metaphysical 
language, argues Noggle, ‘lies in its power to throw us clear of itself when we perceive 
it rightly’.63  
 
There is an evident spiritual or religious tenor to these ideas of clarity and returning, and 
both Wittgenstein and DeLillo seem to suggest the link between new ways of seeing or 
spiritual awakening with achieving a sense of peace. Such spiritual fervour is much in 
evidence in the Investigations, for example in the importance Wittgenstein gives to 
changing our ‘way of looking at things’ (PI 144). He writes that,  
 
The clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means 
that the philosophical problems should completely disappear. The real discovery is 
the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to. – The 
one that give philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions 
which bring itself in question. (PI 133) 
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There is nothing metaphysical about this experience for Wittgenstein, clarity of vision is 
not the privileged insight into ‘the bottom of things’, into ‘something that lies beneath 
the surface’ (PI 89, 92). Rather it is a question of not being ‘dazzled by the ideal’, but 
looking at the ‘actual use’ of words ‘clearly’ (PI 100). We can see a parallel between 
this mode of vision and the clarity with which Lauren sees things when she is not 
blinded by grief or bewitched by the temptations of Mr. Tuttle. The ordinariness of what 
Lauren sees – walls and floors, tap water, a blue jay – is contrasted with the blurred, 
somewhat fantastical vision Lauren experiences in the midst of her suffering. 
Ultimately, the novel suggests that if there is a possibility of transcendent meaning it is 
to be experienced in the material and activities of daily life, in ‘all the shadow-dappled 
stuff of an undividable moment on a normal morning going crazy in ways so humanly 
routine you can’t even stop and take note’ (BA 24).  
 
 
100 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
From the ‘numinous glow’ to ‘gut squalor’ – Underworld’s Dialectic of 
Transcendence and the Ordinary 
 
She’d summon a moment that struck me with enormous force, any moment, 
something ordinary but bearing power with it - ordinary only if you haven’t lived 
it.  
Don DeLillo
1
 
 
God grant the philosopher insight into what lies in front of everyone’s eyes. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein
2
  
 
 
This chapter will be informed by the first two chapters of the thesis but also look 
forward to the last two. It will return to Falling Man by further examining aspects of 
‘looking at the overlooked’ from a Wittgensteinian perspective, and will look to The 
Body Artist in terms of the significance of language, loss, and a sense of movement 
from the transcendent to the ordinary. However, in its concern with a disengaged, 
solipsistic protagonist and the possibility of transcendent meaning we will see 
connections with earlier novels and thus with the concerns of the last two chapters.  The 
last chapter ended with the suggestion that if transcendence is to be found anywhere it is 
in ‘all the shadow-dappled stuff of an undividable moment on a normal morning’ (BA 
24). This chapter will argue that Underworld is characterized by a similar dialectic 
between the transcendent and the ordinary; that, ultimately, transcendent meaning, if it 
exists at all, exists in the material of daily life; that, for all the suggestions of mysterious 
connections or miraculous visions, it is to the wonder of everyday things that the novel 
ultimately appeals. By looking at Underworld in the light of the novels that appeared 
after its publication we may gain a deeper insight into both the novel itself and its role 
                                                 
1
 Underworld, p. 101 
2
 Culture and Value, p. 63 
101 
 
  
in DeLillo’s work as a whole. In particular, I intend to show that by examining 
Underworld in the light of my reading of Falling Man and The Body Artist we can get a 
clearer sense of DeLillo’s equivocal engagement with the transcendent and its 
dialectical relation to the ordinary.  
 
That the novel is engaged on various levels with the transcendent – things ‘outside the 
limits of experience’ – is unquestionable (U 509). Arthur Saltzman observes that 
‘Underworld displays a particular, consistent concern with what may lie beyond. By 
interrogating the accessibility and the merit of transcendental moments, Underworld 
focuses and extends an interest that appears throughout DeLillo’s fiction’.3 Underworld 
is shot through with moments of, and reflections upon, transcendence: from an atomic 
test blast to the mysterious appearance of a dead girl’s face on a billboard; a historic 
baseball game to the traumatic shock of shooting someone; epic landscape sculpture to 
numinous landfill sites. The novel is in part an attempt to re-imagine the forms that 
transcendence, or rather the craving for transcendence, take in a postmodern, secular 
culture. The novel is engaged with the question of the possibility of metaphysical 
experience in a commodified world.  
 
This chapter will attempt to address the nature and significance of this mystery or 
transcendence by arguing that it should be read as part of a dialectic with the ordinary. It 
will examine the way in which the ordinary and transcendent are intrinsically linked in 
the novel; how, in each case, the ‘moments of possible transcendence’4 are related in 
some way to a material object. They are immersed in the ordinary or, as Saltzman 
observes, ‘transcendence is tethered’. 5  The argument will be informed by an 
engagement with Cavell’s reading of Wittgenstein’s work as an ‘inescapable dialectic’ 
between the metaphysical and the ordinary. I will argue that Underworld enacts an 
inversion of the metaphysical and the ordinary, and is ultimately marked by a return to 
the contingent and particular, to the ‘thick lived tenor of things’ (U 827). I will show 
how Wittgenstein’s thought can help us think philosophically about the function of the 
various metaphysical features of the novel, particularly in relation to the importance and 
nature of the hidden. By reading Underworld through a Wittgensteinian lens we will be 
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able to see the transcendent moments not as endorsements or examples of a 
metaphysical or essentialist conception of things, but as part of a dialectic between the 
drive to metaphysics and a return to the ordinary or everyday; a dialectic that inverts 
metaphysics by seeing wonder in the ordinary and seeing the ordinary in the seemingly 
transcendent. Underworld’s engagement with ordinary things and the everyday is not 
only central to understanding the way, and sense in which, the transcendent figures in 
the novel, but is also significant in itself. The concern with the ordinary pervades the 
novel, ranging from the obsessive interest in waste to the role and nature of the artists 
and works of art featured in it. The novel is animated by an interest in daily ephemera, 
in the unseen elements of everyday life; it unearths the forgotten, overlooked or 
neglected elements of culture and history.  
 
It might be argued that the novel’s metaphysical engagement is less equivocal than I am 
suggesting, as there is a great deal in the novel that may seem to illustrate what Maltby 
calls DeLillo’s ‘metaphysical cast of mind’.6 From the title, with its implication of a 
division between depth and surface – between a world ‘under the surface of ordinary 
things’ (U 761) and a world with ‘a rehearsed and layered and cosmetic look’ (U 157) – 
to the repeated distinctions between real and fake, we might assume that the novel is 
underpinned by the kind of romantic metaphysics that Maltby, in reference to earlier 
novels, argues is central to DeLillo’s work. Especially if, following Maltby, we were to 
see the various moments of transcendence as ‘premised on metaphysical assumptions of 
supernal truth’, 7  as moments of insight into reality or hidden truth. The novel’s 
preoccupation with conspiracy and the accompanying notion of dietrologia – ‘the 
science of dark forces […] the science of what is behind something’ (U 280) – might 
also be read in such metaphysical or Platonic terms, for, as McClure writes: ‘conspiracy 
theory explains the world […] by positing the existence of hidden forces which 
permeate and transcend the realm of ordinary life’.8  
 
By reading DeLillo’s novel in relation to Wittgenstein’s philosophy, which challenges 
this Platonic idea that reality, or the real, true nature of things lies hidden, we can show 
that Underworld’s concern with conspiracy, paranoia and the hidden, with secrets and 
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the loss of the real, is not an endorsement of an unequivocal metaphysics but part of an 
engagement with understanding what Cavell calls ‘the essential and implacable 
restlessness of the human’ in the striving to find meaning.9   
 
By turning to Wittgenstein I hope to show that we can make sense of and illuminate the 
novel’s paradoxical engagement with the hidden and the ordinary without recourse to 
problematic metaphysical paradigms or the suggestion that DeLillo is an unequivocally 
metaphysical novelist. I will show that what is hidden does not refer to some 
inaccessible metaphysical realm of truth or essence but to ordinary things not normally 
seen. And I will show that, by looking at the ordinary in a certain way, we can be cured 
of a metaphysical yearning that for Wittgenstein, though inevitable, leads to confusion, 
nonsense, a sense of loss and exile, and that for DeLillo leads to, among other things, 
paranoia, alienation, and solipsism. Wittgenstein’s radical approach to ‘what is hidden’, 
and the way in which he engages with the metaphysical, neither rejecting nor accepting 
it, can help illuminate the complexity of DeLillo’s engagement with metaphysics and 
show that notions of depth or the real are not the result of a privileged insight into the 
true nature of things, but simply of ordinary things seen clearly.  
 
 
I. THE ORDINARY AND TRANSCENDENT  
 
Underworld ends with a single word paragraph, a word that seems to hover 
ambiguously between suggesting possible transcendence and acceptance of the 
ordinary: ‘Peace’. It is a word that ‘spreads a longing’ and yet marks serenity and 
contentment; that represents both an unattainable ideal and the physicality of ‘binding 
touch’ (U 827). Osteen reads this ‘final, pacific word’ as being ‘offered hopefully but 
tentatively as an ideal that may nonetheless remain out of reach’,10 while Saltzman picks 
up on the term’s ambiguity as a conclusion to the novel: ‘it is hard to tell whether 
“peace” results from the contention that “everything connects in the end” or whether it 
is just a wish for a release from that sentence.’11 There is added ambiguity from the 
sense in which it is possible to hear ‘peace’ as a goodbye in hippy slang. 
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The tension embodied in this powerful, single word – between longing and acceptance, 
between the ideal and the actual – and the equivocal conclusion it provides for the novel 
encapsulates DeLillo’s ambiguous and complex engagement with the transcendent. This 
final word comes at the end of a series of endings, all of which are marked by a similar 
tension or dialectic between the transcendent and the ordinary. The Epilogue seems to 
reach its climax with the apparently miraculous appearance of a recently murdered 
young girl’s face on a billboard. The girl, Esmeralda, was a homeless child who lived 
and roamed around ‘the Wall’, a run-down area of the South Bronx. She is brutally 
raped and murdered, and a few days later rumours start to spread of her face appearing 
on an advertising hoarding for Minute Maid. People start to congregate at the spot 
hoping to see this possible miracle, including Sisters Edgar and Gracie, who have been 
trying to rescue Esmeralda. Gracie is sceptical, but Edgar is keen, ready to believe that it 
is the sign she needs to keep her faith intact. The face seems to appear, fleetingly, as the 
headlights of ‘an ordinary commuter train’ illuminate the billboard. For Sister Edgar the 
experience is a revelation. She feels ‘an angelus of clearest joy’ (U 822) and 
experiences the rapture of communal bliss, as she lets go of a lifetime’s lack of contact 
and embraces her fellow, rapt believers.  
 
The experience of ‘how a crowd brings things to a single consciousness’, how a single 
fleeting event produces a ‘holler of unstoppered belief’ and ‘swaying soulclap raptures’ 
(U 821, 824) connects this event with the novel’s beginning; with the account of Bobby 
Thompson’s homerun – the fact that ‘what could not happen actually happened’ (U 57-
8). In DeLillo’s depiction of the legendary baseball game between the New York Giants 
and Brooklyn Dodgers we can see a significant emphasis on its transcendent nature. 
According to Todd McGowan, for example, Thompson’s home run ‘is a transcendent 
event’; it has ‘an aura surrounding it, as if it were a sacred event’. McGowan adds that 
DeLillo’s narration ‘further establishes this aura, as he slowly builds up a sense of 
anticipation and inevitability’.12 DeLillo conveys the transcendent aspects of the ball 
game not only at the moment of Thompson’s dramatic homer and the euphoric eruption 
that follows, but from the start, from Cotter’s slow motion leap over the turnstile and his 
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first sight of the field: ‘that unfolding vision of the grass that […] seems to mean he has 
stepped outside his life’ (U 14). 
 
This sense of the transcendent, however, is given its weight and force by the way it 
contrasts with, and is embedded in, a deeply textured account of all the ordinary 
elements that constitute the event; elements of lived experience or what Klara Sax calls 
‘felt life’ (U 77). DeLillo’s rendering of the baseball game is as remarkable for its 
ordinariness – for the local, American, and historically specific features – as it is for its 
transcendent aspect. The prologue is notable, as is the novel as a whole, for the way 
DeLillo immerses us in the ordinary – in the ‘gut squalor’ of the event, from the ‘reek 
and mold’ of the toilet or the ‘sweaty meat and grease bubbles’ of a hot dog (U 21, 13), 
to the vomit on Frank Sinatra’s shoes. The prologue’s most transcendent image – the 
falling pocket litter that rains down onto the field, described by David H. Evans as an 
‘eruption of countless particulars’13 – is itself marked by its ordinariness: 
 
Paper is falling again, crushed traffic tickets and field-stripped cigarettes and work 
from the office and scorecards in the shape of airplanes, windblown and mostly 
white. (U 37) 
  
It is coming down from all points, laundry tickets, envelopes swiped from the 
office, there are crushed cigarette packs and sticky wrap from ice-cream 
sandwiches, pages from memo pads and pocket calendars […] rolls of toilet tissue 
unbolting lyrically in streamers. (U 45) 
 
This conjunction of the transcendent and the ordinary in an inextricable dialectic is also 
manifest in DeLillo’s depiction of the Bobby Thompson ball that is hit out of the stands 
and eventually into the hands of Nick Shay, as well as in the sport of Baseball itself. 
Baseball is symbolic of an innocent past. It functions as an ideal, part of American 
mythology, but also represents the grounded and homely; the ‘real’. In a later scene Big 
Sims evokes the ordinariness of baseball as a way of rebuffing Nick’s conspiratorial 
invocation of ‘dietrologia’ when he replies that he doesn’t need this science: ‘I’m an 
American’, he says, ‘I go to ball games’ (U 280). 
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As for the Bobby Thompson ball, which plays such a pivotal symbolic and structural 
role in the novel, it can be seen as both a ‘magical object’14 and a useless thing, ‘junk’ – 
celebrated as both a transcendental, ‘high aura’d’ emblem and for its ‘irreducible 
thingness’.15 Nick’s attachment to the baseball is in part for its symbolic value, but the 
importance of its physicality and ordinariness is also emphasised, as we can see from 
the way Nick delights in the materiality and sensuality of such a lived but inanimate 
object, in the friction between hand and ball, and sense of human contact with things:  
 
You squeeze a baseball. You kind of juice it or milk it. The resistance of the 
packed material makes you want to press harder. There’s an equilibrium, an 
agreeable animal tension between the hard leather object and the sort of clawed 
hand. Veins stretching with the effort. And the feel of raised seams across the 
fingertips […]. The ball was deep sepia, veneered with dirt and turf and 
generational sweat – it was old, bunged up, it was bashed and tobacco-juiced and 
stained by natural processes and by the lives behind it. (U 131) 
 
Cowart notes that the ball ‘may or may not retain a special meaning’ 16  and this 
ambiguous status, this sense in which an ordinary thing can suggest transcendent 
possibilities, is also a marked characteristic of Esmeralda’s appearance on the billboard. 
The billboard is illuminated by the headlights of ‘an ordinary commuter train’ and is 
itself a banal advertising device. In discussing this scene, Peter Knight points out that 
‘the source of mystery’ is located  
 
not in an uncorrupted zone outside the iron cage of capitalism but within the 
system itself: the moment of collective religious wonder comes not by traditional 
divine or artistic revelation but through the medium of advertising, the very soul of 
consumer capitalism.
17
  
 
Not only does the miracle appear through the medium of advertising, but it is soon 
incorporated into the market: ‘just as the exhilaration of the baseball game’s incredible 
conclusion is followed by a sordid struggle over the possession of the ball’, observes 
Evans, ‘so the site of Esmeralda’s manifestation quickly becomes a makeshift strip 
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mall’.18 The billboard miracle is corrupted by ‘Manhattan money and glut’ (U 818) – 
vendors selling ‘laminated images of Esmeralda’ and the tabloid sensation of 
Esmeralda’s junkie mother being taken away in ‘an ambulance that is followed by a 
number of TV trucks’ (U 823). Esmeralda ends up, notes Molly Wallace, subjected to 
‘the logic of consumption’.19  
 
Similarly, it does not take long before a sense of loss or disappointment undermines the 
personal experience of transcendent bliss. Just as Cotter ‘feels the little bringdown’ 
brought about by ‘the sour air of his building’ and the ‘pain from the seat leg’ (U 58) so 
Edgar is brought back to her body by the ‘pain in her joints, the old body deep in routine 
pain’ (U 824). Cowart writes: ‘although DeLillo affirms that […] Sister Edgar 
experiences a moment of exaltation, he simultaneously denies its ultimate validity’,20 
for just as Cotter is unable to keep hold of his possession so Edgar struggles to maintain 
her belief in the vision. She ‘holds the image tight in her mind’ but, she seems to 
acknowledge, the image is a result of her yearning: it is ‘the vision you crave because 
you need a sign to stand against your doubt’ (U 824). 
 
Following this episode, however, the novel seems once again to suggest the possibility 
of transcendence as we experience Sister Edgar’s life-after-death: 
 
There is no space or time out here, or in here, or wherever she is. There are only 
connections. Everything is connected. All human knowledge gathered and linked, 
hyperlinked, this site leading to that, this fact referenced to that, a keystroke, a 
mouse-click, a password – world without end, amen. (U 825)  
 
Philip Nel writes that ‘though this passage seems to posit the Internet as a means of 
transcending the material world, the very next paragraph quickly disabuses us of that 
notion: “But she is in cyberspace, not heaven, and she feels the grip of systems. This is 
why she’s so uneasy (U 825).”’21 DeLillo emphasizes this turn from the transcendent to 
the material with a wry and amusing interjection of the narrative voice: ‘she sees God. 
No, wait, sorry. It is a Soviet bomb she sees’ (U 826).  
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Nel concludes his essay with the claim that DeLillo’s work ‘challenges us to reconnect’ 
to the ‘material world’.22 Curiously, however, Nel doesn’t actually examine the way 
DeLillo does this in the novel’s final paragraph. Nel claims that it is ‘significant that the 
novel ends in the Internet’,23 but is it not more significant that the novel finally ends 
with a concrete reconnection to the material world? With an escape from the ‘grip of 
systems’ (U 825), a shift from the immateriality of cyberspace – a place of ‘easy 
retreats, half beliefs’ and the ‘false faith’ of paranoia (U 826, 825) – to the world of 
ordinary things:  
 
You look at the things in the room, offscreen, unwebbed, the tissued grain of 
deskwood alive in light, the thick lived tenor of things, the argument of things to be 
seen and eaten, the apple core going sepia in the lunch tray, and the dense measures 
of experience in a random glance […] and the chipped rim of the mug that holds 
your yellow pencils, skewed all crazy, and the plied lives of the simplest surface, 
the slabbed butter melting on the crumbled bun, and the yellow of the yellow of the 
pencils.  (U 827) 
 
This rich, sensuous passage, which, like Nick’s description of the baseball, is 
‘extraordinary in it assiduous specificity’,24 depicts the power, resonance and beauty of 
ordinary things and everyday life. By turning away from the false promise of 
cyberspace and ambiguous visions to the ‘thick lived tenor of things’ – things seen 
clearly and in illuminated detail – DeLillo seems to suggest that it is in ‘the depth and 
reach of the commonplace’ that we can see what is extraordinary (U 542). By showing 
the extraordinariness of the ordinary, this passage reveals that the significance of the 
transcendent in DeLillo does not lie in the fact that it offers a means of escape or retreat 
from contemporary culture and existence. Transcendence in DeLillo is not a reactionary 
mode of religious hope or promise of the infinite; it is not, claims Knight, to be found in 
‘some inaccessible and outmoded otherworldly realm’.25 Rather, the transcendent in 
DeLillo consists of a deeper engagement in material, temporal culture, and it is the 
result of an increased or intensified clarity of vision.  
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The passage exemplifies the inversion of the metaphysical and the ordinary that is at 
work throughout the novel. The focus is on ordinary things – things overlooked because 
of their ‘simplicity and familiarity’, things ‘always before one’s eyes’ (PI 129) – yet 
these things are imbued with a kind of wonder; there is an attempt to convey what 
George Steiner, citing Heidegger, calls the ‘luminous “thereness of what is”’.26 And, as 
we have shown in Chapter One, the emphasis on light, colour and tone – the ‘tenor of 
things’ – and the fact the things ‘are simply the ordinary, attended to’ 27  in their 
uniqueness, calls to mind a certain mode of still life painting.  
 
 
II. ‘NOTHING IS HIDDEN’ 
 
‘Nothing is hidden’, writes Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations (PI 435). A 
radical claim that seems in direct contrast to the prevailing mood and theme of 
Underworld, in which secrets, hidden connections, and ‘second meanings’ play such a 
vital role (U 88). Of course any attempt to extract a truth claim or any kind of theory or 
generalisable point from Wittgenstein’s work is fraught with difficulties. The 
Investigations, writes Perloff, ‘is neither a book of proverbs nor a systematic argument’, 
but a trip through a ‘network of fragments’.28 It is in large part a series of dialogical 
exchanges between different illocutionary voices, and there is no attempt to make 
substantive propositions on any subject. As discussed in the introduction, the purpose of 
the text is to demonstrate a method or style of thought, not to express doctrines. 
Nevertheless, it can be safely asserted that the idea that nothing is hidden is a recurring 
theme in the text and forms part of Wittgenstein’s critique of metaphysics. It is part of 
his attempt to demystify our sense that something ‘out of the ordinary is involved’ (PI 
94) in the workings of language, and by extension in the meaning of things generally. In 
particular, it is, according to David Finklestein, part of his attempt to show ‘why we 
ought to be dissatisfied with a Platonistic account of meaning and understanding’.29  
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Wittgenstein fully recognises the force and pull of the metaphysical urge, of the extent 
to which a metaphysical attitude lies embedded in our language and consciousness. He 
writes: ‘we feel as if we had to penetrate phenomena […] as if there were something 
hidden […] that had to be brought to light’ (PI 90, 91). Wittgenstein shows why we are 
led to think that the essence of things, or meaning, lies hidden – for example, because of 
the ‘fascination which forms of expression exert on us’ (BB p. 27) or because of ‘certain 
analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of language’ (PI 90) – 
but also why the temptation to think in such a way leads to philosophical grief. The idea 
that something is hidden – truth, essence, meaning, God – something that can be 
discovered or found or that philosophy can give an account of, is precisely the kind of 
misleading belief that Wittgenstein thinks leads to philosophical confusion, but one 
which he recognises as having a profound grip on us. It is a picture of things that holds 
‘us captive’ (PI 115) and its ‘roots are as deep in us as the forms of our language and 
[its] significance is as great as the importance of our language’ (PI 111). He writes:  
 
People are deeply embedded in philosophical, i.e. grammatical confusions. And to 
free them from these presupposes pulling them out of the immensely manifold 
connections they are caught up in. One must so to speak regroup their entire 
language. – But this language came about // developed // as it did because people 
had – and have – the inclination to think in this way. (PO 185) 
 
Wittgenstein acknowledges and explores the urge or apparent need to seek metaphysical 
answers – to uncover what lies hidden – because an important part of his work is 
concerned with showing the false paths we seem naturally inclined to take. He writes, 
‘one must start out with error and convert it into truth. That is, one must reveal the 
source of error, otherwise hearing the truth won’t do any good […] one must find the 
path from error to truth’ (PO 119). Thus a great deal of the Investigations is taken up by 
diagnosis, by showing the way philosophical confusion arose in the first place. Cavell 
claims that ‘the first step of a philosophical answer to a philosophical problem is to 
demonstrate to us that we are indeed lost, confused’.30 It is this acknowledgement of, 
and engagement with, metaphysical yearning or ‘the philosophical, or say the human, 
craving for the metaphysical’ 31  that leads Cavell to claim that Wittgenstein’s later 
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thought ‘can be regarded as providing a theory of the drive to metaphysics’; that it is ‘as 
much a philosophy of metaphysics as it is a philosophy of the ordinary’.32  
 
What is important about Wittgenstein’s writing in this area for thinking about DeLillo is 
that he doesn’t simply reject metaphysics or the drive to metaphysics, but seems to 
invert it. Wittgenstein recognises that metaphysics attempts to satisfy a deep need 
within us and rather than reject this need he turns the issue on its head, ‘by turning our 
whole examination round. (One might say: the axis of reference of our examination 
must be rotated, but about the fixed point of our real need)’ (PI 108). Wittgenstein 
attempts to show that the satisfaction or answers we seek from metaphysical questions 
can be provided by a turn or return to the ordinary, but seen in a specific way – by 
‘seeing connections’ and ‘arranging what we have always known’ (PI 122, 109). And, 
paradoxically, this way of seeing may seem metaphysical. This paradox can be 
illuminated by a passage from Wittgenstein’s notebooks for Remarks on Frazer’s 
Golden Bough, in which he talks of ‘metaphysics as a kind of magic’. He writes ‘I must 
not make a case for magic nor may I make fun of it. The depth of magic should be 
preserved. Indeed, here the elimination of magic has itself the character of magic’ (PO 
116).  
 
The steps Wittgenstein advocates for a return to the ordinary frequently have the 
appearance and magical effect of a metaphysical insight, in which the sudden changed 
‘way of looking at things’ (PI 144) brought about by his method has the air of religious 
revelation. He writes: ‘the solution of philosophical problems can be compared with a 
gift in a fairy tale: in the magic castle it appears enchanted and if you look at it outside 
in daylight it is nothing but an ordinary bit of iron (or something of the sort)’ (CV 11). 
Furthermore, his highly figurative use of language, frequent use of similes, metaphors 
and analogies, and recurring use of light imagery, also has strong metaphysical and 
religious connotations. Cavell argues that the ‘idea of philosophical progress in the 
Philosophical Investigations is from the darkness of confusion to enlightened 
understanding, or from illusion to clarity’;33 it is not from ‘ignorance to knowledge’ but 
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from ‘being lost to finding ourselves’.34 Along with religious imagery Wittgenstein thus 
also invokes the religious idea of a journey or quest, a movement from darkness to light 
– a journey in which language plays a central role. He writes, ‘the choice of our words 
is so important, because the point is to hit upon the physiognomy of the thing exactly, 
because only the exactly aimed thought can lead to the correct track’ (PO 165). 
Wittgenstein writes of finding ‘the liberating word’, and this word functions not by 
unlocking a secret or revealing hidden truths, but by making problems disappear (PO 
165). The liberation is not an insight into true reality or an otherworldly realm; it is the 
liberation of ‘peace’ (PI 137). ‘The problems are dissolved’, claims Wittgenstein, ‘in 
the actual sense of the word – like a lump of sugar in water’ (PO 183).  
 
By viewing things in this way we can better understand the apparent contradiction in the 
Investigations between two closely related, almost consecutive statements on ‘what is 
hidden’. In remark 126 Wittgenstein states that, ‘since everything lies open to view 
there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us’. This 
is closely followed in remark 129 by the claim that ‘the aspects of things that are most 
important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to 
notice something – because it is always before one’s eyes)’.  
 
There is no real contradiction here because Wittgenstein is making two separate though 
related points, but the use of the word ‘hidden’ does reveal the way Wittgenstein shows 
that the seemingly metaphysical is ordinary and that the ordinary can seem 
metaphysical. The first statement – that what is hidden is of no interest – is an argument 
against the temptation to metaphysics; against the misleading but powerful belief that 
‘the essence is hidden from us, […] lies beneath the surface’ and that ‘analysis can dig it 
out’ (PI 92). The second statement concerns the ordinary or everyday workings and uses 
of language that we overlook or can’t see precisely because we are looking for 
something hidden. It is precisely because we are misled or bewitched by the role of the 
ideal in our language that we are unable to see ‘what we have always known’ (PI 109). 
Instead, ‘we are dazzled by the ideal’ (PI 100) and thus fail to see the actual workings of 
our language in ‘ordinary life’. The ideal functions ‘like a pair of glasses on our nose 
through which we see whatever we look at. It never occurs to us to take them off’ (PI 
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103), and Wittgenstein brings us out from this false ideal by opening the ordinary world 
to us. By taking off the glasses through which we were trying to find what is hidden – 
the metaphysical - we can see the simple and familiar, which was previously unseen, 
but is in fact ordinary. In other words, the aspect of things that seems hidden and which 
is of vital importance for Wittgenstein is the ‘everyday use’ of words or ‘the language 
of everyday’ (PI 116, 120). He writes: ‘a main source of our failure to understand is that 
we do not command a clear view of the use of our words’ (PI 122). 
 
The issue of sight or clarity of vision is central to Wittgenstein’s thinking here. The 
answers to philosophical difficulties, he argues, ‘must be homespun and ordinary. But 
one must look at them in the proper spirit’ (PO 169). The dazzling ideal prevents us 
from seeing clearly. What Wittgenstein wants to do is ‘to bring words back from the 
metaphysical to their everyday use’ (PI 116), which Cavell argues is a return to ‘the 
actual language of life in a life momentarily freed of an illusion’. 35  This relation 
between language and vision, the everyday and the metaphysical, is explicitly addressed 
in Underworld during Nick Shay’s discussion with Father Paulus, which will be 
discussed shortly, and it is central to the novel’s concerns as a whole. The ‘illusion’ that 
Cavell refers to is a metaphysical, systematic, totalizing paradigm that prevents us from 
seeing the singular and ordinary. By showing that the novel’s concern with the hidden 
aspect of things is primarily a concern with neglected everyday things that are unseen, 
we can suggest a Wittgensteinian approach to the way paranoia functions in the novel 
and show that the novel carries out a subtle critique of a metaphysical or paranoid 
conception of the hidden.  
 
 
III. ‘OVERLOOKED KNOWLEDGE’ 
 
In Underworld the hidden refers not so much to some kind of Platonic realm – there is 
no suggestion of finding some essential core of truth – but to things not normally seen. 
The novel’s concern with seeing what we don’t ordinarily see – what Father Paulus 
refers to as the ‘overlooked knowledge’ of ‘everyday things’ (U 542), things which 
exist in concrete, material reality and not in some abstract or ideological realm – has 
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political, aesthetic as well as philosophical consequences. In a scene that can be said to 
illustrate Wittgenstein’s claim that ‘One is unable to notice something – because it is 
always before one’s eyes’ (PI 129), Klara Sax experiences an aesthetic revelation when 
she starts to see things previously unseen or from revealing new perspectives:  
 
she realized how rare it was to see what stands before you, and what a novelty of 
basic sensation in the grinding life of the city – to look across a measured space 
and be undistracted by signs and streetlights and taxis and scaffolding, by your own 
bespattered mind. (U 379) 
 
Wittgenstein’s words are also echoed by Marvin Lundy who states that ‘People sense 
things that are invisible. But when something’s staring you right in the face that’s when 
you miss it completely’ (U 173). Knight reads the idiosyncratic Lundy’s conspiratorial 
musings as indicative of the novel’s general conception of counter-history. He writes:  
 
For both Marvin and the novel as a whole the hidden story of recent history is not 
to be found buried in government files, waiting to be pieced together into a 
coherent story of shadowy conspirators. Instead it is to be found in the daily 
ephemera and vast entanglement of multinational consumer capitalism, both more 
obvious because it is omnipresent, and less detectable because it is so much taken 
for granted.
36
  
 
For Lundy, this conception of things involves looking at the map of Greenland or shape 
of Gorbachev’s birthmark for telling signs, but for the novel as a whole it indicates the 
general importance of the ordinary or everyday, of the way beauty and wonder lie 
hidden in everyday life. In the same essay, Knight draws a parallel between Libra and 
Underworld and cites an interview with DeLillo that suggests a Wittgensteinian way of 
thinking about the unseen:  
 
In the New York Times interview, DeLillo explains how the true meaning of the 
Warren Commission Report […] was not its revelations about any conspiracy plot, 
significant though they were, but the accidental insight it affords into the otherwise 
invisible interweavings of the vast social – and textual – fabric of America:  “[…] 
the assassination […] cast a strong light on a part of the culture that nobody was 
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aware of”. […] In a parallel fashion, the labyrinthine path of the Bobby Thomson 
baseball in Underworld offers DeLillo a way of shedding light on vast areas of 
American culture normally omitted in other inquiries.
37
 
 
Both the language used and the ideas embodied in this citation have strong 
Wittgensteinian resonance. Wittgenstein is preoccupied in his later work with areas 
normally omitted in other inquiries; what we might call the invisible interweaving of the 
vast fabric of language, and the social and cultural forms of life that are integral to its 
function and meaning. These areas are invisible not because they are transcendent or 
somehow behind or beneath phenomena, but because they are unseen. ‘Wittgenstein’s 
grammatical enquiry’, notes McGinn, ‘aims to produce a kind of understanding which 
consists in seeing a pattern or form in what is there before our eyes, but which we had 
previously neglected or overlooked.’38  
 
Wittgenstein’s preoccupation with the particular and specific, with the ordinary, is thus 
part of his attempt to demystify our metaphysical preconceptions of language and 
meaning; our sense of an apparent mystery or hidden essence that lies behind or beneath 
language and meaning, and thus behind the existence of things generally. But in doing 
so, Wittgenstein is not diminishing the power or wonder of language, meaning or 
existence. On the contrary, by exposing the emptiness of metaphysical explanations, 
Wittgenstein shows that the ‘satisfaction we are trying to get from the explanation 
comes of itself’. 39  According to Cavell, Wittgenstein questions ‘how it is that 
philosophy, in its craving for explanation, seeks to explain so little, that is to say, that it 
conceives so little to be mysterious’.40 Ultimately, Wittgenstein’s aim is to reawaken a 
sense of wonder at the sheer remarkable fact of existence: ‘man has to awaken to 
wonder’, he writes in Culture and Value (CV p. 5). And in the Tractatus he states: ‘it is 
not how things are in the world that it is mystical, but that it exists’ (TLP 6.44), which 
Cavell reads as Wittgenstein ‘redressing philosophy’s disparagement of the things of 
sense.’41 Cavell argues that ‘the specificity of the clauses in Wittgenstein’s mythology 
of the ordinary produces the sense of a continuing effort to recognize the 
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extraordinariness within the ordinariness of our lives’.42 This effort involves a radical 
challenge to our seemingly natural tendency to theorisation, and a concentration instead 
on ‘particular concrete cases’ or ‘concrete details’.43  ‘In order to see more clearly’ 
writes Wittgenstein, ‘we must focus on the details of what goes on; must look at them 
from close to’ (PI 51). 
 
This effort to see the extraordinary in the ordinary, or what DeLillo calls the ‘radiance 
in dailiness’,44 is a defining feature of Underworld. It is achieved through a remarkable 
attention to specificity, what Evans describes as Underworld’s ‘meticulous respect for 
the insistently in/significant trivia of ordinary life over half a century’,45 which can 
perhaps most clearly be seen in the novel’s concern with different forms of waste. 
DeLillo’s treatment of waste in the novel is another illustration of the tension between 
the transcendent and the ordinary in the novel. Waste is characterised both by its 
‘numinous glow’ and its ‘gut squalor’ (U 809-810); by its ‘aspect of untouchability’ (U 
88) and the ‘menacing heft and breadth of the material, the actual pulsing thing’ (U 
805). Waste is both ‘a religious thing’ with ‘a solemn aura’ (U 88) and the ‘real stuff of 
the world’ (U 99). In his essay on the significance of waste in the novel, Evans suggests 
that there is a direct connection between waste and the ‘overlooked everyday things’ in 
which DeLillo finds such beauty and mystery. He writes: ‘another word for those 
forgotten quotidian things might be garbage – which, according to Lenny Bruce, “is just 
another name for ordinary life”’.46  
 
 
IV. CONNECTIONS 
 
To suggest that the novel is concerned with the particular and contingent, with ‘the 
unpredictable and singular elements of ordinary life’,47 is not, however, to deny the 
importance of connections or overlook the manifold connections that the novel makes. 
For both DeLillo and Wittgenstein the idea of seeing connections is of pivotal 
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importance. At the core of Wittgenstein’s method lies the ‘concept of a perspicuous 
representation’. It is of ‘fundamental significance’, he claims, since it ‘earmarks the 
form of account we give, the way we look at things’. ‘A perspicuous representation’, 
observes Wittgenstein, ‘produces just that understanding which consists in “seeing 
connections”’ (PI 122). Likewise, Underworld contains a dizzying array of connections 
– of people, themes, objects, places – and the recurring phrase “everything is 
connected” can be said to be the novel’s ‘operating maxim’.48 But these connections 
should not be seen as revealing some deeper truth or representing an attempt at a 
totalized, systematic account of things; rather they should be viewed as ‘family 
resemblances’.  
 
Knight points out that, ‘although Underworld is structured by the principle that 
everything is connected, what is striking about the novel is how confusing and 
fragmented its narrative is’,49 and Evans observes that ‘DeLillo’s history is offered as a 
seemingly arbitrary array of cultural moments and disconnected episodes’. 50  This 
narrative fragmentation and confusion – for example the frequent jumps from one 
subject to another seemingly unrelated one – is central to the way, as Catherine Morley 
argues, the novel forces the reader to ‘participate in the formation of meaning’. 51 
Underworld provides a vast, non-systematic survey of a variety of lives and events that 
criss-cross and overlap in a complex network of connections. It is these connections that 
enable us to see things differently. The novel’s concern with ‘revealing otherwise 
ignored connections’,52 with casting light on the unseen, is not metaphysical, but part of 
an attempt to show the wonder of ordinary things. The connections are not metaphysical 
or essentialist, but similar to arrangements. They point to things that already lie ‘open to 
view’, which are ‘surveyable by a rearrangement’ (PI 92). Furthermore, there remain 
important unconnected spaces in the novel. Evans mentions the Bronx streets Bronzini 
strolls through, full of playing children, as an example of ‘spaces of the unconnected 
and real’53; while Knight claims that ‘though some of the connections in Underworld 
can be inserted into a coherent narrative of the quasi-conspiratorial collusion of 
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hegemonic interests in the globalized economy, there are many others that refuse to be 
assimilated so easily’.54 
 
The significance of the narrative’s fragmented structure is perhaps best understood by 
considering it in relation to the importance of DeLillo’s use of montage in the novel.55 
In an essay on DeLillo’s adoption of avant-garde techniques, Nel analyses the use of 
montage in Underworld and reveals the way in which it forms part of his critical 
engagement and, most importantly, changes the way we think and see. Crucially, Nel 
illustrates the way in which DeLillo’s use of montage is related to the novel’s concern 
with the hidden. Montage, writes Nel, ‘is able to create analogies and suggest 
connections that might otherwise go unseen’.56  These connections enable us to see 
‘things differently’, they don’t demonstrate a theory of how things are (U 443). In a 
similar vein, Wittgenstein’s work, observes Alessandra Tanesini, frequently makes use 
of a ‘striking image in order to bring about a change in perspective’; his use of ‘new 
comparisons or similes’, she argues, is ‘intended to free us from pictures that hold us 
captive’.57  
 
Ultimately, the significance of DeLillo’s use of montage and a fragmented, non-linear 
narrative lies with the reader. And here we can draw a significant parallel with 
Wittgenstein’s method in the Investigations. Both DeLillo and Wittgenstein force the 
reader to critically, or self-critically, engage with questions of meaning or, more 
precisely, to overcome the desire for a certain kind of meaning – Wittgenstein writes 
that ‘I ought to be no more than a mirror, in which my reader can see his own thinking 
with all its deformities so that, helped in this way, he can put it right’ (CV 18). What’s 
more, they do this through making connections, or producing an understanding which 
consists in ‘seeing connections’. Osteen observes that ‘Underworld presents a series of 
fragments […] that dialectically guide the reader’, adding that the novel ‘challenges the 
reader to discover links, [...] encourages us to read actively’.58 DeLillo never allows his 
readers to feel ‘washed in a blowing wind that tells [them] everything’ (U 757). Rather, 
the ambiguity of the novel’s engagement with metaphysics, and the density and 
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complexity of the narrative method, leaves the reader in a state of uncertainty, longing 
perhaps for unambiguous meaning.  
 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy is an attempt to cure his readers of this kind of longing for 
unequivocal certainty and meaning; ‘to cure us of the impulse to transcendence’.59 This 
involves work on oneself. Marie McGinn writes:  
 
Wittgenstein wants to work on us (or better, he wants us to work on ourselves) in 
such a way that a whole style of thought which we find natural - the theoretical 
attitude - is gradually replaced by a recognition that it is by “arranging what we 
have always known” (PI 109) that we both overcome our philosophical illusions 
and achieve the understanding we seek. The aim is to bring about a change in […] 
how we see things.
60
  
 
One of the key ways in which Wittgenstein tries to bring about this change in the way 
we see things is to ‘draw our attention towards the neglected details of our concrete 
practice of using language’;61 by leading us ‘back to the rough ground’, away from the 
‘crystalline purity of logic’ (PI 107). The desire to find certainty and the essence of 
things, this ‘striving after an ideal’ (PI 98), results in an ‘intolerable conflict’ between 
our need – for an ideal order – and the actuality of everyday language. Wittgenstein 
pictures this ideal realm in the following poetic image: ‘We have got onto slippery ice 
where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just 
because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk. So we need friction. Back to 
the rough ground!’ (PI 107)  
 
Such a concern with ‘neglected details’ and the importance of friction – Nick alludes to 
‘the tensile whisper of friction he counted on to carry him through life’ (U 253) – is a 
central part of Nick’s short lesson with Father Paulus, a priest at the correctional school 
Nick is sent to as part of his punishment for shooting George the Waiter. In a strikingly 
Wittgensteinian gesture, Paulus, who wants to teach Nick a ‘form of respect for other 
ways of thinking and believing’ (U 538), argues against the teaching of abstract ideas in 
favour of a detailed focus on concrete things and the importance of everyday language. 
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Evans observes how, in words that echo Wittgenstein, ‘the priest shifts abruptly back to 
Earth, directing Nick’s attention to the ordinary objects that connect him with the 
ground’.62 After a quip about ‘eternal verities left and right’ Paulus advises Nick that, 
‘you’d be better served looking at your shoe and naming the parts’ (U 540). This 
attention to an ordinary object, and the act of naming simple things, ‘the physics of 
language’, is a powerful, Wittgensteinian embodiment of a return to the everyday. 
 
Significantly, there is nothing banal about this return to the everyday. On the contrary, 
Nick is awestruck by these ordinary words and things. ‘I’m going out of my mind’, he 
says (U 542). Paulus shows how these words and things, seen in a certain way, are 
extraordinary. Like Wittgenstein, Paulus has an apparently metaphysical or ‘arcane’ 
way of seeing the everyday: ‘everyday things lie hidden’, he tells Nick; they ‘represent 
the most overlooked knowledge’ (U 541, 542). Like Wittgenstein, Paulus also sees the 
problem in terms of a lack of clarity in language. He says to Nick: ‘you didn’t see the 
thing because you don’t know how to look. And you don’t know how to look because 
you don’t know the names’ (U 540).  
 
This inversion of the metaphysical and the ordinary – seeing the everyday as arcane or 
as ‘overlooked knowledge’ with the power to produce wonder and awe, and seeing the 
metaphysical as created by particular, local needs or longings – can be seen in Evans’ 
reading of the novel. Evans concludes his essay with an account of Nick’s dialogue with 
Father Paulus in order to support his claim that the ultimate thrust of the novel is away 
from the fantastic towards the ordinary, towards overlooked, everyday things. He thinks 
that ‘Underworld finally seems to want to guide us’ to the everyday things that Paulus 
reveals, concluding that  
  
the ultimate thrust of the novel is to direct our gaze away from the freakish and 
fantastic spectacle that comprises the preferred subject matter of postmodern 
fiction. For DeLillo, the ordinary and contingent, the merely real, is equally 
marvellous – and more mysterious to the extent that it lies neglected beneath the 
mesmerising parade of media-generated effects and virtual images that holds in 
thrall both consumers and cultural theorists.
63
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This ‘mesmerising parade’ can be compared with Wittgenstein’s dazzling ideal. Evans 
maintains, along strong though unexplored Wittgensteinian lines, that the novel is 
‘concerned with preserving and representing the stubbornly particular “offscreen, 
unwebbed” elements of ordinary life’.64 He views the novel’s significant focus on the 
ordinary as a rejection of the ‘appeals of postmodern scepticism and paranoid systems 
theory’65 – a line of argument that has strong parallels with the reading of The Body 
Artist in the previous chapter, in particular with Cavell’s claim that ‘the ordinary occurs 
essentially in the Philosophical Investigations as what scepticism denies, and 
metaphysics transcends’.66  
  
 
V. LOSS 
 
By thinking about the function of the ordinary in this way we can gain a deeper insight 
into the role of paranoia in the novel and its connection to Nick’s nostalgic yearning for 
the real. And by returning briefly to the ideas discussed in the previous chapter we can 
draw a parallel between Nick’s ‘feelings of loneliness, loss and confusion’ 67  and 
Wittgenstein’s sense of the homelessness and loss caused by philosophy, and the need 
to return to the ordinary.  
 
Loss is a central theme in both Underworld and the Investigations. As we have seen, for 
Wittgenstein, the condition of philosophy is one of loss, of being lost, or at a loss. He 
writes: ‘a philosophical problem has the form: “I don’t know my way about”’ (PI 123). 
Paradoxically, philosophy is both the cause and cure of this loss. In Tanesini’s words: 
‘philosophy generates a sense of estrangement or uprooting from one’s community’.68 It 
is this estrangement that leads to Wittgenstein’s treatment of philosophical problems 
being figured as an act of return, of returning home.  
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Towards the beginning of Underworld, Nick visits Klara Sax, his ex-lover from the 
Bronx. Klara laments with Nick that ‘we’re a long way from home’ (U 73); a 
throwaway but deeply resonant comment. It hints at the importance of homelessness 
and estrangement in the novel, which is further strengthened by Nick’s revealing joke 
about being ‘lost and wandering’ (U 79) and his loaded statement which ends the 
chapter: ‘I looked for a sign that would point me home’ (U 84). Boxall notes that 
‘Nick’s very name, Shay, with its phonic reference to the French chez, gestures towards 
this [...] Homeric returning home of and to oneself’.69 In fact, Nick’s very visit to Klara 
seems born out of some impulse to reconnect, to get back to the ‘one set of streets’ he 
keeps returning to in his dreams (U 74).  
 
During their brief discussion Klara reflects on the ‘unreal turn’ life has taken; how 
everything since those years in the Bronx when things were ‘so strong and real [...] is – 
vaguely – fictitious’ (U 73). At first Nick is reluctant to share Klara’s views – he claims 
to ‘live responsibly in the real’ (U 82) – but by the end of the novel it is evident that 
Nick shares this sense of estrangement, loss, and longing for the real. For Klara this 
sense of unreality and estrangement is not merely a personal issue, but also cultural, and 
the novel explores this cultural shift in a number of ways, which are central to the sense 
of unreality experienced by many of the novel’s characters.70 For Nick, however, his 
loss, estrangement and longing for the real can be seen to result from his paranoid 
outlook and the solipsism linked to or caused by it. Nick is a ‘slave to connection’; one 
of several characters in the novel ‘who cannot stop making sense’.71 He ‘examines 
things for second meanings and deeper connections’ (U 88) and thus, notes Evans, has a 
‘tendency to see nothing for itself but only as a part of larger whole’.72 He seems to 
suffer from precisely the kind of philosophical impulse that, according to Wittgenstein, 
leads to solipsism. Tanesini summarises Wittgenstein’s position: 
 
Wittgenstein shows that a certain conception of subjectivity, which we find hard to 
resist, leads to the creation of a gulf between ourselves and reality. We are drawn 
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to this conception because we feel that the only way to safeguard meaning for our 
lives is to make them safe from the vagaries of the world. […] Once we conceive 
of ourselves as radically separate from contingent empirical reality, we become 
prey to a kind of loneliness which finds its expression in the philosophical 
problems of solipsism and scepticism.
73
 
 
‘Nick’s life’, writes Evans, ‘has become an effort to insulate himself by means of 
various containers from the accidental, the contingent, the lucky’.74 He is enclosed, 
fenced off; he has secured himself from risk and made things safe for himself. In the 
process he has made things sterile: he lives in ‘a state of quiet separation’ (U 796), at 
‘several removes from contact with anything solid or material’.75 He has made himself 
like a ‘made man’, a ‘country of one’, and lives without ‘the constant living influence of 
sources outside’ himself (U 275). This attitude, his ‘lontananza’, is a means of 
protecting himself from loss, but also from the very things which give life sense. Nick 
refuses to accept that his father abandoned his family and clings to the idea that he was 
murdered. He holds on to this idea in order to make sense of things, or to safeguard 
meaning for his life, since ‘what Nick cannot accept about Jimmy Costanza’s 
inexplicable erasure is that it is an example of “the mystery of bad luck, the mystery of 
loss”’.76  
 
Ultimately, what Nick cannot accept is human finitude, and thus he is drawn to the life 
lived ‘under the surface of ordinary things [...] organised so that it makes more sense in 
a way [...]. It makes more sense than the horseshit life the rest of us live’ (U 761). As 
we have shown, for Wittgenstein there is nothing under the surface of ordinary things. 
And the desire to find such things is indicative precisely of the desire to make life have 
more sense. This desire, thinks Wittgenstein, is what causes philosophical problems, 
problems for which there are no answers. Paranoia and conspiracy can be seen as an 
extreme manifestation of this desire, of the kind of metaphysical approach to things, the 
‘striving after an ideal’ (PI 98), which Wittgenstein attempts to both diagnose and cure. 
Paranoia and conspiracy theories are examples of what Cavell calls the ‘search for an 
order or system or a language that would secure human settlement with the world that 
                                                 
73
 Tanesini, Wittgenstein, p. 56 
74
 Evans, ‘Taking out the Trash’, p. 128 
75
 Evans, ‘Taking out the Trash’, p. 119 
76
 Evans, ‘Taking out the Trash’, p. 128 
124 
 
  
goes beyond human sense and certainty.’77 And, ultimately, both can be seen as a result 
of the ‘impulse to transcend human finitude’78 that is such a central preoccupation for 
Wittgenstein and DeLillo.  
 
Both Wittgenstein and DeLillo explore the seemingly inevitable need that this 
metaphysical searching is a manifestation of, and how it looks to what lies hidden, or 
beneath or behind things, to account for things; and both reveal the contradictions or 
dead-ends it leads to. McGowan notes that, ‘by depicting the paranoia of characters 
such as Marvin and Nick, DeLillo allows the contradictions of this paranoia to become 
evident;’ he ‘exposes the logic of paranoia’, rather than subscribes to it. 79  DeLillo 
investigates the need that paranoia attempts to satisfy but shows that the satisfaction 
sought can be found in other realms.  
 
As we saw earlier, for Wittgenstein this ‘striving after an ideal’ results in the immaterial 
and unreal conditions of slippery ice and a similar sense of immateriality can also be 
seen to result from paranoia – ‘the faith of suspicion and unreality’ (U 251). Evans 
argues that ‘it is the dream of converting ordinary individual things into the connected 
elements of an integrated and comprehensive system, of denying space to the singular 
[...] that makes the world immaterial and unreal.’80  
 
Paradoxically, Underworld reveals that it is ‘the horseshit life’ that has most meaning or 
sense, precisely because it is not organised so as to have meaning. Nick’s despair at the 
end of a novel, his desire to escape his immaterial and unreal condition, can be read as a 
longing for the ordinary, for all that is not ‘caged’ or ‘enshrined’, but is allowed to ‘run 
loose’ (U 86). Nick’s final words are an uncharacteristic, but highly revealing, cry of 
unrestrained yearning: 
 
I long for the days of disorder. I want them back, the days when I was alive on the 
earth, rippling in the quick of my skin, heedless and real. I was dumb-muscled and 
angry and real. This is what I long for, the breach of peace, the days of disarray 
when I walked real streets. (U 810) 
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Nick’s nostalgia for the past is not metaphysical – it is not a desire to transcend the 
physical conditions of the present, rather it is a yearning to escape the quasi-
metaphysical condition of the postmodern and the paranoid, to return to the solid 
ground of material things. Nick has no desire to transcend reality or the ordinary; he 
wants to experience it. In an interview, DeLillo comments that Nick ‘ultimately 
expresses his regret and longing for the days when he felt physically connected to the 
earth’.81  
 
What Nick longs for is friction, ‘the rough ground’. This idea of a return to the real or 
ordinary highlights the significance of the novel’s final paragraph in which the narrative 
turns towards the ‘things in the room’. Tanesini notes that the philosopher’s striving to 
return home, to ‘find herself and her community, [...] can be read in either Faustian 
terms as the desire to be at home everywhere because one has overcome human 
limitations, or as the desire to return to what is homely, ordinary’. 82  Throughout 
Underworld – and, as we shall see, Libra and The Names – DeLillo explores this 
Faustian desire: in paranoid fantasises; the notion that everything is connected; and in 
the idea of cyberspace, a world ‘where everybody is everywhere at once’ (U 808). Like 
Wittgenstein, he explores our inclinations towards this Faustian attitude, this ‘search or 
demand for the absolute’, 83  but ultimately, despite the temptations of miracles or 
solipsism or the absolute, DeLillo returns us to the ‘thick lived tenor of things’. 
 
In the final two chapters of this thesis we will examine the issues raised above in greater 
detail. Nick’s loss and longing, and his solipsistic mindset point back to DeLillo’s early 
work, especially Libra and The Names. In both Libra and The Names the protagonists 
exemplify the conception of subjectivity that according to Wittgenstein leads to 
solipsism and a longing for transcendent meaning. In particular, both Lee Harvey 
Oswald in Libra and James Axton in The Names share with Nick Shay the same kind of 
‘lontananza’ (U 275), disengagement and existential solitude, and Faustian longing, and 
are similarly susceptible to the lure of secrets, paranoia and conspiracy. In the next 
chapter, we will explore how DeLillo exposes the logic of conspiracy theory and looks 
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at the links between solipsism and the impulse to transcendence, as well as the 
temptations and dangers of this impulse or metaphysical yearning.  
 
In the first two chapters the focus was mostly on the significance of the ordinary, and 
the way transcendence can be found in the ordinary. But, by turning to DeLillo’s earlier 
novels, the focus will shift somewhat. Though we will see a number of parallels, 
notably between The Body Artist and The Names, we will mostly be concerned with the 
way DeLillo examines metaphysical striving and the significant ways Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy can help illuminate this aspect of DeLillo’s work.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Exile on Elm Street: Libra and Religious Yearning 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Not finitude, but the denial of finitude, is the mark of tragedy. 
        Stanley Cavell
1
 
 
 
 
One of the main aims of this thesis is to show some of the ways in which the nature of 
DeLillo’s later work – both with regards to its formal developments and its primary 
concerns – sheds a revealing and possibly transformative light on the earlier novels; 
how a certain mode of reading the later work – one informed by Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy and philosophical methods – provides new ways of thinking about the 
earlier novels and enables us to reassess the way his novels and writing in general were 
initially received.  
 
Perhaps the two most dominant and significant ways of reading DeLillo at mid-career 
were as a novelist of conspiracies, when, as Skip Willman notes, ‘the equation of 
DeLillo and paranoia [...] gained widespread acceptance’2 or, above all, as a postmodern 
novelist. Bonca, for example, observes that DeLillo’s ‘work has been studied primarily 
under the rubric of postmodernism ever since [... his] emergence as a major literary 
presence in 1985 with the publication of White Noise’;3 while Knight notes that DeLillo 
has come ‘to be engulfed by the aura of postmodernism’ and ‘is seen as representing the 
turn to postmodernism in American literature.’4 It was largely from either or both of 
these perspectives that Libra, DeLillo’s ninth novel, was initially perceived. 
 
Libra, DeLillo’s fictional account of the Kennedy assassination and the life of Lee 
Harvey Oswald, features many of the themes that have been explored in the thesis so 
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far. Though the novel is based on historical events and real-life figures, it is not an 
attempt to produce an historically accurate version of these events. DeLillo does not aim 
to explain “what really happened” on November 22nd or establish an unequivocally true 
account of the assassination conspiracy. The novel, DeLillo writes in the author’s note, 
aims to ‘provide ways of thinking about the assassination without being constrained by 
half-facts or overwhelmed by possibilities’. This is not to say that it is necessarily 
untrue, merely that the question of truth or falsity is not relevant to our understanding or 
appreciation of the novel. It is a work of fiction and, as such, it should come as no 
surprise that DeLillo’s engagement with, and account of, these figures and events 
should bear so many of the hallmarks of his work in general. 
 
This chapter is an attempt to provide an alternative to the dominant postmodern 
readings of Libra, though it is not an in-depth or explicit argument against these 
readings. It looks briefly at the initial critical reception of the novel which concentrated 
on its postmodern features, and suggests that a different approach might enable us to 
better illuminate the novel’s philosophical and religious features. Using both Maltby 
and Bonca’s different, though curiously related, arguments against postmodern readings 
as a starting point, it looks at the ways in which the novel is engaged with metaphysics. 
I adopt Matlby’s argument to highlight the importance of a focus on metaphysics for 
understanding certain aspects of the novel, but resist his claim that DeLillo endorses or 
presupposes the existence of a transcendental realm. Following Bonca, I suggest that, 
although DeLillo explores metaphysical yearnings there is a significant element of irony 
and critical reflection in these explorations. Again, as we have shown in relation to his 
other novels, Libra reveals the way in which DeLillo explores both the temptations and 
dangers of metaphysical longing.  
 
The chapter looks at how the metaphysical is manifested in the idea of conspiracy as 
well as in the main characters’ spiritual quests and religiously-inflected, solipsistic 
senses of self. I argue that the metaphysics of conspiracy mirrors the metaphysical 
conceptions of the self embodied in characters such as Oswald and Win Everett and that 
both are based on the same underlying conception of meaning – meaning as an 
essentially occult state. Thus I argue that this idea of meaning, which is fundamental to 
conspiracy theory, is parallel to, and can lead to, or stem from, the idea that the self is 
concealed inside the body. Moreover, I argue that there are deep theological and 
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religious roots to these parallel ideas. Finally, I suggest that, just as it is evident that 
DeLillo is critical of conspiracy theory, so too we can see the critical nature of the 
novel’s portrayal of solipsism and the impulse to transcendence.  
 
In order to illuminate the ambiguity and complexity of how metaphysics and religious 
yearning functions in Libra, a series of comparisons will be made with Wittgenstein’s 
similarly complex engagement with metaphysics and religious perspectives. On the one 
hand, Wittgenstein’s thought is profoundly critical of the metaphysical prejudices 
underlying Western theology and religion, and equally critical of the religious 
conceptions at the root of many of our seemingly natural modes of thought. Yet, on the 
other hand, Wittgenstein maintains what can be described as a religious way of seeing 
things, such as in the way he tries ‘to recapture [a] special sense of wonder and awe’5 
from looking at the ordinary with clear vision. And, as we have shown at various points 
in the thesis, his aim of finding peace and ‘achieving perspicuity’ 6  also has strong 
religious connotations. This chapter will explore and tease out this tension in 
Wittgenstein’s work – how it is seemingly both religious and anti-religious, anti-
metaphysical yet profoundly engaged with what Cavell calls the ‘craving for the 
metaphysical’7 – in an attempt to shed light on a parallel tension that can be felt in 
Libra.  
 
Both Wittgenstein and DeLillo’s religious perspective are bound up with the issue of the 
self. In Theology after Wittgenstein, Fergus Kerr examines Wittgenstein’s critique of the 
deep-rooted theological prejudices that underlie Western conceptions of the self and 
language. Kerr reads Wittgenstein’s later philosophy as an anti-metaphysical crusade 
against misleading but seemingly intuitive paradigms of thought. These paradigms 
appear in a number of guises and affect how we think about meaning, language, 
understanding and the self, among other things. At the root of these misleading thought 
processes and preconceptions lies the dualist idea that meaning exists in the mind – 
‘nothing is more wrong-headed than calling meaning a mental activity’, claims 
Wittgenstein (PI 693) – and the body is animated by the soul. The soul is then figured 
as being in exile in this world, trapped in the prison cell of the body, desperately, 
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essentially solitary and unable to know others except through ambiguous, densely 
material signs.  
 
A Wittgensteinian critique of the problems of the ‘modern philosophy of the self-
conscious individual’ 8  can help illuminate the philosophical aspects of DeLillo’s 
account of Oswald and the conspirators. ‘Modern man’s quest for autonomy and self-
sufficiency’, and the resultant impulse to transcendence, is, argues Tanesini, a central 
feature of the philosophical disease that Wittgenstein’s writing is intended to cure.9 The 
impulse to transcendence is caused by the fact that this quest ‘leads us to conceive of 
human finitude as a cage from which we strive to, but cannot, break free’. 10  In 
Wittgenstein’s work this quest ‘is shown to generate loneliness and separation from 
other human beings,’11 since the need for autonomy results in a metaphysical distinction 
between two realms – the inner realm of the mind and the outer realm of the body – and 
thus a sense of the ‘self as an intangible and private object’.12 I will argue that Oswald, 
whose life is characterised by his confinement in various cells, is an example of the kind 
of isolated, autonomous self characteristic of the ‘modern philosophy’ that 
Wittgenstein’s work is directed against. This argument will be mirrored by the claim 
that DeLillo’s nuanced critique of conspiracy theory can be illustrated by Wittgenstein’s 
argument against explanation and his injunction to return to the ordinary.  
 
As in previous chapters, this comparison between DeLillo and Wittgenstein will, in part, 
take place around the rhetorical figures of home and exile. I will draw a parallel 
between Oswald’s metaphysical exile and quest to find a home, and Wittgenstein’s 
figurative depiction of a philosopher’s exile and striving to return home; between 
Oswald’s misguided sense of self and yearning for knowledge and transformation, and 
Wittgenstein’s diagnosis of the struggle of philosophy caused by its distrust of the 
everyday and the misleading temptations of metaphysical longing.  
 
By adopting a Wittgensteinian approach we can show that Libra’s concern with 
conspiracy, the hidden, secrets and the solipsistic self is not an endorsement of an 
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unequivocal romantic metaphysics, but is part of DeLillo’s on-going exploration of 
what Cavell calls ‘the essential and implacable restlessness of the human’ in the striving 
to find meaning and the yearning to transcend the limits of finitude.
13
 By reading Libra 
in the light of Wittgenstein’s later thought we can understand the novel’s religious or 
metaphysical leanings: the way it explores the desire to transcend social and human 
limitations, without the need to presume a broader metaphysical outlook; and how, on 
one level, the novel is critical of an underlying metaphysics. Furthermore, we can shed 
light on the appeal to and significance of the ordinary in Libra; the way in which the 
novel contrasts metaphysical yearning with a call to ‘regain our grip on things’ (L 15).  
 
 
I. METAPHYSICS AND POSTMODERNISM 
 
In ‘DeLillo’s Libra and the Real’, Stuart Hutchinson provides a brief inventory of the 
critical reception of Libra as ‘one more enactment of postmodernism’, ranging from its 
inclusion in Stephen Baker’s The Fiction of Postmodernity to Frank Lentricchia’s 
‘seminal postmodernist reading’ of it. Lentricchia’s reading, writes Hutchinson, ascribes 
‘an entire environment of the image’ to the novel based on the fact that there are 
numerous indications in it that ‘our reality may be so indistinguishable from images of 
ourselves that we become actors in our own lives and incapable of authenticity’.14 But, 
argues Hutchinson, these moments in the novel are part of DeLillo’s ‘realisation of 
America’: disguise, counterfeit and simulacra are integral elements of American reality, 
not indicators of a lack of reality. Hutchinson attempts to challenge postmodern 
readings by arguing for the importance of ‘the real’ in the novel, both in terms of its 
narrative realism and its historical actuality, arguing that ‘a complicated, even 
contradictory, sense of reality is hardly postmodernist, and it still leaves us with the 
assassination as a culminating and plotted event according to DeLillo, and as an actual 
event according to history’.15  
 
Perhaps the most strident critique of Libra as a postmodern novel and the idea of 
DeLillo as a postmodern novelist comes from Paul Maltby. Indeed, far from suggesting 
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parallels between DeLillo and postmodernism, Maltby uses postmodern theory to 
support a critical assessment of what he argues is DeLillo’s romantic metaphysics and 
accompanying political conservatism. The resolutely anti-metaphysical nature of 
postmodern theory, he claims, leaves no space for the elements in DeLillo’s work that 
could be perceived as being underpinned by a metaphysical conception of things: the 
‘insightfulness of childhood perception’; the possibility of a ‘primal, visionary 
language’; and, above all, ‘the status of the visionary moment’.16 Maltby writes: ‘the 
metaphysical foundations of traditional conceptions of the visionary moment cannot 
survive the deconstructive thrust of postmodern thinking.’17 
 
In his analysis of Libra, Maltby draws attention to the ‘repeated invocations of invisible, 
transhistorical forces’, which he argues is the ‘stuff of metaphysics, not to say the 
occult’. Maltby argues that the novel is animated by a romantic metaphysics: a current 
of thinking in the novel that appeals to ‘transcendent realities’ and conforms with 
‘Romanticism’s depth model of subjectivity’. He claims: Libra ‘appeals to the truth and 
sovereignty of the “deepest levels of the self”’ and so critical readings ‘must reckon 
with the book’s insistent focus on “another level [...] a deeper kind of truth”’. He cites 
an interview in which DeLillo mentions ‘the possible impact of astrology on the way 
men act’ as evidence that ‘DeLillo is more likely to endorse his characters’ beliefs in 
transcendent realities than to dismiss them’.18  
 
Though Maltby points to an important aspect of DeLillo’s novel – its engagement with 
metaphysical yearning – and challenges the dominance of postmodern readings, he 
somewhat overstates the case and overlooks the ambiguity and complexity of DeLillo’s 
engagement with metaphysics. Maltby is right to suggest that DeLillo ‘recognizes our 
need for’ or ‘our impulses towards the transcendental’,19 but this recognition does not 
imply that DeLillo believes in, or attempts to demonstrate, the actual existence of a 
transcendental realm. As I have attempted to show at various points throughout this 
thesis, and will also demonstrate in this chapter, it is by no means evident that DeLillo 
has a traditional conception of the visionary moment or an underlying metaphysical 
outlook. In addition to the questionable claim concerning DeLillo’s traditional 
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metaphysical outlook, Maltby’s reading is also problematic because of his 
unquestioning identification of DeLillo with his characters and the openly 
acknowledged ‘schematic’ comparisons he makes between highly selective citations 
from Libra and Romantic literature. Maltby does not engage with the full complexity of 
the novel or acknowledge the deeply flawed or idiosyncratic nature of the characters, 
whose opinions he reads as if they are the author’s.  
 
It is above all the ‘spiritual advisor’ in the novel, David Ferrie, who expresses the kind 
of ideas that Maltby identifies as indicative of a belief in transcendent realities, which 
can be seen in this highly significant passage: 
 
Think of two parallel lines. One is the life of Lee H. Oswald. One is the conspiracy 
to kill the President. What bridges the space between them? What makes a 
connection inevitable? There is a third line. It comes out of dreams, visions, 
intuitions, prayers, out of the deepest levels of the self. It’s not generated by cause 
and effect like the other two lines. It’s a line that cuts across causality, cuts across 
time. It has no history that we can recognize or understand. But it forces a 
connection. It puts a man on the path of his destiny. (L 339) 
 
Though this passage is clearly an important moment in the novel’s reflection on itself – 
on its structure and the way in which it rejects both an iron-clad conspiracy theory and 
the contingency theory suggested by the Warren commission report – its apparent 
metaphysical meaning needs to be seen in the context of Ferrie’s highly idiosyncratic 
view of things and the series of motivational conversations he has with Oswald. The 
speech is the dramatic conclusion to Ferrie’s attempt to persuade Oswald to assassinate 
the President. It is thus part of a series of ‘talks’, which employ spiritualist rhetoric and 
manipulative actions – that include smoking marijuana, sexual molestation and visiting 
an astrologer – appealing to the ‘easily influenced’ Oswald’s romantic sense of destiny 
and desperate desire to mean something (L 172).  
 
As I will examine, the apparently metaphysical aspects of the novel that Maltby 
highlights are embedded within complex layers of critical or ironic distance; they are 
indicative of a character’s particular set of concerns and mode of seeing, which in the 
case of Ferrie, ‘strange even to himself’, is very particular indeed (L 45). Though it may 
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seem evident that DeLillo is sympathetic to his characters’ metaphysical yearnings, this 
does not prevent a critical account of them.  
 
Bonca also argues against the idea of reading DeLillo as a postmodern novelist. Even 
though there are clear parallels between Maltby’s and Bonca’s arguments, the latter’s 
differs in certain crucial respects. For where Maltby sees DeLillo’s metaphysics as 
reactionary and his lack of postmodern scepticism in negative terms, Bonca sees the 
apparently metaphysical elements in DeLillo’s novels as vital to our understanding of 
their value and power. Furthermore, though not explicitly or directly, Bonca challenges 
Maltby’s claim that DeLillo adopts a ‘traditional conception of the visionary moment’. 
For Bonca, neither postmodern theories nor modernist or romantic paradigms can 
adequately illuminate the key features of DeLillo’s fiction.  
 
Bonca acknowledges a certain engagement with the metaphysical in DeLillo but is 
attuned to the subtlety and ambiguity of this engagement. He writes:  
 
DeLillo doesn’t make for a very reliable postmodernist. To get right to the point, 
there is too great a yearning for, and too great a noticing of, immanence in his 
work. This yearning doesn’t take the form of nostalgia, however, as it does for the 
modernists mourning a God who’s dead [...]. No, this yearning – and one must 
stress that it is a yearning, not a belief – has little to do with the past, but much to 
do with sudden, compelling emergences of the numinous in the present.
20
  
 
While these ideas of ‘immanence’ and ‘emergences of the numinous’ clearly resemble 
Maltby’s sense of the ‘visionary moment’ in DeLillo, they do not imply the kind of 
underlying, unequivocal romantic metaphysics that is central to Maltby’s argument. 
Bonca argues that immanence ‘indicates a kind of indwelling or ontological presence – 
God for many, Being for Heidegger – which is hidden but inherent in the physical 
world’.21 Even though Bonca seems to reiterate here precisely the kind of metaphysical 
paradigm Maltby rightly views as problematic – real meaning lies hidden beneath the 
surface of things; there exists some kind of pre-linguistic realm of deeper meaning – in 
fact Bonca’s conception of this meaning is quite specific and all too human. For Bonca, 
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the ‘epiphanic moments’ in DeLillo reveal not so much a glimpse of transcendent 
reality as the fear and fact of death. Bonca argues that, for DeLillo, language ‘is the 
organized utterance of mortals connecting themselves to other mortals.’22 Thus, far from 
being based on a mysterious, unknowable transcendental foundation, this conception 
can be seen as comparable to Cavellian ideas of community, acknowledgment, and the 
acceptance of finitude.  
 
The fear of death can be felt throughout Libra – a sense of mortality haunts Nicholas 
Branch, for example, and both David Ferrie and Win Everett are death-obsessed – but 
Bonca’s approach is most significant for its stress on yearning. Yearning plays a crucial 
role in the religious dimension of Libra. This is not to say that the characters’ yearning 
in Libra is not related, at least indirectly, to a fear of death, for as DeLillo illustrated in 
White Noise a fear of death can be brought to the surface by a sense of meaninglessness 
and a misguided conception of an autonomous self.  
 
Although they are in many respects radically different novels, this is one example of a 
significant parallel between White Noise and Libra. Both novels explore the spiritual 
and identity crises of men who experience a profound sense of exile and loss in 
contemporary America; and who cling to a metaphysical or theological idea of the self 
and existential meaning. This can be seen most clearly in the striking similarities 
between Everett and Jack Gladney. Like Gladney, Everett is a melancholy college 
professor with a strong sense of his own detachment and an unhealthy attachment to the 
well-being of his wife; both are ‘anxious, self-absorbed’ and lack ‘the full heat of 
feeling’ (L 219); both like to visit hardware stores; and both have a shared belief in the 
‘deathward […] nature of plots’ (WN 26).  
 
A further parallel can be drawn in the way the two novels are implicitly critical of 
theory or the impulse to theorisation. In White Noise, DeLillo satirises the tendency to 
theorisation through the absurd comedy of Gladney’s desperate quest for meaning and 
Murray Jay Siskind’s outlandish theoretical posturing. For example, in one instance 
Murray says ‘think how exciting it is, in theory, to kill a person’ (WN 290). Libra 
reveals both the temptations and dangers of a theorising attitude not only in the 
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portrayal of deeply misguided idealists like Oswald and Win Everett, but in the way it 
recognises yet subverts the appeal of conspiracy theory. 
 
 
II. DIALECTICAL TENSION 
 
Libra is characterised by a dialectical tension; a tension between conspiracy and 
contingency, the spatial and temporal, but also between the transcendent and ordinary, 
exile and home, loss and longing. The importance of this dialectical tension is suggested 
by the astrological reference of the title, in which, observes Peter Boxall, ‘it is possible 
to hear a balanced tension between liberty and zodiacal predestination’.23 This tension is 
central to the structure, rhythm and meaning of the novel and manifests itself in a 
variety of significant ways. It is nowhere more apparent than in the guiding structural 
tension of the novel’s dual narrative; the way it alternates between the ‘spatial’ chapters, 
those marked by a place, detailing the life of Oswald, and the ‘temporal’ chapters, those 
marked by a date, outlining the unfolding of the conspirators’ plot to assassinate 
Kennedy.  
 
The tension between the dual narratives is central to what Willman describes as 
DeLillo’s accomplishment in Libra of ‘holding conspiracy and contingency in 
dialectical tension and examining the ways in which each undermines the other’.24 The 
tension is further emphasised by the significant differences in the nature of the two 
narratives. Lentricchia argues that the temporal chapters outlining the development of 
the conspiracy form a ‘perfectly shaped, intention-driven narrative’, while the spatial 
chapters form an ‘imagined biography of Oswald, a plotless tale of an aimless life 
propelled by the agonies of inconsistent and contradictory motivation’.25  
 
This narrative complexity is furthered by the fact that the novel functions on two levels; 
as a work of fiction and also as a commentary on the historical event of Kennedy’s 
assassination; since it is based on historical figures and events, and known source 
material, it necessarily comments on these things – both implicitly and explicitly – for 
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the novel consists not only of the parallel narratives of Oswald’s life and the 
development of the conspiracy to assassinate JFK, but also of the sections detailing the 
research activities and thoughts of Nicholas Branch.  
 
Branch is a retired CIA analyst who has been hired to write the secret history of the 
assassination, and as such functions as an authorial double. The Branch sections act as a 
frame for the dual narrative outlined above and enable DeLillo to reflect on the novel’s 
own process. Branch provides the novel with a kind of metacommentary or what 
Jeremy Green describes as ‘an element of historiographic self-reflection’.26 The Branch 
sections are partly a means of addressing the way the novel engages with the historical 
material, but his analysis of the event and its history is not only a comment on the 
source material, it also addresses the broader cultural question of the need to know what 
happened, both historically and philosophically. Branch’s analysis is epistemological 
and religious as much as it is historical or political.  
 
As with so much of DeLillo’s work, Libra is suffused with a certain philosophical and 
religious inflection. Cowart notes that ‘DeLillo allows [...] a curious religious dimension 
to emerge in his essentially historical and political novel’.27 This religious dimension 
can be perceived from a number of different perspectives. The novel can be seen as 
religious in the sense in which it confronts a problem DeLillo explicitly raises in Mao 
II: ‘when the old God leaves the world, what happens to the unexpended faith?’28 The 
main characters in Libra, ‘serious men deprived of an outlet’ (L 63), ‘true believers’ (L 
22), strive to find religious meaning and structure in their lives and look to various 
secular, yet church-like, organisations to help them, such as communism, ‘the one true 
religion’ (L 100), or the CIA, ‘the best organised church in the Christian world’ (L 260). 
The role of the assassination in the novel is closely related to this religious striving, but 
can be viewed as religious in a dual sense. For the conspirators and Oswald it is the goal 
of a metaphysical quest that transcends politics. Although originally conceived as a 
means to an end – to eradicate Castro from Cuba and regain control of the island – this 
practical goal seems to have only limited importance for the conspirators and has none 
for Oswald. Win Everett, who initiates the original plan of an assassination attempt on 
                                                 
26
 Green, ‘Libra’, p. 98 
27
 Cowart, Physics of Language, p. 92 
28
 DeLillo, Mao II, London: Penguin, 1991, p. 7 
138 
 
  
the President, explains that the ‘plan speaks to something deep inside’ him; it is ‘the 
condition we’ve always wanted to reach. It’s the life-insight, the life-secret’ (L 28). And 
for Oswald it is the culminating event of a lifetime attempting to find his place and 
name ‘on another level’ (L 384). 
 
For Branch, on the other hand, the assassination is like an American biblical episode – 
‘six point nine seconds of heat and light’ that illuminate America’s soul (L 15). It is a 
mysterious, explosive event that ‘sheds a powerful and lasting light’, full of eerie 
coincidence and inexplicably strange occurrences (L 58). The fact that the truth of the 
assassination is not known, that ‘simple facts elude authentication’, is crucial to its 
power and to the ‘ensuing ritual of a search for patterns and links’ (L 300, 371).  
 
 
III. ‘MEN IN SMALL ROOMS’ 
 
The religious and philosophical aspects of the novel can perhaps most clearly be seen, 
however, in the solipsistic features of its protagonists, particularly Oswald and Everett. 
The novel portrays them as isolated ‘self-watchers’, ‘at the mercy of [their] own 
detachment’, symbolically separated from everyday reality by their confinement in 
small rooms (L 18). The rooms symbolise their solipsism; the way in which they are 
isolated, self-enclosed, like a mind trapped inside a body – symbolic of the ancient myth 
of the soul in exile, which, argues Kerr, has ‘deep religious roots’.29 The characters are 
imprisoned, desperate to break out, but incapable of properly engaging with the ‘outside 
world’, a place they find too ‘eerie and real’ (L 17). As William E. Cain notes, they are 
‘intense, yearning, detached figures [...] uncomfortable residents of private worlds 
outside history’. 30  Thus they can only envision an escape in metaphysical or 
transcendent terms.  
 
Oswald’s detachment and solipsism are dramatically portrayed in the novel’s opening 
scene: a description of Oswald riding the subway as a young boy, which immediately 
draws attention to his isolation and sense of exile from the ordinary world. The scene is 
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rich in symbolic resonance, not least in the image of the tracks, which the later reference 
to the ‘two parallel lines’ of Oswald’s life and the assassination of JFK subtly echoes. 
Oswald’s journeying on the subway is not to any particular destination, he is ‘riding just 
to ride’ (L 3), highlighting his disengagement from everyday, practical reality and his 
somewhat aimless life. The subway ride suggests Oswald’s struggle to feel free, to 
escape and transcend his limiting circumstances, but also a sense of a blind trajectory to 
his life, of being driven by an unknown and powerful force; it symbolises Oswald’s 
thought that an ‘individual must allow himself to be swept along, must find himself in 
the stream of no-choice, the single direction’ (L 101). 
 
Oswald’s experience on the subway also reveals his metaphysical yearnings, his 
impulse to transcendence. The subway acts as an inverted version of Plato’s cave. In the 
darkness of the underground, thinks Oswald, things can be seen in ‘purer form’, and he 
can feel an ‘inner power’, the ‘secret force of the soul’ (L 4, 13). Green writes that 
Oswald ‘identifies with the image of a secret world, an alternative to the everyday 
reality that surrounds and demeans him.’31 Oswald rejects the ordinary world – ‘there 
was nothing important out there’, he thinks (L 4) – preferring this metaphysical journey 
in the darkness, which, argues Hutchinson, provides him with a ‘sense of exaltation’.32 
 
Like Oswald, Everett identifies with the idea of a secret world. Indeed, there are a 
number of significant parallels between Oswald and Everett, who are both, notes Cain, 
‘outcasts from meaningfulness’.33 Everett is a former CIA intelligence agent forced into 
semi-retirement, sent ‘into exile’, for his suspected involvement with anti-Castro groups 
keen to redress the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion (L 19). Like Oswald, Everett feels 
angry and resentful towards authority. He spends much of his time alone, in various 
private spaces, where he works ‘patiently on his bitterness, honing and refining’, 
reflecting on ‘what they’d done to him’ (L 178, 180). Like Oswald, Everett prefers 
underground spaces, at the university where he works he is ‘grateful for the gloom of 
the basement nook’ (L 178); he needs ‘to live in small dusty rooms, layered safely in, 
out of the reach of dizzying things, of heat and light’ (L 260). He is disengaged from the 
reality around him, which he thinks of as ‘the other life, the eerie realness of living with 
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people who do not keep secrets as a profession or duty’ (L 17). And like Oswald, 
Everett is full of religious longing: ‘There was a burning faith in this man, a sense of 
cause’; he is ‘all principle, all zeal’ (L 18).  
 
The recurring reference in the novel to men in small rooms evokes both the figure and 
thought of Descartes, whose ‘conception of the self’, notes Kerr, ‘sprang from explicitly 
theological concerns’34. Branch’s drift into Cartesian solipsism, for example, is such 
that he ‘sometimes wonders if he is becoming bodiless’ (L 14). Like Descartes, he 
‘questions everything, including the basic suppositions we make about our world of 
light and shadow, solid objects and ordinary sounds’ (L 300). And yet partly he feels 
this epistemological solitude has been imposed on him by outside forces; it is somewhat 
against his will and pragmatic inclinations. He is trapped in this ‘room of growing old’, 
which ‘they built’ for him (L 14, 445). 
 
Branch feels condemned to a lifetime of thinking about the case, overwhelmed by the 
amount of data, ‘horrified by the weight of it all’ (L 14). He sits in his book-filled room 
and thinks through the manifold aspects and complexities of the case, studying 
‘everything’ (L 59). And though, as Green notes, he ‘has a sense of something deeply 
mysterious and inexplicable about the events of Dallas’,35  he maintains a desire to 
return to the world of things, ‘he wants a thing to be what it is’ (L 379). He finds that he 
‘has to come back again and again to the page, the line, the fine-grained detail of a 
particular afternoon’ (L 14), as if he is wary of the ‘endless suggestiveness’ of the case 
and the temptations of theory-building and speculation (L 57). He has to remind himself 
that ‘he is writing a history, not a study of the ways people succumb to paranoia’ (L 57). 
 
Branch thus finds himself in the paradoxical position of being like the Cartesian 
solipsists whose histories he is investigating, even though he seems strongly resistant to 
the kind of idealism and religious yearning underpinning their solipsistic outlook. He 
can be seen to personify conflicting positions and thus to embody an element of the 
dialectical tension structuring the novel. On the one hand, he seems to reject the 
theorising impulse, the quest for certainty and the kind of solipsistic madness of the 
characters his research is focused on. On the other hand, however, as a disembodied 
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man who spends his life in a small room ruminating obsessively on seemingly 
unanswerable questions, who ‘has abandoned his life to understanding that moment in 
Dallas’, he comes to resemble these characters himself (L 181). Branch is aware of this: 
 
This is the room of dreams, the room where it has taken him all these years to learn 
that his subject is not politics or violent crime but men in small rooms. 
Is he one of them now? Frustrated, stuck, self-watching, looking for a means of 
connection, a way to break out. (L 181)  
  
In his later philosophy Wittgenstein shows that such a solipsistic conception of the self 
manifests itself in a whole series of subtle and unassuming ways. Though not 
necessarily as extreme as the kind of solipsism on display in Libra, the kind of 
entrenched ways of seeing and thinking that Wittgenstein aims to root out are 
nevertheless on the same spectrum. Hans Sluga, for example, argues that his philosophy 
reveals ‘an enduring hostility to the idea of an individuated, substantive self’ and is 
deeply infused with anti-Cartesianism.
36
 One of the main targets of Wittgenstein’s 
thought, especially in his later work, is what Perloff calls the ‘entire romantic and 
postromantic faith in inwardness, in the hidden depths of the unique, individual 
consciousness’37: the idea that the mind lies hidden in the body, that ‘meaning is a 
mental activity’ and thus that the meaning of things lies behind or beyond appearance 
and needs to uncovered. These ideas can be traced to a metaphysically generated picture 
of things, but the depth of their roots is such that they seem intuitive or natural, like 
common sense notions. They are deeply embedded in our language and culture, and in 
part stem from the religious picture of the soul in exile in this world. 
 
An illuminating, if complex, parallel can be drawn between Wittgenstein’s critique of 
the enduring myth of ‘the inner’ and the religious element of Libra. Both Wittgenstein 
and DeLillo reveal the temptations and dangers of what Kerr calls the ‘narcissistic 
metaphysics of the self’; both give ‘voice to our deepest metaphysical inclinations’.38 
Libra explores religious yearning, albeit of a warped kind, and asks what it might mean 
in a secular, commodified, mediatised society. The object of this yearning is not God or 
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spiritual enlightenment, at least not directly, but it is, in a sense, to be God-like. Both 
Oswald and Everett seek power and control, and long for transcendence of some kind – 
to escape the limitations and confines of an alienating reality.  
 
Their metaphysical yearning, their impulse to transcendence, is intrinsically related to 
their solipsism. The Faustian desire to overcome human limitations, writes Tanesini, 
‘proposes that we overcome any feelings of fragility or isolation by striving for more 
power, and more freedom’. 39  This striving leads to a ‘drive to knowledge’ which  
solipsists assume will end their isolation. For Oswald and the conspirators this is a drive 
to secret knowledge; they are driven by a metaphysical desire to both believe in and 
uncover secrets and hidden truths. Osteen notes that ‘Libra links secrecy with the 
sacred, analysing two conflicting needs: the powerful craving for belief in mystery, and 
the need to penetrate such mysteries’.40 Oswald, like the conspirators, views secrets as a 
source and form of power, and also as a source of religious fascination. According to 
Hutchinson, they ‘relish the seeming potency of secret knowledge which, by seeming to 
place them at the pitch and limit of things, “the edge of no control”, nourishes the self-
aggrandisement and metaphysical intimations their desperation yearns for.’41 
 
The fact that these yearnings are so warped, so far removed from traditional religious 
objects of devotion and striving, is not without significance for it suggests the ironic and 
critical stance DeLillo adopts towards the metaphysical urge. Libra, writes Osteen, 
‘critically analyses the desperation that motivates the belief in a “world inside the 
world”’.42 Though the novel is clearly engaged with metaphysics, it nevertheless brings 
into question the motives, and psychological and cultural conditioning, underlying a 
metaphysical conception of things.  
 
 
IV. OSWALD’S SEARCH FOR MEANING 
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In a conversation with M. O’C Drury, Wittgenstein is reported to have remarked that he 
‘cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view’.43 Given his radical 
critique of the basic thought structures that underlie Western theology and metaphysics 
this is a striking but not necessarily inconsistent claim – indeed, it is precisely the nature 
and method of this critique that can be said to have a religious element. Wittgenstein 
writes: ‘all that philosophy can do is to destroy idols. And that means not creating a new 
one, as in “absence of an idol”’ (PO 171). He is not proposing a Nietzschean re-
evaluation of all values based on the death of God. For even though his later philosophy 
is almost entirely critical, even though it seems to ‘destroy everything interesting’, there 
is no loss. He writes in the Investigations: ‘what we are destroying is nothing but houses 
of cards and we are clearing up the ground of language on which they stand’ (PI 118). 
Wittgenstein is not trying to disabuse religious yearning but merely the metaphysical 
illusions it has a tendency to focus on; the ‘longing for the supra-natural’ (PO 187), 
which he believes can be satisfied in other ways than trying to get beyond the limits of 
language.  
 
Wittgenstein deconstructs the theological prejudices behind, and religious roots of, our 
apparently natural ways of thinking, but his comment to Drury points towards what 
Cavell calls the ‘sense of moral or religious fervour’ in his work;44 the emphasis on 
philosophising as a ‘spiritual struggle’.45 As we have previously explored, for Cavell the 
‘idea of philosophical progress in the Philosophical Investigations is from the darkness 
of confusion to enlightened understanding, or from illusion to clarity’;46 from ‘being 
lost to finding ourselves’.47 But this progress is not an ascent, or form of transcendence, 
rather it is like a form of inverted religious spirituality, not away from, but towards the 
human, the body, the social and communal – the ordinary.  
 
Wittgenstein’s work is not concerned with explicitly religious questions, such as the 
existence of God; he has no general doctrines to offer on religion. But although 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy seems to be mostly concerned with topics in the philosophy 
of logic, language and the mind, ‘he discusses these issues’, writes Tanesini, ‘because of 
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the therapeutic effect that getting clear on these matters has on him and [...] his 
readers’.48 She adds: ‘what Wittgenstein seeks from philosophy is nothing less than the 
redemption of his body and soul.’49 But it is important to be clear about just what this 
redemption might be. For although Wittgenstein speaks of the ‘liberating word’, ‘peace’ 
as a philosophical goal, and establishing a clarity of vision, the peace, clarity and 
liberation he seeks is from the lure of the transcendent, not ascent to it. Cavell writes: 
‘the direction out from illusion is not up [...], but down [...]. Philosophy [...] is a refusal 
of, say disobedient to, (a false ascent), or transcendence’.50 And as we have seen at 
various points throughout this thesis, this downwards direction marks an act of 
returning, as if from exile. It is not a question of seeing or knowing anything new, but of 
seeing what was always there; it is a question returning home, to the ordinary. 
 
Tanesini, developing Cavell’s sense of the importance of the ideas of loss and home in 
the Investigations, describes the two ways in which, in Wittgenstein’s account of things, 
the philosopher strives to return home. Her description resonates with many of the 
issues already examined in this thesis and can shed light on Oswald’s condition in 
Libra. She writes: 
 
Philosophy begins with a sense of loss, of being in exile. One is lost to oneself, or 
has lost the ability to find oneself with others. The philosopher is a stranger in her 
homeland, or alternatively she is exiled to an unknown territory. At the same time 
the philosopher also strives to return home, to find herself and her community. 
Such striving can be read in either Faustian terms as the desire to be at home 
everywhere because one has overcome human limitations, or as the desire to return 
to what is homely, ordinary.
51
  
 
Oswald experiences a sense of loss, exile and confinement from the beginning to the 
end of his life. He is condemned to a lifetime of ‘stunted rooms’, solitary cells, all 
representations of the solitary cell of his mind (L 100). As Glen Thomas observes, 
Oswald’s exile is ‘symbolised [...] by his repeated confinement in small rooms’.52 This 
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exile, his solitude and sense of isolation, is not merely circumstantial but profoundly 
existential, even epistemological; he embodies a Cartesian picture of things in which the 
true self is private and inaccessible – ‘there is a veil between him and other people 
through which they cannot reach him, but he prefers this veil to remain intact’ (L 12). 
He has a solipsistic sense of self: he ‘feels he is living at the centre of an emptiness’; ‘it 
was all about him. Everything that happened was him’ (L 357, 385). The solipsist, 
writes Kerr, has a ‘picture of meaning as an occult adventure that goes on in secret 
behind one’s brow’ 53  and this picture of meaning is a result of a metaphysically 
generated doctrine of the self, in which the self is closed-off, private and inaccessible. 
‘You don’t know who I am’, thinks Oswald as he clings to the powerful sense of ‘his 
real life, the inward-spinning self’ (L 37), a life and self he seems incapable of getting a 
grip of.  
 
Oswald’s exile in part derives from and is directly related to his struggle with language, 
caused by his dyslexia. ‘Due to his difficulties with language’, writes Thomas, ‘Oswald 
feels that he is somehow exiled from the real world’.54 Oswald is desperate for meaning 
precisely because of, in Osteen’s words, his ‘alienation from the linguistic order’, his 
exclusion from the shared public world, the ‘world of social exchange’.55 Oswald’s 
approach to language, however, can be seen as stemming from his solipsism, for, as 
Kerr argues, ‘perhaps it is only if we are strongly tempted to treat the self as a solitary 
intellect locked within a space that is inaccessible to anyone else that language looks 
intuitively like a system of referring to things’.56 
 
Oswald’s dyslexic struggle with language is the kind of metaphysically generated 
misconception of language that Wittgenstein aims to bring to light in his later 
philosophy. Cowart notes that, ‘however clinically specific his condition, Oswald 
becomes at such moments [...] an emblematic figure of all who grapple with the 
intransigent mechanics of signification’.57 When Oswald is trying to write his historic 
diary he is deeply frustrated because ‘the nature of things was to be elusive. Things 
slipped through his perceptions. He could not get a grip on the runaway world’ (L 211). 
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In the Investigations Wittgenstein shows that there is a natural tendency to see the kind 
of experience Oswald has with language as the general experience of the discrepancy 
between language and reality. He writes:  
 
Here it is easy to get into that dead-end in philosophy, where one believes that the 
difficulty of the task consists in our having to describe phenomena that are hard to 
get hold of, the present experience that slips quickly by, or something of the kind. 
(PI 436) 
 
Wittgenstein argues, however, that this kind of aberrant experience of language and the 
world should not be used as a general model of how language functions, since under 
normal circumstances language functions perfectly well, and it is only romantic 
yearning or theological prejudice or philosophy that makes it seem otherwise.  
 
Oswald’s solipsism and sense of exile can also be seen in the way his life is portrayed as 
a search for meaning and a clearly defined sense of self. His journey loosely follows the 
structure of the traditional or mythic quest saga, in which the hero abandons his 
familiar, safe environment and ventures into the dangerous unknown, where he faces a 
series of tests and trials, and has to slay a monster for which he is rewarded with a 
magical prize. According to Joseph Campbell, these narratives symbolise an essentially 
inward journey from detachment and difficulty to understanding and transformation.
58
 
There is a clear sense in which Oswald sees his life as a grand quest or struggle and 
longs for understanding and transformation, as is evident from the way that he identifies 
with historical revolutionary figures, such as Stalin, Lenin and above all Trotsky, 
who’ve made such journeys (L 47). However, mostly his life is characterised by 
repeated losses and recoveries, by a continual sense of starting again. He longs ‘to make 
a move one time that was not disappointed’ (L 248).  
 
One of the significant differences between Oswald’s struggle and a traditional quest 
saga is that, although Oswald abandons America he never feels particularly safe or at 
home there. He is, like Wittgenstein’s characterisations of a philosopher, both a stranger 
in his homeland and an exile in ‘unknown territories’. His journey is marked by his 
ceaseless striving to find himself and a community to which he can belong; he 
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desperately tries to ‘find a structure that includes him’ (L 357). He longs to transcend 
his circumstances and sense of isolated, autonomous selfhood. Indeed, so central is this 
idea that the epigraph to part one with which DeLillo begins the novel is an excerpt 
from a letter written by Oswald to his brother, which reads: ‘happiness is not based on 
oneself, it does not consist of small home, of taking and getting. Happiness is taking 
part in the struggle where there is no borderline between one’s own personal world, and 
the world in general’ (L 1). 
 
Oswald’s ideas here are an expression of a basic Marxist conception of things, but in 
DeLillo’s portrayal of Oswald, in the main body of the novel, Oswald’s Marxism is 
characterised by a religious or spiritual yearning. Indeed, Oswald’s ‘struggle to exist’, 
his lifelong search for meaning and purpose, can be viewed as a longing for 
transcendence (L 86). Oswald, for whom, ‘communism is the one true religion’ and ‘the 
brig was a kind of religion too [...] a counterforce to politics and lies’, is full of a 
warped kind of religious longing: he ‘wanted to carry himself with a clear sense of role’ 
(L 100, 248). His political convictions have a deeply religious aspect to them, even his 
belief that ‘religion just holds us back’ (L 320). His flirtations with Marxism are 
idealistic fantasies, part of his lifelong yearning to transcend his limiting conditions. His 
Marxist books ‘were private, like something you find and hide, some lucky piece that 
contains the secret of who you are’ (L 41). He sees revolution, like his hero Trotsky, as 
a means of being led ‘out of the dark night of the isolated self’ (L 101). 
 
Oswald longs to escape his solitary cell, to put an ‘end to isolation’. He longs to escape 
the self, ‘to climb out of [his] own skin’, ‘to be swept along’, to be ‘done with being a 
pitiful individual’ (L 101, 322). His vision of how to do this is to merge with history 
but, as Green notes, Oswald ‘imagines history as an impersonal metaphysical force that 
will at once give him a permanent identity and sweep him out of his isolation’.59 
Oswald believes ‘he is a zero in the system’ but can only envision hope in terms of 
entering another system – he can only think in terms of something greater than himself. 
He longs for salvation of a kind, seeks ‘a definition clear enough to specify where he 
belongs’ (L 357). In Mao II, DeLillo articulates this longing as people’s need to ‘lose 
themselves in something larger’60 and in Libra we can see that Oswald desires to enter 
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another system partly as a way of becoming a different person, of losing, and thus 
transcending, himself. Alek, the Soviet agent in charge of Oswald, reflects: ‘that’s what 
they all want, isn’t it, these people who live in corners inside themselves, in blinds and 
hidey-holes? A second and safer identity. Teach us how to live, they say, as someone 
else’ (L 166). At the same time, however, Oswald longs to make himself known, to 
‘make his existence felt’ (L 373). He is forever hoping to obtain some form of 
recognition and acknowledgement for his heroic actions. Thus he is torn between a 
paradoxical desire to be known and yet remain unknown or hidden, to have a name but 
to be someone else, to be accepted and yet to escape. 
  
Oswald’s dream of merging with history is a variant of what Kerr describes as the 
metaphysical dream of an ‘incorporeal, wordless, unmediated presence of one bare soul 
to the next’, which is the inevitable consequence of the solipsist’s view that the 
metaphysically conceived body is ‘what isolates human beings from one another’.61 
Oswald fails to undertake any real or serious political engagement precisely because of 
his extreme solipsism and the metaphysical way in which he perceives the struggle. 
Oswald’s desire to enter history is actually an attempt to transcend history, for, as Ferrie 
says to Oswald, ‘you wanted to enter history. Wrong approach, Leon. What you want is 
out. Get out. Jump out. Find your place and name on another level’ (L 384). 
 
Oswald’s yearning for transcendence is, to a certain extent, realised during the 
assassination, when he experiences a sense of heightened perception that is of such 
intensity – ‘everything was so painfully clear’ (L 395) – that he has an almost out of 
body experience.  DeLillo writes: ‘there was so much clarity Lee could watch himself in 
the huge room of stacked cartons’ (L 398). But the experience is short-lived and he soon 
finds himself back in the same condition that he has known all his life; in a cell, the last 
of ‘the stunted rooms’ in which he’s ‘spent his life’ (L 100).  
 
There is thus a sense in which Oswald’s journey or quest culminates in a return to a 
kind of home. For though Oswald’s life and search ends when he is murdered by Jack 
Ruby, he does, briefly, seem to have returned to, or rather found something, resembling 
home, and furthermore this home is transformed: ‘he no longer saw confinement as a 
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lifetime curse’. Just prior to being led out of his jail cell for the last time Oswald is 
struck by an insight and sense of awakening or renewal:  
 
It was beginning to occur to him that he’d found his life’s work. After the crime 
comes the reconstruction [...]. He will be able to bend the light of that heightened 
moment, shadows fixed on the lawn, the limousine shimmering and still. Time to 
grow in self-knowledge, to explore the meaning of what he’s done. [...] See his 
whole life change. 
This was the true beginning. (L 434) 
 
Unlike James Axton or Lauren Hartke, who also experience a new beginning at the end 
of The Names and The Body Artist respectively, Oswald’s beginning is curtailed by 
death. This new beginning is also his end. But though it is an end of his physical self, 
his death does mark the beginning of the mythical, historical self that he was so eager to 
become. Furthermore, the arc of Oswald’s journey resembles DeLillo’s other 
protagonists who undertake a spiritual quest. This idea of a true beginning, of seeing his 
life change as he grows in self-knowledge, can be read as both a serious reflection of his 
metaphysical fantasy life and a deeply ironic comment on the status of his posthumous 
renown. 
 
 
V. CONSPIRACY AND CONTINGENCY 
 
Though Libra is clearly engaged with the metaphysical there is also a significant 
engagement with the ordinary. DeLillo contrasts the world of conspiracy and religious 
longing with a powerful sense of the everyday and contingent, with ‘American kitchens’ 
(L 16), ‘the daily jostle’ (L 440) and a plethora of seemingly random details. He 
contrasts the novel’s many men in small rooms with grounded, pragmatic women, such 
as Marina and Marguerite, and, most notably, Everett’s wife Mary Frances who, thinks 
Everett, ‘was in the world as he could never be’ (L 76), and has the capacity to ‘bring 
him back to what was safe and plain’ (L 16). 
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The novel, notes Cain, reveals an ‘astute, off-beat, defamiliarizing curiosity about 
everyday life’.62 This can be seen in the portrayal of Lee and Marguerite Oswald’s 
basement room in the Bronx with their Motorola TV and its tinted filter; in the Everett’s 
middle-class, suburban home with its ‘frostless freezer and color-matched appliances, 
on the quiet street of oak and pecan trees’ (L 31). It can be seen in the repeated breakfast 
scenes: Everett buttering his toast; Jack Ruby, who ‘liked his juice fresh-squeezed in the 
morning’ (L 342), hefting his grapefruits, making scrambled eggs and coffee. And it can 
be seen in Ruby’s reading in the toilet or in his daily run through Dallas with his dog 
and dirty laundry in the car, going from his clubs to the Sheraton and to the Police and 
Courts building.  
 
The ordinary moments in the novel are, however, often ironic or ambiguous, they reveal 
the ‘secret symmetries in a non-descript life’ and how ‘our lives [...] abound with 
suggestive meaning’ (L 78). Libra, writes Nel, ‘explores the extraordinary significance 
of ordinary lives’,63 and this significance or suggestive meaning results from the way 
these lives are related to the assassination of JFK. Thus Everett, for example, is 
described as ‘a fellow on a quiet street doing ordinary things’ (L 51), during the period 
in which he is thinking obsessively about his assassination plan. On Oswald’s last night 
with Marina, the night before the assassination, he thinks of the time as ‘ordinary in 
every way, simple moments adding up’ (L 390). And Ruby’s apparently casual visit to 
the Police and Courts building on September 25
th
 is infused with the knowledge of what 
he will do there two months later. 
 
The novel’s engagement with the ordinary is in part due to the use of the Warren 
Commission report as a source text, described in the novel as the ‘Joycean book of 
America’ (L 182), and the related emphasis on the random and contingent. The Warren 
Report, writes Green, provides the novel with a sense of the ‘strangeness of contingent 
things. The testimony and exhibits attached to the report include [...] evidence fraught 
with potential significance and the most prosaic piece of quotidian reality’. 64  And 
Knight argues that, for DeLillo, ‘the true meaning of the Warren Commission Report 
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[…] was the accidental insight it affords into the otherwise invisible interweavings of 
the vast social – and textual – fabric of America’.65  
 
The significance of the ordinary in the novel can most clearly be seen in the way it is 
used to undermine a coherent conspiracy theory. Libra explores both the possibility of a 
conspiracy theory and moreover, the appeal of conspiracy, or the urge to believe in 
conspiracy, but does not endorse it. Indeed, according to Willman, DeLillo demolishes 
the ‘ideological fantasy of conspiracy theory’. 66  Willman develops Lentricchia’s 
argument that DeLillo ‘presses us to rethink the question of Oswald outside the 
framework of conspiracy’,67 and this means outside the framework of a reductively 
logical, causal explanation that betrays a theological need for an unambiguous answer. 
Both Lentricchia and Willman stress the crucial ‘role that contingency plays in derailing 
the plot leading to Kennedy’s death’, a role that undermines the sense of an ‘engineered 
history’. Willman notes that DeLillo ‘creates a conspiracy held together by the 
“meaningless” and the contingent’,68 citing the contingent nature of Oswald’s inclusion 
in Everett’s conspiracy and the coincidence of Kennedy’s motorcade passing in front of 
the Texas School Book Depository. What DeLillo shows in the novel is that, in the 
words of Branch: ‘the conspiracy against the President was a rambling affair that 
succeeded in the short term due mainly to chance. Deft men and fools, ambivalence and 
fixed will and what the weather was like’ (L 441). 
 
Crucially, these contingent, chance elements are what give depth and power to the event 
and to the novel itself. It is because it can’t be fully explained – politically, 
scientifically, historically, or psychologically – that the assassination has such 
resonance and imaginative force:  
 
There is enough mystery in the facts as we know them, enough of conspiracy, 
coincidence, loose ends, dead ends, multiple interpretations. There is no need, 
[Branch] thinks, to invent the grand and masterful scheme, the plot that reaches 
flawlessly in a dozen directions. (L 58) 
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Nevertheless, Branch recognises the deep appeal of such a scheme, of certainty and 
clarity:  
 
If we are on the outside we assume a conspiracy is the perfect working of a 
scheme. Silent nameless men with unadorned hearts. A conspiracy is everything 
that ordinary life is not. It’s the inside game, cold, sure, undistracted, forever closed 
off to us. We are the flawed ones, the innocents, trying to make some rough sense 
of the daily jostle. Conspirators have a logic and a daring beyond our reach. All 
conspiracies are the same taut story of men who find coherence in some criminal 
act. (L 440)  
 
The desire to believe in a conspiracy is an expression of our need for a definiteness of 
sense, of the need to believe someone or something is in control. It is a metaphysical 
yearning for a schematic seamless account, in which everything falls into place with a 
clear motive, method and execution. In philosophical terms this is parallel to what Kerr 
describes as the ‘powerful inclination to get up or down to something simple and 
ultimate’, either by looking upwards to the celestial realm of eternal forms or inwards at 
an essential self and mental-individualist knowledge.
69
 DeLillo satirizes this attitude in 
General Walker’s paranoid belief in the ‘Real Control Apparatus’, which is described as 
 
The mystery we can’t get hold of, the plot we can’t uncover. This doesn’t mean 
there are no plotters. They are elected officials of our government, Cabinet 
members, philanthropists, men who know each other by secret signs, who work in 
the shadows to control our lives. (L 283) 
 
Similar paranoid or conspiratorial ideas are expressed by other characters confined to 
small rooms. Radio disc jockey Weird Beard, for example, opines that ‘there are only 
two things in the world. Things that are true. And things that are truer than true’ (L 
266); and David Ferrie believes ‘there’s no such thing as coincidence’ and that history 
‘is the sum total of all the things they are not telling us’ (L 384, 321).  
 
These passages and paranoid statements highlight the metaphysical or transcendent 
nature of conspiracy theory, how it is based on a platonic conception of meaning, in 
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which the true meaning of things lies hidden, beyond reach, closed off to us. The 
language used by DeLillo recalls Wittgenstein’s ironic description of logic as being of 
the ‘purest crystal’, ‘as something pure and clear-cut’ (PI 97, 105). It is precisely 
because they are ‘perfect’, ideal, ‘everything that ordinary life is not’, that both the idea 
of reducing the world to pure logic and conspiracy theories are so deeply appealing. For 
we are constantly dissatisfied with ordinary life, full of what Kant describes as ‘a 
longing to pass out beyond our immediate confines and to relate ourselves to other 
worlds’. A ‘malady’, writes Kant, which is ‘the opposite of the love of home’.70 The 
idea that something is hidden – truth, essence, meaning, God – is one which 
Wittgenstein recognises to have a profound grip on us, but he shows that it stems from a 
theorizing attitude. The notion of logical purity or a hidden essence is due to the way we 
seek philosophical solutions. He writes: ‘the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, 
not a result of investigation: it was a requirement’ (PI 107). In other words, a 
metaphysical picture of things leads to the conviction that the essence of things is 
necessarily hidden and pure. Like logical purity, the unequivocal nature and 
seamlessness of a conspiracy theory is a requirement, not a result.  
 
Like Wittgenstein, who writes that ‘we must stick to the subjects of our every-day 
thinking and not go astray and imagine that we have to describe extreme subtleties’ (PI 
106), Branch is critical of a theoretical approach and wryly ironic, if not sardonic, about 
his own role in analysing the ‘six point nine seconds of heat and light’ of Kennedy’s 
assassination: 
 
Let’s call a meeting to analyze the blur. Let’s devote our lives to understanding this 
moment, separating the moments of each crowded second. We will build theories 
that gleam like jade idols, intriguing systems of assumption four-faced, graceful. 
We will follow the bullet trajectories backwards to the lives that occupy the 
shadows, actual men who moan in their dreams. Elm street. A woman wonders 
why she is sitting on the grass, bloodspray all around. Tenth street. A witness 
leaves her shoes on the hood of a bleeding policeman’s car. A strangeness, Branch 
feels, that is almost holy. There is much here that is holy, an aberration in the 
heartland of the real. Let’s regain our grip on things. (L 15) 
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The beginning of this passage has a mocking tone: the repetitive and colloquial use of 
“let’s” sounds derisory, highlighting the absurdity as well as the obsessive nature of 
Branch’s task. The reference to gleaming theories seems to indicate his scepticism and 
rejection of a theoretical approach, an approach that is implicitly seen as parallel to a 
theological or metaphysical yearning for authority. Green notes that the language in this 
passage ‘suggests that the theory-building impulse springs from the same source as 
religious belief and entails the worship of idols constructed by the faithful themselves 
onto which faith is pinned’. 71  Against this theory-building impulse stands Branch’s 
Wittgensteinian desire to ‘regain our grip on things’. The phrase refers to the loss of 
meaning and inability to make sense of things following Kennedy’s assassination, to the 
sudden disruption to the fabric of ordinary life. As well as to the way in which the 
unresolved question of how and why he was killed has led to endless speculation and 
paranoid conspiracy theories. More broadly, however, the phrase can also be seen to 
refer to the main characters’ lack of concrete engagement with reality. How Oswald, 
Everett and even Branch are isolated, desperate idealists, exiled to the margins, 
searching for a secure hold on things or place in society. As discussed in the thesis 
introduction, the statement marks a return or call to return to the physical and ordinary. 
It indicates the drawing of limits and resonates not only throughout DeLillo’s work, but 
with Wittgenstein’s injunction to get ‘back to the rough ground’ (PI 107). Just as 
Wittgenstein reveals the purity of logic to be a misleading illusion and urges a return to 
the ordinary, so we can see that in Libra DeLillo undermines the underlying 
metaphysics of conspiracy theory by emphasising the importance of the random and 
contingent.  
 
The way in which the novel resists a neat historical, political or causal explanation of 
the assassination can be seen as implicitly critical of a theorizing attitude. The fact that 
DeLillo emphasises the importance of alternative determining elements does not imply 
an endorsement of an unequivocal metaphysics. Maltby argues that these non-causal, 
non-rational elements – ‘how patterns emerge outside the bounds of cause and effect’; 
or the things Branch thinks of as ‘holy’ (L 44, 15) – betray DeLillo’s romantic 
metaphysics, but we can see that, as vital elements in the rejection of conspiracy theory, 
they are paradoxically part of a more complex picture of things. The metaphysical 
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quests of both Oswald and the conspirators mirror the quest for certainty and the 
accompanying belief in a conspiracy that Branch (and, by extension, the novel as a 
whole) calls into question. It can thus be argued that, although Oswald and the 
conspirators clearly embody certain metaphysical ideas or a metaphysical conception of 
things, the figure of Branch and the significant, if not pivotal, role he plays in the novel 
indicates the extent to which DeLillo’s portrayal is fundamentally critical of this 
metaphysical conception of things.  
 
The novel challenges the idea of unmediated access to historical truth and of a grand 
narrative that can explain everything clearly and unambiguously. A turn against theory, 
a turn to the non-rational and non-causal, to elements that are strange and holy, is not 
necessarily metaphysical. It may suggest the mystery of metaphysics, but does not 
imply a metaphysical ground or concept of truth. Coincidence and mystery are not 
signifiers of the transcendent but of the richness and depth of reality, for, as Everett 
remarks: ‘you have to leave them with coincidence, lingering mystery. This is what 
makes it real’ (L 147). 
 
Thus we can see how DeLillo’s engagement with conspiracy theory can be compared 
with Wittgenstein’s critique of the theorising impulse; a critique that involves an 
investigation of the appeal of this impulse and metaphysics more generally. Both 
Wittgenstein and DeLillo explore the seemingly inevitable need that theorisation is a 
manifestation of, and how it looks to what lies hidden, or beneath or behind things, to 
explain or provide the meaning of things in a clear-cut, pure and unambiguous mode, 
and expose the contradictions or dangers that it leads to. Both resist this kind of 
totalising narrative, and both turn to the ordinary and contingent as a way out from the 
lure of theory and metaphysics. As has been shown throughout this thesis, this return to 
the ordinary in Wittgenstein is far from straightforward. It is the site of a continuous 
struggle, an almost spiritual struggle to return and accept home, to be constantly 
vigilant, self-questioning and willing to change the fundamental way one sees things. 
One of the main reasons for this struggle is the constant tension with the impulse to 
transcendence. Wittgenstein does not advocate the replacement of the necessary with 
the contingent, he does not reject theory for practice, rather he provides a picture of a 
tension between conflicting drives.  
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Likewise, in Libra DeLillo’s emphasis on contingent elements has to be seen in relation 
to the appeal of conspiracy theory. The novel obtains its force from suggesting the 
importance of the tension between metaphysics and the ordinary. The novel accepts 
neither the lone gunman theory nor the water-tight conspiracy theory, but produces a 
complex picture of the controlled and the random, the individual and the collective, and 
the religious and the political. Though ultimately critical of the kind of metaphysical 
longing underlying both religious yearning and conspiracy theory, it nevertheless 
reveals the importance of understanding its significant role in individual and social 
behaviour.  
 
In the final chapter of this thesis we turn to The Names, in which the impulse to 
transcendence is manifested in a dramatic manner. The kind of transformation Oswald 
sought is achieved in this novel through a return from metaphysical exile to home and 
the ordinary. We will continue to explore the ways in which DeLillo and Wittgenstein 
engage with, and ultimately challenge, the powerful appeal of the theorizing impulse 
and examine the social and political significance of returning to the ordinary. We will 
show that, like Libra, The Names reveals the dangers and temptations of both solipsism 
and the theory-building impulse, and ultimately points towards the importance of 
community and the kind of ‘safe and plain’ values embodied in Everett’s wife, Mary 
Frances, who places her trust in the ‘ordinary mysteries’ (L 76). 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
The Dangerous Sublimity of Logic and the ‘Correctness of Detail’1 in 
The Names  
 
To be at home in a language is to be at home in the world. 
        Stephen Mulhall
2
  
 
 
In an introduction to the work of Stanley Cavell, Richard Eldridge summarises the sense 
in which, for Cavell, philosophy inevitably involves a ‘spiritual struggle’. He writes:  
 
One will find oneself at times pursuing a thought, vision, course of action that is 
not generally shared, hence seeking abandonment of or departure from the 
common. But then one will also find oneself, at times, recoiling from the solipsistic 
madness of apocalyptic vision and returning to the common, accepting it as a cure.
3 
 
This chapter will argue that DeLillo’s novel The Names displays these two movements: 
both the departure from the common – in the striving to find metaphysical meaning – as 
well as the return to it. In the process, the chapter explores solipsistic madness and the 
possibility of community and the ordinary as providing a cure. I will argue that the 
tension between yearning for the transcendent and acceptance of the ordinary, between 
solipsism and belonging to a community, is central to the novel’s philosophical 
concerns. The philosophical features of both the main characters’ spiritual quests and 
the object of these quests – the language cult – will be examined in detail. I will show 
the way in which, like all of the DeLillo protagonists examined in this thesis, they are 
lost and in exile with a solipsistic, idealistic outlook that leads them to seek transcendent 
meaning. Again, this quest ultimately results in a return to the ordinary.  
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The Names is, among other things, a novel about a spiritual quest, or more accurately a 
series of spiritual quests that, at the same time, as Mark Osteen notes, ‘investigates the 
need for quests’.4 The quest undertaken by the novel’s protagonist and narrator, James 
Axton, is superficially quite practical – to find and learn about a mysterious group of 
nomads who are obsessed with language and carry out a number of ritualised murders. 
But, as is so often the case with quest narratives in DeLillo’s novels, this practical 
aspect is the vehicle for a form of spiritual quest, albeit one that is far from 
unambiguous or straightforward. The Names subtly subverts traditional conceptions of 
the quest, as can be seen most explicitly in its structural loop and inconclusive ending.  
 
The action of the novel mostly takes place in Greece. Axton is an American risk analyst 
based in Athens. His estranged wife, Kathryn, and their son, Tap, live in a small island 
named Kouros, where she is working on an archaeological dig under the direction of an 
eccentric epigrapher, Owen Brademas. The plot is loosely centred around Owen and 
Axton’s quest to find and find out about the ‘language cult’. The quest is also 
undertaken by Axton’s old friend, filmmaker Frank Volterra. Though there is a certain 
amount of cooperation their quests are to a large extent individual and carried out in 
isolation, and all of them end in some kind of failure; a failure however, that 
paradoxically is also something of a success. Their quests result not in transcendent 
vision or privileged insight, but in a return to the ordinary, with a renewed 
understanding and sense of acceptance; they succeed to the extent that they provide the 
characters – Frank and Axton at least – with a sense of the importance of ordinary 
language and community.  
 
The novel is made up of two narrative strands. Of equal importance to the novel’s 
structure and fabric is Axton’s everyday life as an ex-patriot, the events and non-events 
of his social milieu, and the broader political and economic events taking place in all the 
countries in which he and his acquaintances carry out their business activities. This 
second narrative strand acts as a kind of counterpoint to the quest narrative and further 
emphasises the tension between the transcendent and the ordinary that is so central to 
the novel.  
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The main narrative of the novel ends with a symbolic return to its beginning with Axton 
reflecting, as he does in the novel’s opening pages, on the significance of the Acropolis. 
(The novel’s actual ending is a short story by Tap). The novel is thus framed by two 
different readings of the Acropolis. The second reading is a correction or reassessment 
by Axton of his earlier views, which is the result not only of a change of opinion, but a 
radical awakening. This awakening comes at the end of a metaphysical journey Axton 
undertakes in which he seeks to find hidden patterns, uncover secrets and explain 
mysterious actions, but which results in a transformative return to the everyday, 
ordinary life of community and conversation. Thus we can view his awakening as 
signifying his return from a form of exile to the world of ordinary things.  
 
This idea of exile and return, and this return marking some kind of transformation, is a 
recurring theme in DeLillo’s work, and has been repeatedly addressed in the thesis. In 
particular, it was a central feature of The Body Artist chapter, in which I argued that 
Tuttle serves as a kind of facilitator, leading Lauren astray into believing in the 
possibility of language ‘outside language-games’5 but also enabling her to return to 
ordinary language and the wonder of ordinary things. As with The Body Artist, in The 
Names both the exile and return are a result of, and take place in, language.  
 
In The Names this possibility of language ‘outside language-games’ and the desire to 
transcend human finitude can be seen both in the language cult, and in the quest to find 
and learn about them. In The Body Artist the movement between exile and return, 
between the solipsistic temptations of metaphysics and the reassurance of the ordinary, 
takes place in a narrative characterised by the intensity and focus of its narrow range of 
concerns. The novel considers the grieving process of a person who is almost 
completely isolated from the outside world, and so from any social, political or even 
worldly interests. Though both novels, like the philosophy of early and late 
Wittgenstein, explore the ‘limits of the human’ and the apparent human need to exceed 
these limits, in The Names these philosophical features are connected to a broader set of 
concerns and issues. That is to say, the tension at work in the novel between 
metaphysics and the ordinary, between the striving after an ideal and the acceptance of 
the everyday, is embedded in an explicit and detailed geo-political context that 
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necessarily raises a series of questions about the relation between metaphysics and 
social and political realities. In The Body Artist Lauren’s return to the ordinary is 
marked by her having overcome the temptation to transcend human finitude and her 
renewed sense of the wonder of everyday experience and things. In the final section of 
The Names we can see a similar kind of return, but significantly, this return is 
characterised by a strong sense of community, family and shared language.  
 
I will thus argue that although the novel reveals, and is engaged with, the kind of 
tension between metaphysics and the ordinary that we have examined in previous 
chapters, it does so in a way that enables us to think about the social and political 
consequences of both DeLillo’s and Wittgenstein’s work. In the novel the tension at 
work between the transcendent and the ordinary is perhaps most evident in the contrast 
DeLillo draws between two different models or pictures of language – an ideal language 
of logical purity and the ordinary language of conversation and social exchange. In 
order to explore the philosophical aspects of these different pictures of language I will 
trace the shift and examine the contrast in Wittgenstein’s thinking from the Tractatus to 
the Philosophical Investigations. The shift in Wittgenstein’s work will be compared 
with the shift that occurs in Axton’s approach to language, as he overcomes his 
attraction to the logical sublime, the dangers of idealism and a ‘theoretical attitude’, and 
returns to the ordinary and an acceptance of community. This return will be illuminated 
by an account of Cavell’s exploration of the social and political significance of the 
Wittgensteinian ideas of acknowledgement, acceptance and community. This will show 
how Wittgenstein’s later work can help us think about the ways in which the underlying 
philosophical questions raised by The Names relate to broader social and political 
concerns.   
 
 
I. CRITICAL APPROACHES TO THE NOVEL 
 
The recovery of the ordinary requires an act of self-transformation.
6
  
 
In this section I will examine a number of critical responses to The Names and their 
significant points of contact with a Wittgensteinian orientation. I will then show that the 
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two dominant critical approaches to the novel are reflected by the two pictures of 
language displayed in the novel itself, and that these two approaches and pictures of 
language can be illustrated by the shift in Wittgenstein’s account of language from the 
Tractatus to the Investigations.  
 
Several of the critical readings that explore the idea that Axton experiences some kind 
of awakening as a result of his spiritual journey share a distinctly Wittgensteinian thrust. 
Jacqueline Zubeck, for example, argues that Axton, Owen and Frank, undertake 
‘journeys from postmodern abstraction to prosaic actuality’ leading to a ‘self-awareness 
which provides the basis for their social and moral regeneration’.7 Though Zubeck’s 
overall argument is mostly concerned with the ethical consequences of dismissing 
‘actual practice in the interest of disembodied theory’8 the way she reads the text in 
terms of an opposition between theory and practice and her emphasis on the return to 
the ordinary, to the ‘surge and pelt of daily life’ (N 269), has significant points of 
contact with a Wittgensteinian perspective. As we have seen in previous chapters the 
raising of self-awareness as a platform for change, and the movement from abstraction 
to actuality, is crucial to the project of Wittgenstein’s later work, which aims to ‘bring 
words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use’ (PI 116). Though he rarely 
touches on social or moral concerns they nevertheless remain implicit in and profoundly 
important to his work,
9
 and part of the inestimable value of Cavell’s work is the way he 
teases these elements out of Wittgenstein’s writing.  
 
Zubeck’s sense that the novel traces a movement away from abstraction towards the 
ordinary, resulting in a kind of regeneration, is shared by both Osteen and Paula Bryant, 
but their emphasis is more strongly weighted in terms of the importance of language in 
this journey. According to Osteen,  
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Axton undergoes a series of life-altering experiences that move him toward 
commitment and community. His passive character is destroyed and then restored 
by a newly liberating comprehension of language as the necessary ligature of filial 
and communal bonds.
10
  
 
While Bryant claims that Axton goes from viewing ‘language as timeless, pure, 
abstract, and thus limited and limiting, to seeing its potential as a dynamic medium, 
irrational, immediate, expressive, although impure’.11 Both readings can be viewed in 
Wittgensteinian terms: Osteen’s emphasis on language and the way it relates to 
commitment and community, as we will see in due course, points to significant aspects 
of Cavell’s reading of Wittgenstein’s work; and Bryant’s distinction mirrors the 
different approaches to language in early and late Wittgenstein, between language as 
slippery ice and language as rough ground (PI 107). 
 
The novel’s contrast between two conceptions of and approaches to language, and two 
different modes of understanding, can also be seen in critical approaches to the novel, 
between readings which, according to Matthew J. Morris, emphasise ‘the linguistic 
structures [...] at the expense of their political implications’,12 and those which consider 
the broader context, whether social, political or historical. Taking the latter approach, 
Anne Longmuir, in her illuminating essay on The Names, argues against the general 
tendency of critics to view the novel as a ‘metaphysical meditation on language’. She 
claims that ‘existing academic criticism reduces The Names to an abstract analysis of 
language’. 13  Longmuir acknowledges that ‘language and the broader set of related 
epistemological questions that it raises’ are central to the novel’s concerns, but she 
points out that these questions are not asked in isolation. On the contrary, the novel’s 
meditations on language take place ‘within a very specific location and period’. The 
central point of Longmuir’s essay is that the novel needs to be subjected to an 
intertextual reading, and that ‘its most important intertext is historical: its references to 
the Iranian revolution and the subsequent hostage crisis’. She concludes her essay with 
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a claim which is, perhaps paradoxically, significant for a Wittgensteinian reading of the 
novel’s philosophical aspects: 
 
Employing the Iranian hostage crisis as an intertext in our reading of the The 
Names forces us to recognise that DeLillo does not explore language in isolation, 
because he does not believe language exists in isolation but exists within the social 
text.
14
  
 
This suggestion may seem paradoxical given that a Wittgensteinian reading will 
necessarily be more closely focused on issues of language at the expense of historical or 
political implications. However, such an approach, by showing that language does not 
exist in isolation, supports the kind of reading that examines the social, historical and 
political context and consequences; it challenges certain theoretical preconceptions that 
underlie the kind of abstract, analytical readings that Longmuir criticises, and clears the 
ground and provides the philosophical justification for alternative modes of reading. 
Furthermore, a Wittgensteinian reading does have significant social and political 
implications, which are implicit in the philosophical issues under scrutiny in this 
chapter. These issues broadly reveal that just as language should not be examined in 
isolation from the broader social and political context, so social and political questions 
should not be examined in isolation from a consideration of linguistic practices and 
structures. It is precisely the link between language and the broader context, and the 
way linguistic issues are related to, and impact upon, the social and political, that will 
be examined below.  
 
Longmuir’s argument that ‘DeLillo does not explore language in isolation’ is an 
important one, and yet it doesn’t seem to go far enough, for, crucially, DeLillo also 
highlights the dangers of exploring language in isolation. The novel reveals the dangers 
of exploring language in isolation not only in the obsessive behaviour of Axton, Owen 
and Frank but above all in the depiction of the language cult – in the extremity of both 
its theories and its actions. For my purposes, neither the validity of Longmuir’s choice 
of intertext nor the need for an intertextual reading is in question, what is of interest is 
that the contrast she makes between two critical approaches to the novel – between a 
metaphysical, abstract analytical approach and a context-based approach focused on 
                                                 
14
 Longmuir, ‘The Language of History’, p. 120 
164 
 
  
specificity – is in fact played out in the novel, and what’s more, this contrast mirrors 
and can be illuminated by the contrast between early and late Wittgenstein.  
 
One of the radical shifts in Wittgenstein’s thinking, from early to late, is precisely the 
change from viewing language in isolation to showing how it exists within the social 
text. Wittgenstein’s later work is in part a reflection on his earlier work, the Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus, and the dangers of an abstract, analytical approach to language; 
of examining language in isolation. The Tractatus is characterised by its abstract 
analysis of the logic of language – language divorced from any context. The 
Philosophical Investigations, on the other hand, is a critique of this approach to 
language that, at the same time, demonstrates the importance of context, details and the 
everyday use of language. It is, writes McGinn, an ‘attempt to get us to look at language 
when it is functioning within the everyday, practical lives of speakers.’15 
 
The kind of approach to the novel that Longmuir criticises – an abstract analysis of 
language – is mirrored in the novel by the theorising, idealist attitudes of Axton, Owen 
and Frank, especially in their approach to the language cult, (and, as we will explore 
below, in the language cult itself). For Zubeck, the three characters, who all share an 
obsession with the language cult, ‘privilege theory and negate prosaic particularity’. 
They are, she argues, ‘representatives of the academy’ – as writer, epigrapher and 
filmmaker respectively – and ‘are fascinated by the abstract pattern of the murders and 
ignore the actual practice which brings this pattern into being’.16 In other words, they 
embody the kind of ‘theoretical attitude’ that Wittgenstein shows leads to dissatisfaction 
with language, philosophical confusion and a yearning to transcend human finitude. 
 
 
II. AXTON, OWEN, FRANK AND THE LOGICAL SUBLIME 
 
A main cause of philosophical disease – a one-sided diet: one nourishes one’s 
thinking with only one kind of thinking. (PI 593) 
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This section examines the significant similarities between the three main characters and 
the reasons for their interest in, and pursuit of, the language cult. It shows how Axton, 
Owen and Frank are all solipsistic idealists in search of some form of transcendent 
meaning, and illustrates the way the cult’s actions can be seen to embody an idea of the 
logical sublime.  
 
Axton’s initial conception and understanding of language is symbolised or embodied in 
his initial conception and understanding of the Acropolis. In Axton’s first reading of the 
Acropolis, which opens the novel, there is a strong emphasis on the transcendent nature 
of the monument, as he attempts to explain his resistance to visiting it. He begins by 
drawing a contrast with the ‘imperfect, blaring’ modern city surrounding it, as if they 
are separate and distinct things. He notes its ethereal qualities, its luminosity and 
immateriality, calling it a ‘white fire’ and a ‘star lamp’ (N 4). He also emphasises the 
form, the ‘beauty, dignity, order, proportion’ of the ‘worked stones’, suggesting that he 
sees the Acropolis as the embodiment of an ideal (N 3); an ideal that reminds him of our 
‘inadequacy’, and small human failings.  
 
The reading is a prime example of what Morris calls Axton’s ‘tendency to overestimate 
the power of pure form’.17 This tendency is shared by Owen and Frank, with whom 
Axton also shares an obsessive interest in finding the language cult. Owen is an 
intellectual, an idealist and a wanderer, who plays the role of ‘elderly sage’. 18 His 
approach to his subjects of study is far from orthodox, and has more in common with a 
religious fanatic. He wants to devote the rest of his life to reading inscriptions, ‘all I 
want to do’, he says, ‘is read the stones’ (N 23). His idealism and otherworldliness are 
plain to see, ‘Owen’s in another world’, says Kathryn (N 73), and Axton notes how for 
Owen ‘even random things take ideal shapes’ (N 19). His idealism is most apparent, 
however, in his approach to reading. He is no longer interested in what the stones he 
reads say, but only in the shapes of the letters and the materials used, he ‘sees a 
mysterious importance in the letters as such, the blocks of characters’ (N 35). This 
experience of the ‘shapes’ is, for Owen, ‘strange and reawakening’ and ‘goes deeper 
than conversations’ (N 36). According to Zubeck, Owen’s ‘allegiance to a nether world 
of intellectual paradigms has robbed him of attention to quotidian concerns’; he is 
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isolated from ‘untidy quotidian complexity’. 19  And for Morris, it is ‘Owen’s 
misreading’ that ‘points him toward extremism and isolation’.20 
 
Though equally elusive, Frank is a wilder, less measured and predictable character than 
Owen. He is a filmmaker, ‘a ragged self-regarding artist’, and his attitude to film 
resembles Owen’s attitude to stones (N 125). He is obsessive about film, governed by a 
powerful drive to make films, and interested in film itself (N 109). The film he proposes 
to make about the cult would be ‘an essay on film, on what film is, on what it means’ (N 
199). He is also, like Owen and Axton, deeply solipsistic. ‘I can’t surrender myself to 
places’ he says, admitting, ‘I’m the place. [...] I’m the only place I need’ (N 143). Of the 
three, Frank is perhaps the most explicitly drawn by the possibility of transcendence, he 
is ‘hungry for the limit of things’ (N 218). 
 
Axton lacks the manic, extreme drive of Owen and Frank, he is disengaged, ironic and 
complacent – a ‘perennial tourist’, who lacks commitment in all areas of his life (N 43). 
This is made clear when he explains his resistance to visiting the Acropolis by 
acknowledging that there are ‘obligations attached to such a visit’ (N 3). His avoidance 
of the Acropolis is indicative of a more general attitude of avoidance and his reluctance 
to accept or honour obligations. He is, like Oswald, Nick Shay and Keith Neudecker, ‘a 
man living apart’ (N 44), and according to Zubeck, ‘utterly removed from social 
responsibility’.21 His job as a risk analyst involves a moral and emotional detachment 
from the prosaic reality of the data he collects and interprets. (The contrast between 
Axton and Kathryn is telling here. Kathryn, an archaeologist, is literally and 
symbolically grounded by her work). These aspects of Axton’s personality are most 
clearly emphasised in ‘the 27 Depravities’, a mental list Axton compiles that he believes 
accurately reflects Kathryn’s grievances against him, and which reveals his ironic stance 
towards his failings. He describes himself as ‘self-satisfied’, ‘uncommitted’, ‘willing to 
settle’, and ‘politically neuter’ (N 16-17). 
 
Axton’s detachment is also evident in the nature of his social existence among the ex-
pat community in Athens, which enables him to persist in his disengaged state, his 
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‘artificial life’ (N 130). The ex-pat world is unreal, a ‘pretend world of exotic 
landscapes and foreign people’; 22  it requires no investment, commitment or 
responsibility. It is alienating – ‘there was around us almost nothing we knew as 
familiar and safe’, thinks Axton, lamenting that, ‘we’d lost our capacity to select, to 
ferret out particularity’ (N 94). And this alienation is strongly related to Axton’s 
theorising attitude, his generalising impulse, his ‘tendency to sublime’ the way he see 
things.  
 
This inability to select, to see the particular, is indicative of his social and political 
disengagement – he is incapable of recognizing and accepting the broader consequences 
of his own and his community’s behaviour. Axton fears politics, a fear hinted at 
throughout the novel, such as when he lies about visiting Turkey to his concierge 
because the concierge ‘looks political’ (N 103). This fear of politics, and his avoidance 
of social responsibility and commitment, can be seen as related to his refusal to 
acknowledge or accept what being American might mean; his refusal to acknowledge 
his real community.  
 
Axton acknowledges the political and historical events taking place in the Middle East, 
but only as an observer, not a participant, in spite of the fact that he admits his job is 
concerned with ‘money and politics’ (N 97). He refuses to acknowledge the role that he 
is playing in these events (and his unawareness of the fact that he works for the C.I.A 
exemplifies rather than justifies his lack of engagement and sense of responsibility). 
Furthermore, he sees these events in abstract, transcendent terms: ‘in some of these 
places’, he tells Charles Maitland, referring to various Middle Eastern cities, ‘things 
have enormous power. They have impact, they’re mysterious. Events have weight [...]. 
It’s a heightening’ (N 98).  
 
His reading of America is equally vague and abstract. He argues that ‘America is the 
world’s living myth’ (N 114) and thus refuses to acknowledge or take responsibility for 
the actualities of American political intervention. He seems unwilling or possibly 
incapable of looking at the wider context or considering the specific details. This 
attitude is revealed most forcefully in his dinner discussion with Greek nationalist 
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Andreas Eliades, during which Andreas tries to persuade Axton to think about 
America’s imperialistic role in foreign affairs. Axton says that he doesn’t want to ‘hear 
the history of foreign interference’ (N 237) and denies responsibility for American 
actions and policy, saying decisions taken were ‘not by me’ (N 236), thus failing to 
understand, at least according to a Cavellian account, what belonging to a democratic 
state involves, the responsibility that accompanies membership in a polis.  
 
For Cavell membership in a political community is based on consent, an idea that has 
several significant consequences. By consenting, he writes, ‘I recognise the society and 
its government, so constituted, as mine; which means that I am answerable not merely 
to it, but for it’.23 Tanesini elaborates this point by highlighting that ‘to consent is to 
undertake a commitment. It is a matter of accepting one’s responsibility for one’s 
community’.24 Axton’s refusal to say “we” not only emphasises his political blindness 
but also his desire for autonomy and longing to transcend the ordinary. 
 
Such attitudes of denial are shared by Frank and Owen, and are partly explained by  the 
fact that all three men are exiles, they’re ‘a long way from home’ (N 50). Owen, who 
hasn’t ‘been home in thirty-five years’, refers to himself as a ‘lost traveller’ (N 77), 
Frank has been exiled from the film community and lives more or less underground, and 
Axton laments that there is ‘no place in particular’ to which he belongs (N 49). All three 
are solipsistic idealists in search of the possibility of transcendence – they are ‘looking 
for something that lies outside the range of expectations’ (N 140) – and this helps 
explain their shared attraction to the cult.  
 
Axton learns about the language cult from Owen on one of his trips to visit Kathryn and 
Tap. Owen tells him about meeting a group of strange people who live in a cave. The 
cave-dwellers, like Owen, are interested in language, but whereas Owen is interested in 
inscriptions, the cult are interested in the ‘alphabet itself [...] in letters, written symbols, 
fixed in sequence’ (N 30). They are ‘zealots of the alphabet’ (N 75). A murder takes 
place on the island and both Owen and Axton suspect that the group was responsible. 
They slowly learn more about the group: that they may belong to a bigger organisation; 
that they have carried out other murders; and, most significantly, that there is ‘some 
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alphabetic link between the victim’s name and the place where he or she was killed’ (N 
171). As they learn more about the group, and its extreme behaviour, they become 
increasingly obsessed with it.  
 
Their interest in the group is driven by the mystery, by the desire to solve a puzzle, but 
mostly by the logical sublimity of the cult’s actions, the way their actions seem to 
embody some logical ideal, which serves as a ‘vault into eternity’ (N 203). The ideas 
and language used by Owen the first time he speculates about the group’s motives 
reveals the appeal of the logical sublime. He thinks that maybe the man found murdered 
on the island ‘was a victim of some ordering instinct. They may have felt they were 
moving toward a static perfection of some kind. [...] To be part of some unified vision. 
[...] Safe from chaos and life’ (N 115-6).  
 
Osteen argues that ‘a religious longing underpins the obsession with the cult’,25 and 
though it clear that there is a strong element of spiritual yearning and desire for 
transcendence in the obsession, this longing manifests itself in an impulse to theorise 
and an attraction to an abstract ideal, rather than in a longing for communal rapture or 
release. ‘There is a different signature here, a deeper and austere calculation’, reflects 
Owen, ‘the murders are so striking in design that we tend to overlook the physical act 
itself’ (N 171). It is this design that they find so compelling, the logic of an action with 
‘no sense, no content, no historic bond’ (N 216). They are drawn to the transcendent 
possibilities of pure form, and to the very inhumanity of the logical sublime, and thus 
they ‘barely consider the victims except as elements in the pattern’ (N 171).  
 
For both Wittgenstein and Cavell an attraction to the inhuman, or desire to transcend the 
human, is an essential part of being human. In his reading of Wittgenstein, Mulhall 
claims: 
 
Nothing is more human than the desire to deny the human, to interpret limits as 
limitations, and to repudiate the human condition of conditionedness (finitude) in 
the name of the unconditioned, the transcendent, the superhuman – the inhuman.26  
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Crucially, this drive to the inhuman manifests itself in an attraction to the sublime. 
According to Mulhall, ‘it as if the very inhumanity of the sublime seduces us, as if 
transcending the human condition amounted to an infinitely desirable purification and 
refinement of ourselves’.27 
 
This idea of the sublime is central to Wittgenstein’s diagnosis of certain philosophical 
assumptions about language, and has important parallels with DeLillo’s depiction of the 
language cult. In the Investigations, Wittgenstein diagnoses our ‘tendency to sublime 
the logic of our language’ (PI 38), and the ways in which logic is considered to 
transcend the empirical or ordinary, as well as the dangerous consequences of this idea. 
In his detailed analysis of the Investigations, Mulhall shows how Wittgenstein’s 
metaphors in this section, ‘interlinked chains of figuration that attempt to capture our 
sense of the peculiar character, the queerness of logic,’ emphasise different but equally 
significant aspects of the sublime.
28
 Firstly, the sublime is figured in terms of depth, as 
that which lies below the threshold of ordinary awareness. Secondly, in terms of 
sublimation or refinement, and lastly, the sublime also embodies a notion of sublimity – 
a sense of exaltation, of being elevated to or beyond a certain threshold.  
 
All three of these senses – depth, purification, exaltation – are manifest in the ‘obsessive 
logocentrism’ of the language cult and their ‘working towards a purer vision’ (N 149). 
They can be seen, for example, in the way cult work at a ‘preverbal level’ (N 208), in 
Emmerich’s claim to Owen that ‘only a death can complete the program’, insisting, ‘it 
goes deep, this recognition, beyond words’ (N 293); in Bern’s starving herself to death 
(N 292); and in Andahl’s account of the ‘frenzy of knowing’ during the experience of 
killing, that was ‘beyond any horror’ (N 211). These senses of the sublime are equally 
manifest in the obsessive pursuit of the cult by Axton, Frank and Owen.  
 
 
III. WITTGENSTEIN AND THE LANGUAGE CULT 
 
What is the relation between name and thing named? – Well, what is it? (PI 37) 
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The cult members see and discuss their actions in formal, or more precisely, logical 
terms, describing murder as carrying ‘out the pattern’ (N 210). They speak about their 
‘program’ as if the logic itself is self-justifying: ‘it’s true to the premise [...] it follows 
logically upon the premise’, they say, and emphasise the ‘rightness of it’; how it is 
‘correct’, ‘valid’ (N 209, 302). Before concluding, ‘it’s a blunt recital of the facts’, a 
phrase with faint echoes of the idiosyncratic language of the Tractatus and its emphasis 
on facts: ‘the world is the totality of facts, not of things’; ‘we picture facts to ourselves’ 
(TLP 1.1, 2.1). It is clear, therefore, that the language cult is not merely a reflection on 
language, but perhaps more significantly on logic – or on a certain picture of language 
that leads to a logical conception of things.  
 
This emphasis on logic, the way, as Osteen notes, ‘their ritual is all structure’,29 and the 
obvious incongruity between such use of logical language and the act of murder 
suggests the possibility of reading the language cult as a satirical illustration of a 
‘theoretical attitude’ or an abstract approach to language. Born, for example, suggests 
the cult can be viewed as an ‘hilariously literalistic, expression of Derrida’s concept of 
logocentricity’,30 while Zubeck claims that the cult ‘seems to exemplify some of the 
tenets of postmodernism’. She writes, ‘DeLillo seems to incorporate and satirize various 
strands of postmodern theory [...] by taking it literally. [...] The language cult [...] 
manifests what might be its logical implications’. The problem with postmodern theory, 
she continues, is that ‘language becomes the disembodied expression of an amorphous 
discourse’ that ‘refers only to its own construction’.31 Her argument, however, is less 
with postmodernist theory itself, which she admits to ‘oversimplifying’32, than with the 
dangers of a blind adherence to theory or a theoretical perspective in general, and thus 
can be compared with later Wittgenstein’s critique of the theoretical impulse.  
 
Rather than attempt to pinpoint the precise object of DeLillo’s critique I will suggest 
that the cult embodies and satirizes a general picture of language rather than a theory. 
By viewing the cult in this way we can illustrate not only the parallels between the 
cult’s vision of language and elements of the Tractatus, but also the significance of later 
Wittgenstein’s critique of the metaphysical impulse for our understanding of Axton’s 
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eventual return. For Wittgenstein does not challenge particular theories of language, 
rather he diagnoses how a certain picture of language leads to a theorising attitude. 
Crucially, in order to overcome a picture of language it is necessary to change the way 
we see things.  
 
The idea of viewing the language cult as a kind of satirical illustration is suggested in 
the novel itself, though not unambiguously, when Owen comments to Axton that ‘these 
killings mock us. They mock our need to structure and classify, to build a system 
against the terror in our souls’ (N 308). The need Owen refers to here can be seen as a 
manifestation of the ‘craving for the metaphysical’, 33  or what Wittgenstein would 
identify as ‘an urge to understand the basis, or essence, of everything empirical’, a need 
to secure ourselves to solid foundations (PI 89). Wittgenstein recognises and deeply 
respects this need, but thinks it can be satisfied in other ways than building systems. 
And though he doesn’t mock this need, he does mock a great deal of the misguided, 
theory-based attempts to satisfy it – including his own earlier effort in the Tractatus.  
 
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein attempts to satisfy metaphysical problems by producing a 
logical analysis of how language represents reality and by showing that, in David G. 
Stern’s words, ‘all language shares an underlying formal structure’.34 In this attempt to 
‘construct a theory of what language’s ability to represent the world consists in’35 he 
takes the analogy between language and a precise calculus as an elucidation of the 
essence of language. In this theory, notes McGinn, ‘the basic signifying unit of 
language is the name’.36  
 
The cult’s actions, as well as the language they use, can thus be seen to represent 
precisely the kind of search for logical purity characteristic of Wittgenstein’s early 
work, an argument made by Bryant, who claims that the language cult’s program ‘is a 
perverse version of Wittgenstein’s logical positivist search for one ideal language that 
will redeem confusion by establishing an inexorable equivalence between word and 
world’.37 The parallels between the language cult’s ‘program’ and the Tractatus, which, 
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notes Stern, sets out a ‘program of logical analysis’, 38  are not only evident in the 
preoccupation with logic, but also in the primary importance they give to names. 
Although the language cult never explicitly articulate what could be considered a 
coherent theory of language, their obsession with names, their focus on one narrow 
aspect of language and the way in which they employ the technical language of logic 
highlight the theorising and Tractarian nature of their program.  
 
Perhaps the most significant parallel between the Tractatus and the language cult is the 
way early Wittgenstein’s conception of naming is echoed in the language cult’s 
approach to names. The language cult, argues Maltby, ‘seek to recover [a] utopian 
condition of language, [...] the language of name, the kind of pure nomenclature implied 
in genesis where words stand in a necessary rather than arbitrary, relationship to their 
referents’.39 Such a conception of naming can be seen in the outline Mulhall draws of a 
certain approach to language that Wittgenstein diagnoses in the Investigations, an 
approach which is found in both the Tractatus and St Augustine: 
 
the philosopher has extracted naming from its contexts in our everyday life with 
words, and hence arrived at the idea that naming is a single, unique, and 
superlatively definite kind of relation between word and thing – a hidden 
connection of crystalline purity.
40
  
 
The Investigations begins with an extended consideration of this conception of naming 
and the representational view of language accompanying it, which results from an 
approach to language exemplifying the ‘theoretical attitude’ Wittgenstein’s later work is 
directed against. But rather than directly address the Tractatus, Wittgenstein opens the 
Investigations with a citation from St Augustine, which, argues McGinn, brings out the 
‘universality of the temptations he is concerned with’.41 Augustine’s account of learning 
language, claims Wittgenstein, gives us a ‘particular picture of the essence of human 
language. It is this: the individual words in language name objects’ (PI 1). In other 
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words, Augustine takes one sort of word – the name – as a model and ‘derives his 
general picture of how language functions from this one sort of case’.42  
 
According to McGinn, for Wittgenstein, this tendency to derive a general model from a 
central case is an ‘important element in the theoretical attitude’, and thus is not unique 
to St Augustine, but is a seemingly natural impulse. McGinn’s summary of this ‘first, 
primitive impulse to theorize about language’ has evident parallels with the language 
cult, who call themselves ‘beginners’: 
 
Our general sense of a need ‘to penetrate phenomena’ predisposes us to neglect the 
wide horizon of human linguistic activity, and to focus on particular linguistic 
elements in isolation from both the field of language and the actual employment of 
this language by speakers. Our attitude towards these particular examples is one of 
studying them closely in order to discern their essence (e.g. the essence of naming). 
The tendency to take a narrow or over-simplified view of the phenomenon of 
language is thereby combined with a tendency to idealize or mythologize it.
43
  
 
These tendencies are equally evident in the behaviour and ideas of Axton, Frank and 
Owen, as they pursue and idealize the cult, whose secret ‘they are intent on 
unlocking’.44 One of the problems with this approach to language, according to later 
Wittgenstein, is that it leads to a ‘conception of naming as, so to speak, an occult 
process’ (PI 38). In this conception, continues Wittgenstein,  
 
Naming appears as a queer connection of a word with an object. And you really get 
such a queer connection when the philosopher is trying to bring out the relation 
between name and thing by staring at an object in from of him and repeating a 
name or even the word “this” innumerable times. (PI 38)  
 
The picture that Wittgenstein paints here of a philosopher’s slightly manic or absurd 
behaviour is analogous to the obsessive behaviour of the language cult who attempt to 
bring out the relation between name and thing by inflicting repeated blows on their 
victims ‘innumerable times’. It is clear that the cult perceives naming as an occult 
                                                 
42
 McGinn, Wittgenstein, p. 39 
43
 McGinn, Wittgenstein, pp. 39, 37, 39 
44
 Born, ‘Sacred Noise’, p. 213 
175 
 
  
process and insists on idealizing and mythologizing the process – Andhal speaks of the 
‘secret power of name forms’ (N 210). Thus their behaviour – described by Owen as 
‘ritualizing a denial of our elemental nature’ (N 175) – can be seen as a satirical 
embodiment of a metaphysician who is ‘under the illusion that what is peculiar, 
profound, essential’ in a philosophical investigation, ‘resides in its trying to grasp the 
incomparable essence of language’ (PI 97).  
 
This idea that the cult are a satirical embodiment of the logical implications of a 
metaphysical picture of things makes Wittgenstein’s critique of his earlier positivist 
thinking particularly relevant, especially since it too is not without its satirical edge, and 
since its aim is in part to return us to ‘our elemental nature’ – to the rough ground of 
ordinary language and everyday life. One of the ways in which Wittgenstein tries to 
achieve this return is to highlight or reveal the absurdities of a narrow, logical approach 
to language, to reveal what he describes as the ‘bumps that the understanding has got by 
running its head up against the limits of language’ (PI 119), and he does this through 
innovative formal means. Wittgenstein’s purpose, argues Mulhall, is ‘diagnostic rather 
than critical’ and thus ‘the peculiarities of tone and style in Wittgenstein’s writing 
reflect [...] the particular work they are intended to perform on his readers’.45 One of 
these characteristic peculiarities is his use of humour. To carry out the work of changing 
the way his readers see, Wittgenstein not infrequently uses comical methods to bring 
into question certain philosophical assumptions and their logical consequences. This 
comic mode ranges from sarcasm – ‘How strange that we should be able to do anything 
with the [language] we have!’ (PI 120) – to borderline slapstick –  ‘Imagine someone 
saying: “But I know how tall I am!” and laying his hand on top of his head to prove it’ 
(PI 279).  
 
These comic tropes, combined with Wittgenstein’s striking use of metaphor and 
imagery convey the manic and absurd state, the head bumping, that a certain 
philosophical attitude can induce or lead to. A state Wittgenstein encapsulates in an 
aphorism that, despite its economy, perfectly illustrates not only his ideas, but also his 
deft use of the comical, metaphorical image: ‘What is your aim in philosophy?’ he asks 
himself, answering: ‘to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle’ (PI 309). 
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Perhaps the most characteristic way in which Wittgenstein works on his readers, 
however, is through the relentless posing of questions. These questions take place 
within the dense, complex dialogues of unspecified interlocutors, but they often read as 
if they are directed at the reader, and serve to bring the reader into the dialogue, as we 
can see in the following example, in which the questioning increases in intensity: 
  
When someone says the word “cube” to me, for example, I know what it means. 
But can the whole use of the word come before my mind, when I understand it in 
this way?  
Well, but on the other hand isn’t the meaning of the word also determined by this 
use? And can these ways of determining meaning conflict? Can what we grasp in a 
flash accord with a use, fit or fail to fit it? And how can what is present to us in an 
instant, what comes before our mind in an instant, fit a use?  
What really comes before our mind when we understand a word? – Isn’t it 
something like a picture? Can’t it be a picture? (PI 139) 
  
Here and elsewhere Wittgenstein challenges the preconceptions and prejudices of his 
readers, teasing out the logical implications of certain deeply held beliefs. The dialogic 
element of his writing is essential to the way he tries to change the way we see things, 
not by correcting particular mistakes or theories, but by showing us how we got into the 
fly bottle in the first place; showing us the paths we may have taken or be tempted to 
take, and we why we took or are tempted to take them. One of the most significant 
temptations, and one that we can see echoed in The Names, is the desire to ‘penetrate 
phenomena’, to uncover the essence of things (PI 90). This desire in part stems from the 
belief that ‘the proposition and the word that logic deals with are supposed to be 
something pure and clear-cut. And we rack our brains over the nature of the real sign’ 
(PI 105). Thus we are led to ‘imagine that we have to describe extreme subtleties. [...] 
We feel as if we had to repair a torn spider’s web with our fingers’ (PI 106). This image 
powerfully conveys the mania that can result from a certain conception of language. 
And forms part of the general picture of how philosophical questions can lead to the 
obsessive, quest-like pursuit of the hidden essence of things, of logical purity, and the 
apparent need to transcend human finitude; how, according to Cavell, we feel 
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‘compelled to search for an order or system or a language that would secure human 
settlement with the world that goes beyond human sense and certainty’.46  
 
Wittgenstein reveals, however, that such philosophical searching, which sends ‘us in 
pursuit of chimeras’ (PI 94), leads to frustration or dissatisfaction, even, argues Cavell, 
‘touches of madness’.47 Wittgenstein writes, ‘when we believe that we must find that 
order, must find the ideal, in our actual language, we become dissatisfied with what are 
ordinarily called “propositions”, “words”, “signs”’ (PI 105). Such a desire to find an 
order or ideal, ‘a static perfection of some kind’ (N 116), and sense of dissatisfaction 
with ordinary language, is clearly evident in both the language cult and in Axton, Owen 
and Frank’s quests to find the cult. According to Wittgenstein, this dissatisfaction leads 
us to ‘try to purify, to sublime, the signs themselves’ (PI 94). For Wittgenstein, this 
longing for logical purity, this deep desire to sublime the logic of our language, 
inevitably leads to the idea that language or logic is somehow limiting, and thus to a 
desire to transcend this limit. It is a desire, however, that his work is intended to help us 
overcome, in part, writes Mulhall, by seeking ‘to establish an orientation in which 
problem-solving and theory-building no longer appear to attract or satisfy us’. 
Furthermore, argues Mulhall, ‘if we can overcome our sense of the sublimity of logic 
then we might cease to picture logic as liminal, and so as demarcating that which is 
within from that which is beyond human experience’.48 Thus, if Axton and the others 
can overcome this sense of the sublimity of logic and the tendency to sublime the logic 
of language then they can, in Bryant’s words, move from ‘despising language as 
timeless, pure, abstract, and thus limited and limiting, to seeing its potential as a 
dynamic medium, irrational, immediate, expressive, although impure’.49 
 
As we have seen, Axton, Frank and Owen are attracted by the sublime elements of the 
language cult’s program, and the ‘problem-solving and theory-building’ that this leads 
to. But it is precisely because these elements fail to satisfy that they are able to return to 
the ordinary; it is the failure of the sublime, the bumps caused by attempting to 
transcend the limits of language that enables Axton, at least, to overcome his sense of 
the sublimity of logic and so renew his approach to language. As discussed in relation to 
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The Body Artist, according to Noggle, our fascination with an ideal of language leads to 
philosophical confusion and to ‘linguistic alienation’. However, by clearly seeing this 
fascination for what it is we can be led back to the ordinary, with a new or fresh insight 
into things. Noggle writes that ‘linguistic alienation’s value lies in its capacity to purge 
us of itself, to bring us back to the language game in which we live and breathe’.50 
Axton, Frank and Owen are all in some way purged of their alienating fascination with 
the language cult, and by extension, with an abstract, idealist conception of language, an 
ideal language of logical purity and rigour. A language that, like the pure maths Charles 
Maitland’s son studies, ‘means nothing, says nothing, refers to nothing, is in fact 
absolutely useless [...]. It doesn’t bear on human experience, human progress, ordinary 
human language’ (N 164).  
 
Owen tells Axton that he believed ‘India would cure [him] of the fascination’ with the 
cult (N 290), thereby acknowledging the extent to which such a fascination is like a 
disease, similar to Lauren’s bewitchment by Mr. Tuttle, and the kind of philosophical 
disease Wittgenstein thinks needs therapy – ‘the philosopher’s treatment of a question’, 
he remarks, ‘is like the treatment of an illness’ (PI 255). By recognizing the nonsense or 
meaninglessness of the language cult’s logic – ‘they intended nothing, they meant 
nothing’ (N 308) – as well as the dangers of an attraction to logical ideals in general, 
Owen, Frank and Axton are cured of their fascination with the cult. The extent to which 
Owen is cured of ‘the impulse to transcendence’,51 however, is left open, for though 
they all recoil ‘from the solipsistic madness of apocalyptic vision’ only Frank and James 
are seen to return ‘to the common, accepting it as a cure’.52 Frank, argues Zubeck, is 
rescued from his ‘dangerous solipsism’ through his return to his lover Del Nearing and 
‘human intimacy’.53 We will examine Axton’s return in the next section.  
 
Owen has no sense of what an ordinary form of community might be; he is only able to 
consider two social possibilities: solitude or the ‘nightmarish force of people in groups, 
the power of religion’ (N 276). Morris argues that Owen lost his ‘sense of community’54 
as a result of his childhood trauma of being unable to partake in the experience of 
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speaking in tongues. Though Owen fears crowds he harbours a fantasy of the ‘fearsome 
driving rapture’ of a collective religious experience, of somehow redeeming this early 
trauma. But he is drawn to this fantasy – this longing ‘to burn away one’s self in the 
sandstone hills. To become part of the wave of chanting men’ (N 296) – because of the 
possibilities of a loss of self and not because he is ready to acknowledge or accept 
others.  
 
Unlike Owen, Axton already has a sense of what community could be, as we can see 
from his relationship with Kathyrn and Tap, and his friends in Athens. In the first part 
of the novel he describes a conversation with Kathryn about ‘family matters, 
commonplaces’. He says, ‘the subject of family makes conversation almost tactile [...]. 
There’s a close-up contact warmth in the names and images. Everydayness’ (N 31). He 
recognises that the ‘ordinary and familiar’ talk they were having about ‘familiar things 
[...] seemed to yield up the mystery that is part of such things, the nameless way in 
which we sometimes feel our connections to the physical world’ (N 32). Though he 
seems to value ordinary language to a certain extent, at this point in the novel he has a 
tendency to view even everyday conversation in formalist terms. When reflecting on the 
conversations he hears on the streets of Athens he thinks, ‘this is a way of speaking that 
takes such pure joy in its own openness and ardour that we begin to feel these people 
are discussing language itself. [...] It is talk as a definition of itself’ (N 52). Axton is 
clearly not immune to the appeals of ordinary language and familial, shared experience, 
though he has tendency to mystify them, and furthermore, for most of the novel he 
remains resistant to them.  
 
 
IV. AXTON’S RETURN 
 
Knowledge is in the end based on acknowledgement (OC p. 49e) 
 
Mulhall argues that to ‘overcome our sense of logic as sublime’ requires attending ‘to 
the logic of language as [it] is manifest in the empirical context within which our life 
with words is lived’.55 At the end of the novel Axton can be seen to return to and engage 
with the lived, empirical context in which words have meaning. His return to the 
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common, to the familiar and ordinary, can be seen in what Zubeck describes as his 
‘emerging respect for prosaic detail and regard for the actual embodied particularity of 
human existence’.56 This is immediately evident when Axton returns from seeing Owen 
in India and realises that he needs to know about Kathryn and Tap’s ‘daily routine’ now 
that they have moved back to Canada. Because they have ‘removed themselves from 
[his] experience of real places’ he has no usable details, he is unable to place them in an 
‘empirical context’. He thus wants to know how they spend their days – ‘what I needed 
was a sense of the present, their living days, the things around them’ (N 312). Axton 
longs for what Zubeck calls ‘the luminescence of the quotidian, the “details” which 
“help” one to “see”’.57 In order to see someone as real, thinks Axton, you need whatever 
you can collect of ‘particular things’, asserting aphoristically: ‘the only safety is in 
details’ (N 311), echoing Wittgenstein’s claim that, ‘in order to see more clearly we 
must focus on the details of what goes on’ (PI 51). 
 
Axton’s return to ‘human experience’ and ‘ordinary human language’ emerges not only 
from his failed encounter with the language cult, but through the reading of his son’s 
manuscript (N 164). Although Tap’s manuscript forms the final section of the novel, 
acting as a kind of coda to the main action, Axton discusses the profound impact the 
reading of the manuscript had on him in the final chapter of the main narrative. Tap’s 
story is a retelling of Owen’s childhood experience of attending a Pentecostal church in 
which the congregation spoke in tongues. What Axton finds most significant about the 
story, however, are Tap’s ‘spirited misspellings’, which he says, made the words ‘new 
again, made me see how they worked, what they really were’ (N 313). These 
misspellings are significant, in part, because they debunk the idea of some logically 
pure idea of language. In the Investigations, Wittgenstein repeatedly emphasises the 
importance of how words work, and how this in itself can enable us to see language 
anew; it is part of what Mulhall calls Wittgenstein’s ‘anti-subliming strategy’.58   
 
This strategy, argues Mulhall, is most evident in ‘Wittgenstein’s counter-concepts of 
family resemblance and grammatical investigation’. These counter-concepts are 
significant in relation to The Names because they eschew the idea of a ‘state of 
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complete exactness’ and subvert ‘the idea of rigour that is embodied in our sense of the 
crystalline purity of logic’.59 In other words, they reveal a way out of the fly-bottle, they 
prevent the understanding from bumping up against the limits of language, and thus 
help overcome a desire for transcendence. They also provide an alternative way of 
thinking about the conception of naming that prevents the kind of fanaticism found in 
both the language cult and in certain philosophical obsessions. The concept of family 
resemblance, writes Mulhall, shows that ‘the concept of a name is held together by a 
number of overlapping resemblances, not by a single pure essence that must be hidden 
behind this multiplicity and dug out from it’.60  
 
These counter concepts can thus be compared to, and illuminate, the significance of 
Tap’s prose, which, argues Osteen, ‘is a counter language that stands against the 
obsessive logocentrism of the cult’,61 while Bryant notes that it ‘celebrates rather than 
denies, its own ambiguity’.62 Tap’s language exemplifies and exaggerates the way in 
which ordinary language in general stands against the dangerous temptations of a 
theorising attitude. Cavell argues that, ‘maybe the very ambiguity of ordinary language 
[...] is just what gives it the power, of illumination, of enriching perception’,63 and it is 
precisely the ambiguity of Tap’s writing that Axton finds so illuminating and enriching. 
The ambiguity of Tap’s misspellings, argues Zubeck, demonstrates the ‘lexical fullness’ 
and ‘prosaic richness’ of language.64 Tap’s writing enables Axton to, in Wittgenstein’s 
words, ‘experience the meaning of a word’ (PI p. 214d). In experiences of meaning, 
explains Mulhall, ‘words can seem to be a manifestation of their meaning, a living 
embodiment of the sentiment they express’.65 Axton refers to the ‘spoken poetry’ of 
Tap’s words, ‘the rough form lost through usage’; insisting that the misrenderings 
‘seemed to contain curious perceptions about the words themselves’ (N 313).  
 
Axton’s reading of Tap’s manuscript, writes Bryant, ‘transform(s) his approach to 
language’66 and this new approach can be seen when at last he visits the Acropolis. 
Although not explicitly stated, it is evident and significant that both his decision to visit 
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the monument and his reassessment of it is in part determined by his experience with 
the language cult and the fact that he has been cured of his fascination with it. The 
failure of his quest to discover the secret of a transcendent, logical ideal, and the 
accompanying revelation of the all-too-human aspects involved in ritualised murder, has 
resulted in a different or new way of seeing things.  
 
Following his failed quest Axton develops a ‘new conception of the Acropolis’,67 a 
correction of his earlier, metaphysical view. His reading of the monument changes 
precisely because his approach to language changes. He ceases to be attracted to 
language as an ideal, and recognises the wonder of everyday language. ‘It is the voice,’ 
argues Bryant, ‘transpiring language in individual utterance, which matters now to Jim 
[Axton], rather than the monumental abstractions that language, unshaken by feeling, 
can construct’.68 Mulhall writes that ‘the conversion Wittgenstein seeks is a turning 
away from the impulse to theorise about meaning as well as from certain families of 
theory about meaning.’69 Such a turning away can be seen in Axton’s new reading, in 
which he acknowledges that he had previously misconceived the Parthenon, ‘I’d 
thought it was a separate thing, the sacred height, intact in its Doric order’. He now 
realises, however, that it ‘was not a thing to study but to feel. It wasn’t aloof, rational, 
timeless, pure. […] But was part of the living city below it’. It is ‘scarred, broken, 
rough’. Totally ‘different from the spotlighted bijou’ he’d theorised about at the 
beginning of the novel (N 330). A description that echoes Wittgenstein’s contrast 
between the ‘slippery ice’ of ‘the crystalline purity of logic’ where ‘conditions are 
ideal’, and the ‘rough ground’ of ordinary language and experience (PI 107). 
 
There is a clear parallel here between Axton’s two ways of understanding the Parthenon 
and the two models of language at work in the novel. His earlier conception of the 
monument – rational, timeless, pure and a separate thing – matches the conception of 
language embodied in the language cult. His new conception, on the other hand, with 
the emphasis on its human aspect, its voice, and being part of and not separate from the 
city, exemplifies ordinary language, language as a tool for exchange, a part of the 
human experience.  
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Axton’s new attitude to language and the Acropolis has important social and political 
consequences. It is significant that his new, radically altered reading of the monument is 
based on the experience of actually seeing it close-up and amongst a throng of visitors. 
The other tourists are, he realises, an integral part of the experience, it ‘is a place to 
enter in crowds, seek company and talk’ (N 331). This experience is part of his dawning 
realisation of the importance of community and ordinary language, of ‘small talk and 
family chat’ (N 312). ‘No one seems to be alone’, he observes, ‘everyone is talking’ (N 
331). Axton’s experience and attitude here marks a stark contrast with the isolation and 
solipsism of Owen’s adventures described in the previous section, as well as with 
Owen’s attitude to crowds.  
 
Axton encounters the crowd as a community, a community of voices or speakers. Far 
from undergoing a loss of self, as Owen fears will happen in a crowd, Axton learns that 
what is significant about a community is precisely the way in which it enables him to 
overcome his disengagement and solipsism, and affirm his sense of self. His visit ends 
with a sudden and significant shift in the narrative voice from first to third person:  
 
I move past the scaffolding and walk down the steps, hearing one language after 
another, rich, harsh, mysterious, strong. This is what we bring to the temple, not 
prayer or chant or slaughtered rams. Our offering is language. (N 331)  
 
For Osteen this shift ‘signals Axton’s new appreciation of the communal’; he now 
‘perceives language as a mode of communion’ and recognises language ‘as a sign of 
community’.70 This understanding of language as what Bryant calls a medium ‘of direct 
interchange between self and other’,71  brings with it certain responsibilities, for, as 
Hammer notes, ‘to say something is to take up a particular position vis-a-vis others, one 
that encompasses obligations’.72 This sense of the obligations and responsibilities that 
come with the social engagement involved in language use, with what possessing or 
inheriting language actually entails, returns us to the issue of consent. Zubeck writes 
that Axton’s ‘awakening [...] brings him back to a sense of answerability for his own 
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irreplaceable place in the world’.73 This answerability is not only for himself, but for his 
community. According to Tanesini:  
 
For Cavell, to consent is to undertake a commitment. It is a matter of accepting 
one’s responsibility for one’s community. This acceptance is realized by 
acknowledging claims that others make upon us. Acts of saying ‘we’ sometimes 
function as an expression of these acknowledgements’.74 
 
Crucially, this act of saying “we”, this answerability and sense of community, provides 
a stronger sense of self than the dangerous illusion of solipsism.  
 
This chapter began with a citation from Richard Eldridge concerning Cavell’s sense of 
the ‘opposed drives’ of acceptance and overcoming inhabiting our relation to the 
ordinary. These drives lead to our life being shaped and unbalanced by the basic 
conflicting tendencies orienting it. He writes: 
 
These tendencies include [...] the pursuit of independent selfhood and the pursuit of 
communion, community, love, and the common. Seeking both, one is left between 
avoidance (of others, of the common, of what is common with others in oneself 
[…]) and acknowledgement (of others, of the common, of what is common with 
others in oneself, as what alone enables thought, recovery, conversation, and 
restoration).
75
  
 
This chapter has shown that these two tendencies are highly evident in Axton’s attitude 
and behaviour, and how the novel traces the tension between these two tendencies as 
well as an overall shift from one to the other. For the majority of the novel Axton 
chooses the path of avoidance, and the pursuit of independent selfhood, but by the end 
he acknowledges what it means to belong to, and accept, one’s community. His 
transformation mirrors the shift that occurs from the Tractatus to the Investigations, and 
so reveals the kind of change of vision that Wittgenstein attempts to bring about in his 
later work. Axton’s visit to the Acropolis can thus be seen as a sign that he has accepted 
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the ‘obligations attached to such a visit’ (N 3) and is ready to pursue ‘communion, 
community, love and the common.’  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
‘Let’s regain our grip on things’: to a certain extent this thesis has been an extended 
meditation on the force and meaning of this phrase. It has explored its rich resonance by 
reading it in relation to Wittgenstein and investigating the way it can illuminate 
DeLillo’s writing. Its richness, significance and resonance derive in part from its 
simplicity and familiarity, its ordinariness and its colloquial tone. But, equally, from its 
depth of suggestiveness: the way it intimates movement, the importance of returning 
and the need for change. It can be read as self-commentary – it refers to the narrative 
itself – but also as a proposal to the reader. The implication is that we have lost our grip: 
we are lost, disconnected from things, unmoored. Like Wittgenstein, with whose ‘back 
to the rough ground!’ the phrase so profoundly echoes, DeLillo is diagnosing a more 
general condition, but also indicating a cure.  
 
Throughout this thesis we have shown the various ways in which DeLillo’s protagonists 
are disconnected from things: lost, exiled, disengaged and disembodied. All the main 
protagonists we have looked at experience some form of either figurative or literal exile: 
Keith and Lianne in Falling Man are ‘falling out of the world’, ‘self-sequestered’ (FM 
232, 212); Lauren in The Body Artist is alone and isolated, cut off from the outside 
world, losing her grip on reality; Underworld’s Nick Shay is disconnected from the 
earth, pretending to be who he is, trapped in his ‘lontananza’; Oswald, Everett and 
Branch in Libra are ‘men in small rooms’, exiled to the fringes of society, desperate to 
break out; and The Names’ Axton, Owen and Frank are exiles from America and from 
everyday life and responsibilities.  
 
The thesis examined the philosophical consequences of these different forms of exile by 
comparing them with Wittgenstein’s sense of philosophical exile, arguing that this exile 
in DeLillo can be read in Wittgensteinian terms: how it determined the characters’ 
perception of things and transformed their attitudes to language, other human beings 
and to the ordinary. It showed that as exiles they are disengaged from the ordinary, 
unable to see it clearly or recognise its value. They long to escape it and think meaning 
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or significance lies hidden within it, or below or outside it. They attempt to overcome 
‘things’ entirely by embarking on a quest: they are led to the temptations of scepticism, 
the lure of paranoia and conspiracy, to building systems, theorizing, and to the desire for 
metaphysical meaning and to transcend human finitude.  
 
But these quests inevitably fail to provide the hoped for results; transcendence was only 
an intimated possibility, a bewitching fascination. However, it is precisely the failure of 
these quests that enable them to return home, to the ordinary world of things. And 
furthermore on this return they are transformed. They return with a renewed sense of 
self and way of seeing things. Suddenly everything looks different. They can see things 
clearly, appreciate the importance and value of things; grip them. They realise how an 
engagement with things can provide them with a firm sense of who they are.  
 
And yet not only can this moment not be sustained, but these things turn out not to 
provide a secure grip after all. Look too closely at things and this looking will create the 
very isolation and estrangement that led them to need to regain a grip on things in the 
first place. For, when seen from a certain perspective, on return from exile, these things 
can seem metaphysical; that is to say, they can seem enchanted or reveal a kind of 
wonder.  
 
Thus, in the way in which it encapsulates the significance and importance of the 
ordinary, the sense of metaphysical loss and exile, of a need to return and the ambiguity 
of this return, as well as the depth, reach and beauty of ordinary language the phrase 
‘let’s regain our grip on things’ brilliantly conveys the tension between metaphysics and 
the ordinary that has been the central focus of this thesis. 
 
The thesis has illustrated and explored significant aesthetic and philosophical features of 
DeLillo’s engagement with metaphysics and the ordinary through an extended 
comparison with the philosophy of Wittgenstein. It has used Wittgenstein’s philosophy 
to ‘throw light’ on particular aspects of DeLillo’s novels, by drawing comparisons, 
developing analogies and teasing out various significant or revealing points of contact 
between their work, which have in turn illuminated significant aspects of Wittgenstein’s 
thought. 
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The thesis has examined the way in which DeLillo’s novels engage philosophically with 
questions of language, perception and meaning – especially spiritual or ethical meaning. 
It has traced a series of thematic, conceptual and aesthetic connections between 
different novels covering a broad span of his career in order to demonstrate DeLillo’s 
primary philosophical concerns. It has investigated significant metaphysical features of 
DeLillo’s novels by examining the way they depict spiritual quests and religious ways 
of seeing; by looking at the recurring themes of exile, loss, and yearning for 
transcendence; and the solipsistic nature and outlook of many of the characters. It has 
demonstrated the significance of DeLillo’s engagement with the ordinary by examining 
the recurring emphasis on looking at and seeing physical objects and things, on the 
importance of the body, of touch, grip and gesture, ordinary language, the everyday, the 
familiar and clarity of vision.  
 
The thesis has investigated the relation between metaphysics and the ordinary in 
DeLillo’s novels, and the various ways in which this relation is ambiguous: how the 
metaphysical elements are tied to or lead to the ordinary and how the ordinary can 
appear metaphysical or lead to the metaphysical. It has examined this tension 
aesthetically, in terms of DeLillo’s use of imagery and language, thematically, in the 
way in which his novels are structured as spiritual quests, and philosophically, in terms 
of the questions raised concerning meaning and perception. Using Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy and developing a Wittgensteinian approach, it has examined the 
philosophical aspects and themes of DeLillo’s novels in relation to similar aspects and 
themes in Wittgenstein’s work. It has done so by focusing on overlapping and 
crisscrossing similarities, by illustrating patterns and resemblances. The thesis has 
highlighted resemblances, not only between different novels, but between the novels 
and Wittgenstein’s writing, which involved exploring the ‘rich resonance’1 between key 
images and phrases in Wittgenstein and DeLillo’s work. The thesis paid particular 
attention to the ways in which both explore and emphasise the sense of movement or 
tension between metaphysics and the ordinary: the movement from Wittgenstein’s 
images of ice and the dazzling ideal to the rough ground of ordinary language, from 
DeLillo’s ‘numinous glow’ to the ‘thick lived tenor of things’.  
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The main aim of this thesis has been to demonstrate a more nuanced understanding and 
appreciation of DeLillo’s engagement with metaphysics and the ordinary, alongside an 
illustration of the literary value of Wittgenstein’s later thought – to show how and why 
Wittgenstein’s work can and should be used in literary textual practice.  
 
By approaching DeLillo in relation to Wittgenstein and by examining the significance 
of his engagement with metaphysics and the ordinary, I have sought to shed light on 
important and largely overlooked aspects of his work, as well as provide an alternative 
mode of reading it. This alternative approach is a means of overcoming the dominance 
of postmodern readings of his work as well as the typical approaches used to argue 
against these readings. It is a challenge to the idea that his novels should be viewed as 
either unequivocally metaphysical or as postmodernist. 
 
The thesis has shown that DeLillo’s novels invite and reward a philosophical reading. 
By illuminating the recurring themes and concerns of his writings in relation to 
Wittgenstein’s thought we have shown the depth and subtlety of DeLillo’s philosophical 
thinking. The novels show a consistent concern with metaphysical themes and ideas but 
that they are related in a variety of significant ways with the ordinary. DeLillo’s 
narratives frequently display, and are structured around, a movement from metaphysics 
to the ordinary; from striving after an ideal and returning back to the rough ground. I 
have shown that DeLillo’s main characters tend to be idealistic solipsists who, due to an 
experience of loss and sense of exile, strive to find metaphysical meaning of some kind. 
Such striving leads to a journey or quest that has a significant spiritual or transcendent 
element, and initially features a rejection or avoidance of, or inability to experience and 
see, the ordinary. A journey, however, that ultimately leads to a renewed appreciation, 
acceptance and vision of the ordinary. Viewing his novels in this way enables us to 
show how DeLillo recognises both the value and danger of metaphysical impulses. I 
have attempted to demonstrate the considerable element of irony and critique in 
DeLillo’s treatment of metaphysical themes and ideas and thus have argued that it is 
misleading to claim that DeLillo’s novels endorse a metaphysical conception of things 
or suggest the existence of a transcendental realm.  
 
The thesis has examined various ways in which DeLillo’s characters experience a 
radical change in the way they see things. In drawing an extended comparison with 
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Wittgenstein I have attempted to provide a sense of what this change might signify in 
DeLillo’s work. In the chapters on Falling Man, The Body Artist and Underworld I 
suggested the change in the way the characters see things could be read in aesthetic 
terms – how they learn to see things anew, to look at, engage with and notice ordinary, 
everyday things. But I also suggested that this way of seeing might be the result of some 
kind of spiritual journey that mirrors a similar journey represented in Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy. I showed that the characters obtain a new understanding and way of seeing 
things more generally, and that there is a significant ethical and spiritual sense to this 
clarity of vision. 
 
One of the things this thesis has recognised is the inconclusiveness of both Wittgenstein 
and DeLillo’s work: the way in which they repeatedly return to the same set of concerns 
and their work is characterised by a series of tensions or conflicts. Wittgenstein’s work 
is necessarily resistant to summary or a final resting point; it does not lead to 
conclusions. Rather, what Wittgenstein provides are the tools and starting points for an 
open-ended, unceasing process of trying to change the way we see. Similarly, DeLillo’s 
novels rarely feature an unambiguous, conclusive ending. Indeed, they frequently loop 
back to their beginning: Falling Man, The Body Artist and The Names all end by 
directly referring back to their opening pages. Underworld ends with a curious and 
unexplained turn to ‘things in the room’ and on the ambiguous single word paragraph: 
‘peace’. Libra, although it follows the trajectory of the historical record, refuses to 
provide a conclusive account of the responsibility of the Kennedy assassination. This 
refusal to provide narrative closure is indicative of the ambiguous nature of DeLillo’s 
novels more generally. Viewing this ambiguity in relation to Wittgenstein’s later 
thought has shown that it has significant philosophical consequences. Like 
Wittgenstein, DeLillo’s novels illustrate that, as Eagleton observes, ‘roughness and 
ambiguity and indeterminancy aren’t imperfections – they’re what make things work’.2  
 
The final chapter of the thesis concluded with the suggestion that Axton accepts and 
acknowledges the importance of community, of being with others. Given that DeLillo’s 
characters are largely cut off from social, communal or political concerns, such a 
conclusion may seem paradoxical. But it is only paradoxical if we assume that by 
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portraying solipsistic characters and metaphysical ideas DeLillo is somehow endorsing 
and outlining a philosophical position, if we assume that DeLillo’s characters and the 
way they see the world directly represent the way he sees the world. But this would 
entail overlooking DeLillo’s evident ironic and critical treatment of his characters, who 
he portrays as lost, exiled and desperate. Again and again he demonstrates the lure and 
the dangers of a solipsistic metaphysical outlook, the way in which it leads to 
scepticism, isolation, loneliness, disembodiment, and a lack of friction and grip.    
 
Similarly, the thesis has shown that Wittgenstein’s critical philosophy consists not of 
what he considered the state of things to be, but in ‘assembling reminders’ (PI 127), 
reminders of ways of resisting the temptations and traps of a metaphysical outlook, 
which is both ‘commonly held’ and ‘very hard to shake, because it is rooted deeply 
within us’.3 I have demonstrated that, like Wittgenstein, DeLillo repeatedly explores 
solipsism, scepticism and metaphysical possibility not because he endorses a solipsistic, 
sceptical or metaphysical account of things, but because he recognises their deep and 
lasting appeal. In short, I have argued that in his novels DeLillo depicts extreme 
examples of what Wittgenstein, in particular as read by Cavell, thinks are our basic 
tendencies: to seek to transcend human finitude, to find transcendental meaning, and to 
strive after ideals; how in Mulhall’s words:  
 
Nothing is more human than the desire to deny the human, to interpret limits as 
limitations, and to repudiate the human condition of conditionedness (finitude) in 
the name of the unconditioned, the transcendent, the superhuman – the inhuman.4  
 
The thesis has shown the way in which DeLillo repeatedly interrogates the appeal of 
metaphysical notions of the self, language and meaning, but also the dangers and dead 
ends that they lead to; how his characters’ metaphysical quests never end in the 
achievement of transcendence or in the realisation of the metaphysical hopes. Rather, 
they result in some form of return, a return to home or the ordinary, in which this home 
is transformed. More specifically, it is the mode in which the ordinary is perceived that 
has been transformed; transformed by the realisation that a sense of self and meaning is 
based on the existence and nature of ordinary things and other people. Thus DeLillo’s 
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novels also illustrate the Cavellian idea that ‘humans are able to transcend their own 
isolation and overcome privacy [through] acceptance and acknowledgement – ways of 
responding that, though epistemically unassured, secure our habitation with things and 
others.’ 5  Though DeLillo’s emphasis is more strongly weighted in terms of our 
habitation with things rather than others, nevertheless in their depiction of the harmful 
consequences of isolation and privacy they ultimately point to the importance of 
community and shared values. 
 
By reading DeLillo with Wittgenstein we have been able to think about the 
philosophical and aesthetic features of DeLillo’s work without recourse to jargon or a 
distorting theoretical framework and without trying to shoehorn his work into a 
preconceived theoretical or philosophical position. At the same time, by viewing 
particular features of Wittgenstein’s thought in relation to literary narratives I have 
highlighted the significant literary elements of his writing. As well as presenting ways 
of understanding DeLillo and Wittgenstein’s work differently, the thesis offers a model 
of how to read literature and philosophy together.  
 
I have shown that the tension between metaphysics and the ordinary is a vital part of 
DeLillo’s aesthetics: it is what gives his work its depth, reach and power, as well as its 
subtlety and humanity. For, in their repeated engagement with metaphysical concerns, 
DeLillo’s novels intimate profound mystery and wonder, but the way in which such 
moments are subverted provides humour, ambiguity and thus prevents his writing from 
slipping into portentous or reactionary mystification. 
 
There are several significant areas in which the concerns examined in this thesis could 
be explored further. To begin with, a more in-depth reading, informed by a 
Wittgensteinian focus on how words work, of DeLillo’s poetics may help develop our 
appreciation of his engagement with metaphysics and the ordinary at a sentence level; 
may help illustrate how his writing itself embodies or displays the tension between 
metaphysics and the ordinary. He writes sublime sentences that at times intimate 
transcendent meaning, but they also emphasise the materiality of words; his writing 
delights in the sight and sound of words, in their pure form as words, but it also subverts 
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such formalism in the frequent use of colloquial and ordinary speech. Such a reading of 
DeLillo’s work would be of value not only because DeLillo’s style is such a vital part of 
his aesthetics and writing in general, but also because the kind of Wittgensteinian 
approach to literature developed in this thesis ultimately points towards a concrete 
engagement with the materiality of texts. 
 
On the opposite spectrum from such a formal approach, it would be illuminating to 
examine the ethical and political consequences of the pairing of DeLillo and 
Wittgenstein. Both are difficult to place politically, indeed both have received 
conflicting political readings of their work. Wittgenstein is read as being either a 
conservative reactionary or a proto-deconstructionist radical with profound affinities 
with Marxist and Feminist thought. Likewise, DeLillo has been read as a reactionary 
romantic concerned with bourgeois or Catholic ideals of the unique (mostly male) self 
or as a radical postmodern critic of the incorporated, commodified contemporary 
experience, of voracious capitalism and the nefarious ways it invades consciousness and 
human exchange. However, there has been little work in either DeLillo or Wittgenstein 
studies on their respective politics and more nuanced, considered enquiry is surely 
called for.  
 
Another possible area of further research would be to explore the significant parallels 
between Wittgenstein and Heidegger in relation to DeLillo’s work. Cowart and 
especially Bonca have illustrated important ways in which Heidegger’s thought can help 
us read DeLillo, and Wittgenstein’s work shares a great deal in common with that of 
Heidegger. Mulhall argues that Wittgenstein’s vision seems ‘intimately, even if 
obscurely, aligned,’ with the central themes of Heidegger’s work – ‘in their mutual 
emphasis upon the centrality of practical activity to human existence and the 
treacherous transparencies of ordinary language and life, and in the atmosphere of 
spiritual fervour which pervades their philosophizing.’ 6  It would be illuminating to 
consider the ways in which this intimate alignment between Wittgenstein and Heidegger 
could further our understanding of DeLillo’s novels.   
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Literary criticism and critical theory seem to be at a strange turning point. Critics have 
been ringing the death knoll of postmodernism and discussing the end of theory for 
some time now. Wittgenstein’s philosophy offers a way out from some of the 
intractable problems associated with postmodern theory. In the current climate of a turn 
against theory and a return to the real Wittgenstein’s profound investigation into the 
ordinary can surely provide valuable insight into contemporary concerns. The 
significant way in which writers as diverse and notable as David Foster Wallace, 
Thomas Bernhard, J.M. Coetzee and W.G. Sebald have engaged with his work surely 
indicates strong possibilities for further readings of Wittgenstein and contemporary 
literature. Furthermore, as writers continue to be engaged with his work, and critics 
increasingly consider the value of his writing for reading literature we can perhaps 
begin to recognise the need for the development of a more fully realised Wittgensteinian 
approach to literature.  
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